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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
There is a current backlog of 3.91million households in Great Britain with housing need 
(s.4.2, p.37) 3.37 million of which are in England. Around half of these are households 
containing concealed households. 
Adding in core and wider homeless people not within private households would add 
0.23 million to this figure (s.4.4, 5.8). Many households (4.65m) are in poverty after 
they have paid their housing costs; at least 0.25m private renters aged under 40 are 
in private renting but cannot afford it on our standard criteria, in addition to the above 
numbers (s.4.2). Thus a broader measure of backlog need including these cases 
would add to 4.75 million across GB.  
We cannot meet all of these needs instantaneously and it will take time to build up a 
really effective housebuilding programme to address these existing needs plus 
expected future needs and demands. 15 years is a reasonable time frame to plan for 
such a programme. 
Over that time horizon, the total level of new housebuilding required is estimated at 
around 340,000 per year for England (380,000 for GB),  We estimate that the level of 
new social housebuilding required in England is approaching 90,000 per year (GB 
100,000), with additional provision of 28,000 shared ownership (or equivalent LCHO) 
and 33,000 for intermediate affordable rent. [GB 32,000 and 36,000]. (s.4.3, s.5.6) 
These estimates are derived from employing three partially distinct methodologies in 
complementary fashion (s.6.2): two based on a traditional demographic framework 
enhanced to reflect affordability, and the other based on a dynamic sub-regional 
housing market model (s.2.1) and consideration of a wide range of key outcome 
measures, relating to affordability, poverty, housing need and homelessness. 
The analysis and the resulting quantitative estimates of housing requirements 
necessarily rest on a range of assumptions (c.6.3). We believe these assumptions are 
reasonable and would be widely subscribed to, although some might differ on some 
aspects, for example the affordability norms or the limits on quotas for affordable or 
social rented housing. 
It is clear that this increase in housebuilding should be skewed towards regions where 
the pressures are greatest, which is currently London and the South, although the 
exact optimal balance between within-London, near-to-London and the ‘Greater South 
East’ is an issue for more careful consideration. At the same time there are significant 
needs relating to poverty and homelessness in much of northern England and care is 
needed to ensure that sufficient housing is available to address these (s.6.4, 6.5, 7.3).  
Following the arguments of Barker (2004) and NHPAU (2009), affordability is seen as 
a key criterion for adapting housing numerical targets away from numbers inherited 
from previous plans or from demographic projections (s.2.2). However, the modelling 
undertaken in this research shows that much greater adjustments are needed to 
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achieve a meaningful levelling of affordability differences than those proposed by 
MHCLG in its 2017 planning guidance (s.5.5, s.6.4). This is part of a more general 
finding, that if the goal is to make a significant and proportional response to need, 
particularly the most acute needs such as core homelessness, quite strongly 
differentiated housing targets are appropriate, at both regional and local scales. (s.6.4) 
Building on previous related research, it is recognised that, to reduce core 
homelessness substantially, additional measures both within housing policy (e.g. full 
application of prevention measures, housing first) and beyond housing policy (limiting 
or possibly reversing some welfare reforms/cuts, particularly in relation to the LHA 
freeze; crime prevention and reduction) are needed (s.4.3, 5.8).  
The analysis explores potential upper limits to overall and social housing supply, 
including outcome indicators around ‘reasonable’ standards of supply relative to need 
and around the dangers of exacerbating ‘low demand’ problems (s.5.6). When taken 
down to local authority level, it is possible to factor in feasibility constraints relating to 
land availability (s.6.3, 6.4). Affordable housing contributions and other resource 
issues are not directly included in the modelling in this study, which is primarily about 
needs and requirements, but supplementary estimates are made building on the 
study’s database (S.8 & Appendix A).  
When applying the target-setting approach to the much more disaggregated local 
authority level, it is argued that local authorities should be seen in their local ‘Housing 
Market Area’ context. The recommended social housing targets are based on an 
averaging of LA and HMA level estimates, and a number of cases where ‘the duty to 
cooperate’ should clearly apply are highlighted (s.6.4, 6.5).  
It is also found that a number of constraints, singly or in combination, serve to limit 
local authority targets in many cases. These constraints include potential land 
availability for development, the general level of demand (affecting viability and the 
speed of take-up of housing allocations or permissions) as well more specific 
indicators of oversupply, and assumed maximum feasible social rented housing 
targets. As a result of the interaction of these factors, in trying to hit the 340,000/90,000 
figures for total and social housing, a considerable amount of local and (sub-)regional 
adjustment of targets is necessary (s.6.5). 
We have examined the particular situation of and targets for Wales and Scotland 
specifically, as well as the broad regional pattern across England (s.5.7). In sum, our 
findings suggest that England requires more ambitious targets across the board, that 
Wales would benefit from more investment in affordable housing and its recently 
enhanced targets are not unreasonable. For Scotland, we have some more nuanced 
findings, suggesting that care should be exercised about the total housing volume 
target in view of issues of low demand and housing surplus in some areas, and that 
the balance of the affordable supply programme should probably be shifted somewhat 
from social renting to intermediate tenures.  
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Meeting the goals of strategies to reduce and potentially end core homelessness are 
challenging, and there is currently not enough social housing to meet requirements 
associated with this in most of England (s.5.5). Under the recommended strategies, 
while also including additional prevention measures and changes in welfare and 
criminal justice policies, this would become feasible by the mid 2020s, although a few 
individual local authorities might still face more challenge (s.6.4). 
The analysis shows up the limitations of conventional household projections as a fixed 
base for determining future housing requirements, highlighting the extent of 
suppressed household formation and the consequent strong feedback from additional 
supply to additional household formation, making household growth a moving target. 
(Ch.1, s.2.2, s.5.9, s.6.3, 6.4) 
It appears that some outcome targets are difficult to shift at all, most obviously the 
tenure target of increasing the share of home ownership, overall or more particularly 
for the younger generation (s.5.9). However, the absolute number of home owners is 
still expected to rise. 
Policy consideration of the study findings also needs to consider the sensitivity of 
results to a wider range of assumptions about future conditions, including national and 
regional economic growth and population changes (s.7.1). It is shown that the strategy 
is robust in the face of a couple of key alternative scenarios, relating to lower growth 
and regional rebalancing (s.7.1, 7.3).  
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
This is the full technical report of a project commissioned at the beginning of 2018 by 
Crisis and the National Housing Federation (NHF) to assess housing supply 
requirements across Great Britain for low-income households and homeless people.  
It is not difficult to argue that such a study is both important and timely in the current 
policy juncture. To the greatest extent in more than a generation, there is a cross-party 
consensus that Britain needs to build a lot more housing and tackle its crises of 
housing affordability, housing availability and homelessness. Policies and resources 
are being deployed to address this challenge, but current plans for housing supply 
appear strangely incomplete, with little clear commitment to the scale, form and nature 
of new housing provision which can be expected to address the needs of lower income 
and homeless households. This research is intended to provide an authoritative and 
evidence-based assessment of those housing supply requirements, set within a clear 
picture of the overall housing market, both current and prospective.  
It should be noted that this project was carried out over a period of less than a year, 
with the first stage (effectively Chapters 1-5) completed in four months. The researcher 
shared the client organisations’ desire to make an early impact on the issue of getting 
social and affordable housing requirements into the broader planning and housing 
supply and public spending agendas during 2018. This meant that considerable 
reliance had to be placed on existing models and frameworks and on a body of prior 
analysis of and familiarity with relevant datasets. Fortunately we actually had a working 
set of models, currently in use and under further development with CRISIS and other 
organisations1, which enabled us to meet the essential requirements of this Brief, while 
allowing particular parameters and assumptions to be varied or tested in consultation 
with the client organisations. At the same time, some aspects of the Brief encouraged 
us to explore somewhat differing, complementary approaches to assessing housing 
requirements, while also refining the inputs to and outputs from the main projections 
model.  
While the research brief rightly highlighted the need to focus on the poorer end of the 
socio-economic spectrum, with a particular attention given to homelessness, to unmet 
housing need backlogs, and to households who clearly could not afford to buy or even 
to rent in the open market, we argued that the overall study should aim to place these 
in a context of overall housing requirements, including intermediate sectors (both 
rental and LCHO forms) and first-time homeownership in the market. Such an 
integrated overall picture is necessary to inform the land use planning system, as well 
                                                          
1 In particular, the study of Homelessness Projections for Crisis reported in Bramley (2017 and forthcoming) 
and the policy simulations undertaken for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation as part of its ‘Solve UK Poverty’ 
initiative reported in  Bramley et al (2016) What Would Make a Difference? Report.  
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as the political/policy system, where issues of access in the middle of the market and 
aspirations for home-ownership play a significant role.  
This research is mainly about quantifying the need for, or most appropriate scale and 
mix of new housing supply in different parts of Great Britain. Inevitably, in developing 
policy to bring about such an appropriate scale and profile of supply, regard must be 
paid to practical feasibility and economic viability. This research is not primarily 
addressed to those questions, but it does make assumptions about what are the most 
plausible (including deliverable) forms of housing at different levels of affordability. It 
does also examine and utilise evidence on aspects of feasibility relating to land use 
constraints and to the viability of developments which are expected to meet a range 
of planning obligations, relating both to infrastructure and to contributions to affordable 
housing.  
Recent analysis, such as that presented through the Homelessness Monitors 
(Fitzpatrick et al 2018), also underlines the critical interactions of homelessness and 
housing needs among the lower income population with welfare system settings and 
reforms, for example the role of the Local Housing Allowance (LHA) freeze. Thus the 
approach to modelling and forecasting/projecting needs/requirements should be 
sensitive to these key factors. In our recent work for CRISIS modelling ‘core 
homelessness’ (Bramley 2017 and forthcoming), we show that significant factors 
affecting homelessness outcomes include not just the levels of overall and social 
housing supply but also welfare cuts/reforms, regional imbalance in economic growth, 
prevention activity, and other social factors like crime rates. Notwithstanding the 
significant focus on homelessness, it should be emphasized that this study is not 
addressing in detail additional special needs, among this and other groups, which may 
require more specialised forms of housing or housing-related support.  
The study methodology is discussed further in the next section. Variant methodologies 
have been used in the past to make quantitative estimates of current and future 
housing needs and requirements, as reviewed for example in Bramley et al (2010). 
The best-known national studies have perhaps been those undertaken by the late Alan 
Holmans and associates in a series of projects for bodies such as Shelter and the 
Town and Country Planning Association. Like most typical local or regional 
assessments, these rely heavily on the Government’s household projections. For 
reasons set out more fully below, we do not regard this as an adequate basis for such 
assessments.  
Overall, the approach that we espouse and do attempt to apply here is one which 
focuses on outcomes  - what are the desirable outcomes we are targeting, in terms of 
housing need situations, affordability/poverty levels (after housing costs) and so forth, 
and (given what we know about behaviour and market interactions) what level and mix 
of housing supply would best achieve those outcomes across the system?  
Chapter 2  
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Methodology 
 
The centrepiece for our approach to this study is an existing Sub-Regional Housing 
Market Model (SRHMM), developed by the author over the last 9 years. Therefore, we 
first provide an outline of this before addressing the specific requirements of this Brief.  
2.1  Sub-Regional Housing Market Model 
The SRHMM was primarily developed and intended to inform planning decisions on 
housing provision in the decentralised planning framework in England. This economic 
model builds on previous work (notably Meen 2011; Leishman et al 2008, ODPM 2005, 
Bramley & Leishman 2005; as reviewed in Bramley 2013) but goes beyond it in terms 
of using a more appropriate geographical framework of sub-regional housing market 
areas, explicit modelling of the supply process as a function of planning, economic 
modelling of demographic change, and linking component models in an integrated 
simulation approach which takes account of spatial interaction between markets. Its 
outputs were initially primarily intended to provide a critical missing element in the 
evidence basis for localised planning decisions and an ability to assess the 
performance of the whole system in promoting supply and affordability. However, in 
recent applications we have used it as a basis for longer-run forward forecasts of a 
range of economic and housing market variables influencing poverty at (sub-)regional 
level in a mutually consistent fashion (Stephens et al 2014) and on testing impacts of 
a wider range of policy options on poverty and housing need outcomes (Bramley et al 
2016). Most recently it has been used to develop conditional forecasts of core and 
wider homelessness across Great Britain over a time horizon of up to 25 years 
(CRISIS 2017, Bramley et al 2019 forthcoming) 
The model was developed out of a feasibility study commissioned by the National 
Housing and Planning Advice Unit (NHPAU), the government agency then charged 
with advising regional planning bodies on housing numbers and affordability (Andrew 
et al 2009, 2010). Although the NHPAU was wound up following the change of 
Government in 2010, it was possible to develop the model further in work for a 
particular group of local authorities (Gloucestershire County and Districts). The current 
model built further on that work, on opportunities to update using information from the 
2011 Census and other sources, and informed by experience of developing a similar 
model for New Zealand. The fullest account of the model in a peer-reviewed 
monograph length article is in Bramley & Watkins (2016), although this refers to v.14 
of the model, whereas the current operative version is v.18w.  
Main characteristics of the model 
The characteristics of this model which make it suitable for the purposes of this study 
can be set out as follows. 
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• It is a long run model, which focuses on annual changes over a period of 20-30 
years. 
• It recognizes the spatial structure of the housing market in England, by being 
constructed at the level of ‘housing market areas’ (HMAs2), while reflecting the 
interactions between spatially-related market areas as effected through 
mechanisms of migration and price spill-overs.  
• It handles the important role of demographic numbers and processes by going 
beyond extrapolative household projections and explicitly modelling migration 
and household formation as processes which respond to housing market and 
economic conditions, while at the same time influencing and modifying them.  
• It recognizes that housing supply has important impacts on the housing market 
in the long run and that this supply is a dynamic economic process, albeit 
constrained significantly by planning and physical limits on land availability.  
• The model generates household income levels and distributions which are 
important for affordability, when taken in conjunction with house prices. It also 
generates labour market indicators (employment and unemployment rates) 
which are useful for the analysis of poverty while being consistent with the 
economic and demographic scenarios.  
• The model represents a national system which is internally consistent, 
respecting key identity relationships (e.g. linking households and dwellings) and 
given national totals for e.g. population.  
The model is implemented in an Excel workbook format, so that the evolution of any 
variable in any area over time can be observed. In total there are 30 worksheets 
containing nearly 150 variables which vary over time (annual from 1997 or 2011 to 
2041) and space (114 Housing Market Areas or HMAs across GB) together with 
additional sheets for ‘cross-sectional’ and ‘time varying’ national indicators, control 
parameters, predictive formulae, results summaries and sensitivity tests. In addition to 
blocks of variables relating to population and household demographics and migration, 
economic and labour market trends, incomes and poverty, housing tenure, prices, 
rents and affordability, planning and new housebuilding, there are blocks of variables 
on specific housing needs (overcrowding, concealed/sharing households etc) and an 
additional set of variables added to measure and model core and wider homelessness 
in 2017.  Many variables in the model are driven by econometric functions calibrated 
on a variety of data sources including large scale and longitudinal household surveys 
as well as LA-level data, often in panel form. Other variables are derived using simpler 
logical functions or, in some cases, trend extrapolation. Further details and insight into 
the model may be gained from Bramley et al 2016, What Would Make a Difference? 
                                                          
2 The HMAs are based for England on interim output from the study by Jones et al (2011), for Scotland on 
Leishman et al (2008), and for Wales on a commonsense geography as used in Bramley et al (2016).  
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Report, Appendix A, which identifies the key economic functions in the model, what 
drives them, and the evidence base upon which these functions are based3.  
In the above Bramley et al (2016) study for JRF, which was intended to inform the 
latter’s Anti-Poverty Strategy, the SRHMM is linked to a large scale micro/household 
dataset (UK Household Longitudinal Study) which enabled us to generate a more 
detailed picture of the situation of different groups within the population at selected 
points in time. However, this linked model is not used in this study. 
2.2  Key Tasks in the Research 
Task 1: Analysis of current housing profile 
The first task within the project was to provide a baseline profile of population, 
households and their current housing, including key tenure and cost/affordability 
characteristics, for the relevant geography. We proposed that this geography should 
be primarily Housing Market Areas (HMAs) nested within broad regions and GB 
countries4. In practice, the first phase of the project focussed mainly on analysis and 
outputs at the broad region and country level, while the second phase went down to 
the local authority level, while still seeing HMAs as key analytical unit in terms of 
modelling housing market responses. 
Although there are112 HMAs across GB, these vary greatly in size, and there is a case 
for breaking some of these down, notably ‘Greater London Plus’, although in many 
cases the HMAs make good sense as ‘City Regions’. It has been possible to create 
an LA-level breakdown of key indicators, and to use this in the development of targets, 
as discussed in Chapter 6 and later in the report. This has value in adding realism to 
the analysis, as housing market conditions and also the constraints and opportunities 
affecting potential housing development also vary sharply at local level.  For future 
forecasts, HMAs are the best analytical unit to use when modelling market 
adjustments, and LA-level breakdowns are generally on a pro rata basis informed by 
the base period estimates. 
The base year for the study is effectively 2015/16, although for some variables values 
would have been projected or forecast forward from an earlier date for which firmer 
data was available (e.g. 2011 Census). Considerable use is made of key large scale 
surveys, particularly ‘Understanding Society’ (UKHLS) and ‘English Housing Survey’ 
(EHS), to describe recent housing profiles and conditions at national and regional 
levels. The most recent wave of UKHLS available for use at the commencement of the 
                                                          
3 Similar detail for the more recent homelessness and related functions will be included in the forthcoming 
Homelessness Projections Technical Report.  
4 The four broad regions of England used are North (i.e. NE, NW, YH), Midlands (EM and WM), South (SW, EE, 
SE) and London. While London is normally based on the GLA area, the SRHMM HMAs use a ‘Greater London –
plus’ HMA which includes some adjacent districts in surrounding Counties. Wales and Scotland are included 
but Northern Ireland is not included in this study. 
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study was wave 7 (2015/16)5, while for EHS we can access the general version of this 
for 2016/176. Local level estimates will be discussed in more detail in a later section, 
but these are necessary to update the HMA level analysis, including potentially values 
contained with the forecasting model. A range of variables can be updated from 
different sources, including ONS population estimates, ‘Annual Population Survey’ 
estimates of employment and unemployment rates and occupational mix, earnings 
data, house prices, market rents (see Appendix B on data sources).  
There could be as case for including within the baseline profile a report of changes 
over the last 5-15 years, as this would help to point up the problem areas in terms of 
adverse trends in certain key indicators, for example tenure by age, affordability, 
specific needs, homelessness. However there was insufficient time, resources and 
space in this report to consider past trends.  
Homelessness, we argue, is best reported using the framework of core and wider 
homelessness devised with CRISIS in the recent projections project (Bramley 2017 
and forthcoming). Income and affordability potential is reported and analysed in the 
base period using micro-household level data in UKHLS referring to 2015/16 and/or 
the preceding five years. Income distribution measures within the SRHMM are 
enhanced using supplementary more detailed distributions estimated using UKHLS 
data and a battery of local proxy measures developed as a by-product of two other 
research projects7. 
Task 2 Analysis of the backlog of unmet need for affordable and accessible 
products 
The ‘backlog’ of need, in local/regional housing needs studies, is usually taken to be 
the sum of those people/households who have some recognised shortfall in their 
housing situation relative to some normative standards, whether measured through 
surveys, waiting lists (suitably filtered) or census and other ‘proxy’ indicators. At 
national level, the numbers reported in the periodic CRISIS Homelessness Monitors 
for ‘Hidden Homeless’, or within the current projections project as ‘Core’ plus ‘Wider’ 
Homeless, would be examples of such backlog measures. We aimed to measure and 
report these numbers under Stage 1 above (see Section 4).  
The intention of the  research Brief, however, extended an additional meaning to 
‘backlog’, namely a subdivision of households (including potential households) into 
those who could afford (various) sub-market housing products, but who currently 
cannot afford market housing (even if they are living in it ‘unaffordably’). Such a 
                                                          
5 Wave 8 is now available at the time of concluding this report. 
6 We often, however, pool together several years of data from these surveys to increase the number of 
observations in the analysis. It should also be noted that MHCLG no longer publish geographical breakdowns of 
EHS below the level of three very broad regions, one of which combines London with the South.  
7 ‘Local Level Household Income Model’ developed for Scottish Government, but tested on UKHLS data for 
England; and ‘Index of Affordability’ developed for MHCLG as part of the Indices of Deprivation 2015 and 2019 
projects.  
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breakdown would combine information on income and household composition with 
assumed possible generic affordable housing models and what they would cost in 
particular HMAs, given market values. This group would overlap with the backlog of 
households with needs as conventionally measured.  
The affordability bands and thresholds used in this exercise are discussed in more 
detail in the Section 3. below. The housing need problem indicators in the main 
projections/simulation model are based on those developed in the DCLG study 
Estimating Housing Need  (Bramley et al 2010), based mainly upon the Survey of 
English Housing (S.E.H., now incorporated in EHS). These were modified somewhat 
in a subsequent study (Bramley 2016) when the approach was extended to the UKHLS 
and its predecessor panel survey (BHPS). Not all of the original set (for example 
aspects of dwelling unsuitability) could be replicated closely in UKHLS. At the same 
time, the set of indicators used from UKHLS went somewhat further including aspects 
of physical house condition and a better definition of concealed households (as used 
in the Homelessness Monitor).  
While these indicators based on sample surveys can provide estimates at national and 
regional level, and with a pooling of samples over a run of years also at the level of 
larger sub-regional HMAs, for individual Local Authorities and smaller HMAs these 
need to be supplemented by local information. 2011 Census data on occupancy, 
household composition, dwelling types etc. were used to make such estimates as well 
as to update earlier S.E.H.-based estimates.  
On the affordability side, local estimates of household income distributions for younger 
households are generated using a synthetic model, whereby information about income 
patterns among households in a large scale household survey (UKHLS) and their 
relationships with other socio-demographic characteristics, are used to generate 
predicted income patterns for smaller areas (including local authorities) using census 
and other data about local populations. This builds on ongoing research into local 
income distributions in Scotland (undertaken in partnership with David Simmonds 
Consultancy for the Scottish Government), earlier work for Scottish Government and 
the Improvement Service (Bramley & Watkins 2013), and work for the DCLG on 
developing an indicator of housing affordability for England in the 2015 Indices of 
Deprivation. The synthetic income distributions are combined with actual house price 
and market rent information published by ONS, HM Land Registry and the Valuation 
Office Agency (VOA) at local authority level.  
It should be noted that we do not use Housing Waiting List or Register information as 
measures of need in this study, for reasons which were set out in the Estimating 
Housing Needs study (Bramley et al 2010). It is recognised that such lists /registers 
can, in the context of local studies where the basis of local eligibility/priority policies 
and administration (including review) is known, and these factors have not changed 
over the time period of study, provide valuable local evidence of needs of different 
types. However, significant inconsistency over time and space in these key factors, as 
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well as in the prospects of being housed through a waiting list, render such data highly 
questionable as a basis for measuring backlog need comparatively over space or time.  
One further problem with this profiling of backlog needs concerns ‘potential 
households’ – while we can identify the pool of these (as in the periodic Homelessness 
Monitors), it can be difficult to estimate the rate at which they would emerge to become 
actual households and the type of households which they would form (some would 
partner up, some would have a child(ren), some would choose to share). Possible 
responses to that are to use the profile of those who have recently formed, or the 
profile of younger age households who have already formed. We combine both of 
these two approaches using UKHLS data. 
A further interpretation of this concept might attempt to estimate retrospectively the 
‘missed opportunity’ to provide such affordable housing over the preceding period e.g. 
5-15 years – our model could potentially do this for the last 5 years, but not really for 
further back than that. There are a number of complications to any such exercise, 
including the fact that model-based estimates in this time period comprise a mixture 
of actual and model-predicted values. Therefore we do not pursue this as a priority.  
It is important to underline that one cannot make a simple read-across from the number 
of households ‘in need’ or in ‘unaffordable’ or otherwise ‘unsuitable’ housing at a point 
in time to the number of new housing units of different kinds which need to be supplied. 
While there is no standard way of doing this in established housing needs and 
requirements study methodologies, there is a general recognition that part of the 
solution to these identified housing problems is a reallocation of existing households 
and dwellings, so that more households end up in suitable and affordable housing. We 
illustrate at the end of Section 4 what such a reallocation would need to look like, in 
broad terms, and what sort of implications and challenges this might pose in terms of 
changes in housing supply and, potentially, other policy interventions. Such a 
reallocation may indeed be very challenging, even with a relatively generous infusion 
of new supply, as there are limited policy instruments available to, for example, 
encourage under-occupying home owners to downsize or Buy –to-Let landlords to 
pass their stock to social landlords.  
While such a notional reallocation analysis is of value, both in identifying the scale of 
the challenge and indicating the direction of required change in the configuration of 
supply, we would not regard it as the sole of main basis for determining future supply 
requirements. Our preferred approach as already indicated relies upon utilising a 
conditional  forecasting model (the SRHMM) to generate hopefully realistic scenarios 
of future development and to track the results in terms of key outcomes (which will 
include predicted levels of backlog needs and affordability related problems). These 
forecasts will take account of both direct and indirect effects of supply on needs and 
affordability, including certain behavioural feedback effects. The most obvious 
example here is that additional housing supply can contribute both directly to tackling 
need and affordability problems, by providing additional affordable housing for people 
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to move into, as well as indirectly by progressively reducing levels of prices and rents 
in the market. While this illustrates a form of virtuous circle, whereby direct positive 
impacts are enhanced, other aspects of the behavioural responses to housing supply 
may be more mixed in their effects. A key example here is that enhanced housing 
supply, both directly and through lowered prices/rents, will lead to additional household 
formation; some of those additional households would not have been counted as being 
‘in need’ before the change, and some of them might remain in a situation of 
poverty/unaffordability after the change.  
Task 3: Analysis of Future Housing Requirements 
While it is conventional to start assessments of future housing requirements with the 
government’s official household projections, we do not believe that this is the most 
appropriate approach. It is well established that household formation is influenced by 
economic factors (incomes, employment, poverty) and housing market conditions 
(prices/rents, availability e.g. of social housing) as well as by the basic number and 
age structure of the population (Bramley & Watkins 2016). There is even more 
overwhelming evidence that the direction and volume of internal migration is strongly 
influenced by where housing is available and its cost. It follows that to start from a 
trend-based household projection in determining need is to engage in a circular 
process and to risk getting into a cycle of chronic undersupply in some regions, while 
also being in danger of getting out of phase with the economic cycle and making quite 
questionable inferences about the appropriate division of supply between adjacent 
areas (Bramley 2016b)8.  
This is not to say that there is not particular information of value within the projections 
– for example, we use the projected trends in household type composition in our 
baseline future scenario, while allowing these to change in response to changes in 
headship. We are also willing to provide a forecast ‘consistent’ with the official 
projection to show its implications (see below).  
In our recommended approach, we start from assumptions about the future general 
level of economic growth and an associated assumption about population (including 
international migration) – in practice the central assumption here would be close to the 
ONS central population projection at national level. We then plug into the Sub-
Regional Housing Market Model (SRHMM – as described above) a level of supply 
based on current plans and past behaviour of the supply system, and see what 
happens, in terms of actual household growth in different areas and a whole other 
range of outcomes, including house prices/affordability and different kinds of housing 
need (including homelessness). We then ask the question: – how far different are 
these outcomes from what we would regard as a desirable trend and pattern, and what 
                                                          
8 A particularly extreme case of household projections providing perverse signals in the context of assessing 
housing requirements has arisen following the publication of new projections in autumn 2018 by the Office for 
National Statistics – see discussion in the blog https://www.i-sphere.hw.ac.uk/household-projections-and-
housing-need-death-spiral-or-death-knell/   
22 
 
changes do we need to make in supply to get close enough to the desirable pattern? 
This is what we mean by an outcome-based approach.  
Within this general approach, we can certainly treat the level of household growth (or 
features within it such as ‘headship rates’) as an outcome of interest, and indeed we 
can (as mentioned above) see what level of housing supply, in combination with other 
settings, would produce approximately the same level of household growth as is 
suggested in the official household projections. That is one interpretation of ‘housing 
requirements’ – how much housing would be required to make this level of household 
growth happen.  
But we would argue that a more appropriate basis for ‘housing requirements’ is to find 
what level and mix of housing supply is going to generate the pattern of outcomes 
which we would regard as desirable. That is likely to involve tangible reductions in key 
indicators of need including homelessness, greater reductions in areas where initial 
needs or baseline forecast needs are greater, and so forth. We can also explore what 
combination of current indicators gives a good prediction of what those relative needs 
for investment are in different areas.  
In practice, public spending resources are unlikely to be generous enough to build 
enough housing to eliminate all adverse housing need outcomes for all households in 
all areas. There will be some areas, however, where model indicators will suggest that 
diminishing returns are setting in and that there may be a build-up of vacancies and 
possible problems of low demand. It is also desirable to subject proposed supply 
scenarios to sensitivity testing with respect to other assumptions, particularly around 
the economy, international migration, key financial indicators, regional balance and so 
forth. This may suggest further risks to high supply levels in some areas, but also 
conversely risks of outcomes not improving as much as desired in other cases.  
While in general we favour reporting a range of housing need and other adverse 
outcome indicators, we have found that particular combined indicators can give a very 
good signal of how the system is performing, and in a readily comprehensible way. In 
particular, the indicator measuring the forecast probability of a household ‘in need’ 
(one or more of a list of problems) being rehoused in the social rented sector within a 
year is particularly useful in this respect. Similarly, the level of core homelessness as 
identified in the recent CRISIS study is another good summary indicator.  
Task 4. Breakdown of current and future housing requirements by tenure 
It can be seen that this is possibly the crux of the project, the particular output which 
is of strongest interest to the policy community.  There is close to a consensus that we 
need to build more housing in total; it is less clear how to do that; and there is quite a 
wide range of views on what mix of tenures and price/rent levels of housing should be 
provided. 
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Our modelling can provide estimates based on normative affordability standards, 
typically based on various ratios or multipliers, and this was a fairly standard approach 
in typical housing assessments (SHMAs) in the 2000s. There has generally been a 
lack of firm commitment to a normative affordability standard in UK, although for a time 
25% of gross income appeared to be a norm (CLG 2007), and there is a good case 
for this in terms of evidence of adverse effects of excessive ratios (Bramley 2012). 
People may actually choose to spend more than this (although with mortgaged home 
ownership, prudential lending rules may enforce upper limits), or not to spend that 
much: that is the basis of effective demand. In practice at present a general concern 
is that many younger households in private renting are paying more than this 
conventional norm.  
This affordability standards issue is discussed further in Chapter 3 where we propose 
some refinements to these earlier benchmarks. 
Our model is set up to readily estimate proportions of (younger) households able to 
afford to buy in the market, to buy a typical LCHO product, to rent at market rates, or 
to rent at ‘affordable rents’ set at some specific discount below that. With LCHO, it is 
important to recognise that, although there may be a nominal 25-30% discount on 
market cost, this is eroded by the difference between second-hand entry level prices 
and new build values, not to mention less competitive rental/service charges or 
mortgage deals. With the emergence of the issue of the ‘LHA gap’ (between actual 
rents and the Local Housing Allowance frozen at close to the 2011 30th percentile) it 
appears that there is a requirement to model a form of ‘private renting’ at LHA levels. 
We also have social rents set at the post-2015 Budget levels, as well as the concept 
of a Living Rent as promoted by the JRF. There is also scope to model the process of 
saving for a deposit while living in the PRS, where the issue is about waiting time - the 
deposit constraint is likely to be more binding than the income constraint for many 
young households. There is some ability to estimate the likelihood of receiving a lump 
of capital from the ‘bank of mum and dad’ or other relatives, based on EHS data (earlier 
estimates of this proportion remain in the model). 
The capacity is there to model quite a lot of options, but often these overlap and apply 
to the same people, so the effective demand may fall short of potential supply within 
the planned mix. We urged the clients for this research not to make it too complicated, 
and in line with that we refer mainly to a small number of generic products which cover 
the range. In Chapter 3 we set out some options, and then propose in the initial stages 
an approach which distinguishes four broad bands of affordability – able to buy, able 
to market rent or buy with shared ownership, able to afford ‘intermediate rent’, and 
households for whom social housing is the most appropriate affordability option. In a 
subsequent stage we could exemplify how much different it would be to adopt 
somewhat differing benchmarks.  
A related issue, which seems to us to be rather important and sometimes neglected, 
is the issue of size requirements, although this was exposed to some scrutiny in the 
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furore about the ‘Bedroom Tax’. Traditional social sector bedroom standards have not 
typically applied in the home-ownership sector and this has often extended to LCHO, 
where typically buyers can have an extra bedroom and would typically want to do so 
(e.g. in the case of couples). At the other end of the scale is the ‘shared 
accommodation rate’ of LHA support for younger single applicants for HB/UC, and 
associated controversies about whether it should apply up to age 35, to social tenants, 
or to cases with special and complex needs.  
In tracing the impacts of mixed affordable provision it is important to reflect the reality 
that ‘intermediate’ options tend to house a sector of households who are not all ‘in 
need’, or not at the same level of priority as would apply to typical new social tenants. 
The model allows for this.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Affordability Criteria, Thresholds and Supply Options 
 
3.1  Introduction 
The first stage of the research involved reflection on past work and experience and 
discussions with the client organisations, to help fix the main assumptions to be used 
in the modelling and estimation of housing requirements for different types of housing 
provision in this research.  
There are two main issues involved here 
1) The definition of a reasonable norm or standard for ‘affordability’ 
2) The definition, description and properties of the main housing supply options to 
be modelled.  
Under these general headings, a number of sub-issues arise, which will be referred to 
below, which in some cases link the two broader issues. For example, there are issues 
about size requirements and household types, about quality standards, or about 
whether people can/should pay more (or less) for home ownership than for renting, 
and of course issues about how far we can expect to rely on the benefit system to 
‘take the strain’ for the poorest households.  
There has been a fair amount of literature (academic or policy-oriented) about housing 
affordability since the late 1980s, some of which the present author has contributed 
to. Our starting position reflects an understanding of that literature and a particular 
contribution in the Journal of Housing and the Built Environment (Bramley 2012).  
While we seek to check and refine some aspects of this using the latest available data 
or arguments from a range of sources, there is a presumption against deviating too 
much from previous assumptions, where one can at least call on precedent.  
3.2  The Affordability Norm or Standard 
Affordability is best defined as a level of housing outgoings (for rent or mortgage, etc.) 
which a household can (and will) meet from its recurrent income without significant 
risk of material hardship or financial stress, including the risk of being pushed into 
poverty.  
Within the background literature alluded to, there has been general recognition that 
there are two general approaches to defining this. One is focused on the ratio of 
rent/costs to income, while the other is focused on the ‘residual income’ left after 
meeting housing costs and it’s the relationship  with some minimum standard 
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household budget for non-housing expenses, which may be seen as an explicit 
poverty standard.  
While there is a tendency, particularly among more academic and social policy-
oriented people to favour the second approach over the first, my own conclusion in the 
2012 paper was that the simple traditional ratio approach still had considerable merit 
and performed well in predicting adverse outcomes. It also tends to be more familiar 
for practitioners and operationally straightforward, while also capturing something of 
the behavioural aspect (what a household will choose to spend). Based on that study, 
the author would recommend using a combination of the two criteria, if feasible, but if 
not to go for the simple ratio approach.  
A second conclusion from reviewing the literature was that there was no universal 
agreement on the ‘right ratio’ or the right residual income standard, but quite a wide 
range used across the international spectrum. However, it can be argued that, in the 
British context, both from the evidence in the 2012 paper referred to above as well as 
from various significant ‘precedents’, that there is a good case for using a ratio norm 
of around 25% of gross income (referring to rent, not including all housing related utility 
costs as well). These precedents include the 2007 SHMA Guidance, the affordability 
index commissioned by DCLG and used in the 2015 IMD for England, and an 
interpretation of typical mortgage lending practice (see below).  
Some may prefer to express this ratio relative to net income (after tax and NI 
deductions). The difference varies according to household type and income level, but 
typically a 25% ratio to gross income would correspond to around 32% of net income. 
However, a case can be made for a slightly higher ratio, namely 27.5% of gross income 
corresponding to roughly 33-35% of net income. One significant basis for this is 
consistency with the proposed ‘Living Rent’ for social housing, which is discussed 
further below. Such rents are intended to be affordable by a typical working household 
with one full-time worker without recourse to Housing Benefit (or in future, Universal 
Credit). It can also be argued that this was the implicit standard applied in Housing 
Association Grant finance in the 1990s and 2000s. A further very important reason is 
that this is more consistent with contemporary mortgage lending practice having 
regard to the regulatory requirements of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).  
Poverty-related aspect 
With regard to the second (residual income) criterion, in previous work we tended to 
use 120% of the HB Applicable Amount (i.e. the scale rate for non-housing 
requirements given household composition implicit in the UK social security system) 
in affordability modelling studies carried out through the 1990s and 2000s. The 
rationale for 120% was a long-established view in the social policy world that people 
who would rely on benefits longer term (e.g. pensioners, disabled people) would need 
more income than those requiring benefits short-term to cover interruptions in normal 
income (e.g. unemployed/job-seekers), although 120% was relatively conservative for 
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that differential. Clearly, in housing affordability we are concerned about the longer-
term sustainable situation.  
The rationale for using social security rates was fairly clear when we had a 
comprehensive benefit system that was, in some degree, evidence-based and indexed 
to general earning levels. This rationale is much more questionable now, after a 
prolonged period of indexation at a lower rate than earnings or incomes in general, 
culminating in a nominal freeze over recent years, with significant cutbacks affecting 
certain groups (e.g. families with more than 2 children) and other groups or individuals 
effectively excluded. Through our recent research on Destitution in the UK, (Fitzpatrick 
et al 2015, 2016) it has become clear that some of the benefit scale rates, particularly 
for single people of working age, are unacceptably low, and certainly not a basis for 
sustainably living out of poverty, deprivation and financial stress over an extended 
period. At the same time, rates for other groups, notably pensioners, are relatively 
generous.  
Therefore, we argue the time has come for divorcing any secondary residual income 
standard from UK benefit rates, and relating it more to mainstream poverty standards. 
There were several options considered here:  
• either the relative low income standard based on ‘60% of median equivalised 
income’, as used in the official reports on  Households Below Average Income 
(HBAI); 
• or the Minimum Income Standard (MIS), as promoted by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation; 
• or a standard related to poverty defined by material deprivations (MD’s) , as 
exemplified by the UK Poverty and Social Exclusion Survey (Gordon 2018, 
Mack 2018).   
It was decided to use the first of these, on the grounds that this is straightforward to 
implement, familiar across the policy and research world, and the basis of poverty 
targets formerly adopted in England and recently re-adopted in Scotland. The MIS is 
seen as a somewhat more generous standard, and there is no consensus on a 
particular percentage of MIS which might be acceptable as a ‘poverty’ standard’.  
We do explore the third possibility, essentially based on a ‘combined’ poverty measure 
taking account of both low equivalent income and having three of more material 
deprivations based on data in the Understanding Society (UKHLS) Survey. There 
would be problems trying to implement this using the Government’s Family Resources 
Survey (FRS), because the MDs are not designed for use for non-family households 
of working age, while being different for the retirement age group. It is also necessary 
in this approach to translate the standard back into an income threshold for each 
household composition group.  We do experiment with a residual income poverty 
threshold based on this, as an alternative basis for profiling the situation in the stratum 
of society who can only afford the social rented sector. 
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Levels of affordability 
Another conclusion of the literature on affordability was that the term was used across 
a wide range of contexts with somewhat differing connotations. In particular, a range 
of authors recognised the distinctions between affordability as ‘access’ to owner 
occupation, affordability as a general issue of the burden of housing payments, and 
affordability as a direct trigger of ‘housing induced poverty’. These problems tend to 
affect different groups in society and to have different political salience in given 
situations. The problem of ‘generation rent’, namely twenty- or thirty-something 
working households, perhaps contemplating family formation, who cannot afford to 
buy a home, is somewhat different from the unemployed or disabled household  
hoping for access to social housing.  
Lending criteria and access to owner occupation 
The issue of access to owner occupation is useful, not just because of its political 
salience, but also because it provides strong a precedent and anchor point for an 
affordability norm. Historically, mortgage lenders were prudent (because they 
borrowed short to lend long) and adopted norms to assess lending risks, (a) on the 
capital side (loan-to-value ratios, LTVR’s) and (b) on the income side, which is 
essentially about affordability. Time honoured ‘lending multipliers’ (typically around 3-
4) limited the multiple of annual income which you could borrow.  In the halcyon days 
of the early-mid 2000s, with interest rates stable but generally falling, and vast waves 
of money washing through the system from China, prudential lending standards 
dropped, and in UK this was particularly around the assessment of income-based 
affordability (self-certified ‘liar loans’, interest only loans, etc.). Following the financial 
crisis, the FSA (now FCA) were obliged to tighten up standards, which are reflected in 
the regulatory codes, which has led to the situation where first time buyers must be 
assessed on the basis that they have a repayment mortgage and that they could 
withstand an increase in interest rates of 2% points.  
So, essentially, mortgage lending norms provide quite a strong basis for bolstering a 
particular position on affordability norms. It appears that under current conditions this 
typically involves lending multipliers of around 4, which with likely future interest rates 
probably means gross ratios of payment to income of around 27.5%. Some lenders 
may go further in checking other commitments (which may increasingly include 
student loan repayments as well as other credit commitments) in a household budget 
assessment, and all also tend to use credit scoring checks as well.   
Some may argue that people buying a home can pay more, because they are investing 
in an asset (it is form of contractual or forced saving), as well as because they are 
typically better-off than renters. But, counter to that, it should be pointed out that home-
purchasers are also liable for repairs and insurance, over and above the mortgage. It 
should also be remembered, in this context, that ‘affordability’ is about whether you 
can meet the regular cash outgoing without getting into difficulty, not about fairness, 
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value for money or notional long term equivalence of costs (the economist’s concept 
of ‘user cost of capital’ is about that, but that is not relevant here).   
Deposit constraint 
The other big issue with access to owner occupation concerns access to deposits. 
Again, in the halcyon days when 95% and even 100% mortgages were available, the 
deposit constraint on house purchase was not the dominant issue, compared with 
income. During the financial crisis from 2008 through to about 2012, deposits were the 
dominant issue. Lenders were very reluctant to lend on high LTVs, 80% was common, 
with some limited availability up to 90%. Since then things have moved back towards 
traditional normal, but not all the way to the halcyon days. Typical actual lending is at 
up to 90% LTV, and this gets reasonable mortgage deals. A more limited amount of 
lending is at 95%, with less good mortgage deals. So, access to deposits remains an 
issue, although less totally dominant than during the crisis.  
 There are two issues here 
a) How do we analyse the situation of typical households who do not have access 
to large lumps of family wealth 
b) How do we estimate the potential proportion of new household cohorts who do 
have access to large lumps of family wealth 
In relation to a), one option is to analyse the limiting case of 95% mortgage, checking 
the likely interest rate that this would involve, and ignore the deposit, assuming people 
can scrape this together. Another option is to assume the more typical case of 90% 
mortgage but make additional assumptions and calculations regarding the assembly 
of the deposit. We might look at the actual savings of the typical new buyer cohort, 
and make additional allowance for some assumed rate of saving, which would imply 
some deferral of actual date of purchase until deposit is assembled. This could be 
modelled to take into account the typical rent payable for those who will be in the PRS 
while saving, which would probably be most of them (some will still be ‘concealed 
households’). While we have not been able to locate suitable data on saving 
behaviour, we suggest an approach based on income after housing costs in excess of 
MIS being available for saving, and a five year cut-off (i.e. people who would need to 
save for more than five years to get a deposit would be treated as ‘unable to buy’) 
In relation to b), it is desirable to make a separate adjustment for the proportion of 
potential FTBs who can jump over the deposit constraint, and ease the income 
constraint, by getting a lump of capital, typically from family sources. We have made 
estimates of this in the past from data in EHS and FRS. It has been possible to update 
the former estimates, and in addition we can look at the proportion of new buyers in 
the longitudinal UKHLS who appear not to have enough income to afford to buy.  
Further indicators have been derived from the Wealth and Assets Survey, focussed 
on ‘net financial wealth’ (financial savings and investments, less debt). These are used 
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to provide an additional estimate of the proportions able to overcome deposit and/or 
income constraint, and also their demographic and geographic profile.  
Another sub-issue relating to deposits concerns LCHO. Some LCHO schemes in the 
past enabled buyers to overcome or bypass, to some extent, the deposit constraint. 
Before the crisis, when we were looking at LCHO options, shared equity schemes 
looked good because they could be treated as low LTV, given that lender had first 
charge. However, we suspect that this advantage may have been effectively 
weakened since then. Nevertheless, given the relatively low ‘threshold’ equity share 
purchased in shared ownership schemes, it is assumed that the ‘saving a deposit’ 
effect is not a significant issue.  
Deposit constraints also exist at the bottom end of the rental market as well, as PRS 
landlords typically require a deposit of at least a month’s rent. Some homeless 
prevention activity involves LAs helping households with deposits.  
Size matters 
Most of the affordability estimation and modelling which we have done in the past has 
involved distinguishing different sizes/types of households, recognising that they will 
require different sizes (and possibly types) of housing, the prices/rents of which will 
vary significantly. There is a minimum ‘standard’ for size of dwelling in the UK housing 
world, which is the so-called bedroom standard. The problem is that, as became clear 
in the backwash from the so-called ‘bedroom tax’, there are many households in the 
social rented sector who could come up with reasons for having a spare bedroom 
(health/disability related, or child contact related, for example), while at the same time 
there is basic shortage of small units in the sector which will take time to correct.  
Meanwhile, further up the scale, once you are talking about intermediate tenures and 
particularly LCHO or market purchase, the bedroom standard does not rule. People 
are generally allowed to have a spare bedroom in these schemes and most people 
would choose to buy with such a spare, and perhaps would be ill-advised not to (in 
terms of both family change and resale prospects). In this author’s 1990s-2000s 
affordability-based models, as used by Barker review for example, it was always 
assumed, for example, that half of couple households would require a spare bedroom.  
A further size issue is of course the shared room rent for single adults aged up to 35 
in the LHA /PRS, which was threatened to be applied also to SRS. It is questionable 
whether such a standard should be applied universally or would be acceptable for all 
such younger single person households. Within the social sector, including for former 
single homeless people, there would be many cases where health, disability or 
complex needs would make sharing inappropriate. Even in the mainstream rental 
market, there will be plenty of single people who would find it difficult or impossible to 
find a suitable group to share with and would choose to remain in housing need (as 
concealed households, or paying an unaffordable rent for self-contained 
accommodation) rather than be forced into sharing.  
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In a recent exercise for Government, the ID 2015 affordability index, it was expected 
to be calculated all on the basis of the bedroom standard, including the shared room 
rent in the case of private renting. In combination with focusing on households aged 
under-40, defined as ‘first benefit units’ (i.e. excluding other adults living with main 
household), this meant that the size profile was very skewed to the small dwelling size 
categories, so making the affordability profile look better than it really was.  
Another issue concerns type of housing. It has long been argued in UK that high rise 
flats are not a suitable housing type for families with young children. In an SHMA 
conducted in England in the 2000s, we assumed that family households needed to be 
able to afford a house, not just a flat. It would be a slight complication to introduce this 
formally into the analysis, but in practice the threshold house prices for larger units are 
based on houses rather than flats.  
To sum up this section, it is argued that it would not be appropriate to apply the 
bedroom standard across the board, but rather to differentiate the situation in different 
tenures, and allow for different proportions of different groups requiring 
accommodation larger than strictly implied by the bedroom standard.  
Relevance of HB/LHA/UC 
The notion of ‘affordable housing’ and questions about the need or requirement for it 
always runs up against the question of how this relates to the system of individual, 
means-tested assistance with housing costs, namely Housing Benefit, or as it is now 
increasingly know, Local Housing Allowance and/or Universal Credit. At the most 
general level, this raises the fundamental and long-standing question in housing 
finance, of the right balance between person-based subsidies or ‘bricks and mortar’ 
subsidies. We do not rehearse this in detail here, and it is for the clients of this research 
to consider how they would want to make these arguments. Any such discussion 
would be likely to include reference to issues of work incentives, patterns of poverty 
over time, administrative costs, take-up, overall cost (short and long term), 
neighbourhood social mix and housing management.  
It was always difficult to argue for ‘affordable housing need’ alongside the existence 
of this system. HB was the system for dealing with housing affordability, and if 
someone was not on HB they couldn’t have had such a problem, could they? However, 
in a more immediate and practical sense, we argued above that the welfare benefit 
system, including HB/LHA/UC, is increasingly deficient in meeting objectives of 
preventing poverty (and destitution) and decreasingly suitable as a basis for defining 
a poverty-related standard of affordability. Even before recent welfare cuts and 
reforms, there was a concern about how suitable HB was for certain groups, 
particularly for actual or potential working households, because of the work incentives 
(marginal tax rate) issue and also because of the system’s sluggish response to 
changes in circumstances (evidenced by the worse payment problems associated with 
partial HB cases). For these reasons one had a lot of sympathy for Steve Wilcox’s 
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argument in his 1999 paper The Vexed Question of Affordability that the best 
pragmatic basis for setting affordable rent levels would be a level that would be low 
enough to mean that typical households with one person working full time on the 
minimum wage should be clear of HB eligibility. 
Such an approach suggests that the role of HB/LHA/UC is to meet the housing  costs 
of people who are out of work short term, or unable to work longer term, or only able 
to work part time, or with additional needs, or facing exceptionally high rent costs; but 
not to meet the housing costs of ordinary working households. While the target for 
‘affordable housing’ is that those ordinary working households on low-to-moderate pay 
could afford to pay for it.  
This line of argument is perhaps most relevant to the issue of social sector rent setting, 
discussed later. It may in fact be very close to the argument for a so-called ‘Living 
Rent’.  
Summing Up on Affordability 
• The central, primary criterion of affordability should be a ratio of housing cost 
to gross income of 27.5% or less 
• A secondary criterion is that residual income after tax and housing cost should 
exceed a threshold, probably related to standard UK relative low income 
poverty definition (60% of median net equivalised income AHC)  
• For house purchase the primary criterion may be expressed as a lending 
multiplier, probably 4 times gross income (single earner), which can be shown 
to be compatible with the 27.5% standard on prudent assumptions about 
repayment and interest rates 
• On recent evidence it appears that lending above 90% LTV is rare; therefore it 
will be necessary to make additional assumptions about access to or saving for 
deposit9 
• Allowance should be made for a proportion of First Time Buyers (FTBs) having 
access to significant sums of family wealth to meet deposits exceeding 10%  
• Affordability of different tenures should be assessed for different household 
composition/size categories, assuming that a majority of market and 
intermediate demand, and a significant proportion of social rented sector 
demand, would require more than the minimum bedroom standard allowance, 
and that sharing is not appropriate for a large/significant proportion of single 
people (in the social sector). 
• The income and household composition profile of new demand/need should be 
based primarily on the profile of households aged under 40, with some 
allowance for additional formation from concealed households. 
                                                          
9 There may be a link between this issue and the issue of the role/function and rent level of intermediate 
rental products, and/or the issue of private rent regulation.  
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3.3    Housing Supply Options 
In the second part of this chapter we review the housing supply options which should 
be considered and modelled, particularly in terms of how far they would be affordable 
to the overall cohort of existing and potential households requiring to be housed over 
the plan period.  
In matching the affordability of supply options to potential household requirements it 
is important to bear in mind the distinction between price/rent in the second hand 
housing stock and resale/re-let supply, on the one hand, and the price/rent that would 
be associated with new build options alongside those. In some market situations prices 
can be relatively close in new build vs second hand cases, whereas in other situations 
there can be quite a big gap – and the same potentially applies to rents.  We would 
normally argue, and assume the clients for this research would concur with this 
principle, that housing is not ‘affordable’ if its cost is not significantly less than 
equivalent housing in the second hand resale/re-let market in the local housing market 
area. It is very important to try to nail the re-establishment of this principle in the context 
of s.106 planning obligations, for example.  
Obviously, insofar as governments give some priority to promoting home-ownership, 
then you can talk about affordable home-ownership, which would cost less than 
market sale (including second hand sales) but might be more than market rental. But 
when talking about affordable housing need one would be typically referring to housing 
whose cost would fall significantly below that of market renting.  
Market sale.  
The key benchmark here is the threshold price of an appropriate house/flat to buy in 
the ‘local’ area, taking (as argued above) the second hand or overall price, although 
we might also want to report on new prices where these deviated significantly. It has 
been customary to use lower quartile price as the threshold level although some have 
at times argued for something lower (Wilcox and Bramley 2010).The most readily 
available local house price data (from Land Registry, based on all sales) do give raw 
data enabling calculation of quantiles by four types, to a low level of postcode 
geography, but do not explicitly give a breakdown by size. There are ways of mapping 
them across from type to size using various data, for example UKHLS. 
There are various options for the geography to use here. In the ID2015 project we 
used lower-tier housing market areas (HMAs) developed in the study by Jones et al 
(2011). Given that (in most cases) the HMAs used in our sub-regional model are built 
up from combinations of LAs10, it makes more sense to use LA as the basic unit here. 
This is quite defensible when considering the needs and supply relevant to lower 
income groups, who tend to be more localised in their search areas, social networks 
                                                          
10 The HMAs used in the SRHMM are comprised of groups of whole LA’s using pre-2009 local authority 
definitions. The creation of some larger unitary authorities (e.g. County Durham) from that year onwards 
means that that is no longer true in some of the affected areas. 
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or commuting distances. While Broad Regional Housing Market Areas (BRHMA) as 
used for setting LHA levels might be another option, these are relatively coarse and 
subject to increasing criticism (part of the problem rather than the solution).  
For income-based affordability we have already proposed using lending multipliers 
(4.0 for single income, 3.3 for dual income households), and can demonstrate that 
these are reasonably consistent with the 27.5% of gross income norm. (It is a bit 
difficult to work out from published data what proportion of First Time Buyers (FTBs) 
borrow above this level; the proportion of all buyers (inc BTL and re-mortgagers, from 
MLAR11) is around half , but the average loan-to-income (LTI) ratio for FTB’s is only 
3.29). 
Deposits and Wealth 
To deal with the deposit constraint, assuming a 90% LTV mortgage, we suggest using 
a simple saving constraint. For a household to be able to buy, they must not only have 
enough income to satisfy the lending multiplier and/or residual income criteria, but also 
should be able to save a 10% deposit within 5 years while living within the private 
rented sector. We assume such households could save income after market rental 
housing costs in excess of (100% of) the MIS standard for their household 
composition, and this margin must exceed 2% (i.e. 10%/5) of the sale price for the 
constraint to be overcome. We estimate from UKHLS data that 84% of under-40 
households who have enough income to buy would also be able to overcome this 
saving constraint, although this varies somewhat between regions (79% in the north, 
93% in London).  
For the other FTBs who receive a lump of capital from family, we have explored three 
sources (EHS, UKHLS, W&AS), as noted earlier.   
• Using the English Housing Survey (2012-13), we identified owners who had 
received significant contributions towards deposit from a range of sources 
including gifts and informal loans. This amounted to 28.5% of recent first-time 
buyers, of whom 10% made a deposit of up to 10%(for them, it overcame the 
deposit constraint) while 18% made a deposit in excess of 10% - this is the 
group for whom access to a substantial lump of wealth (typically from family) 
enables them to overcome the income constraint.  
• Using the UKHLS we found that in2015-16 27% of under-40 home owners 
appear to be in the ‘can’t afford’ category based on income, but relative few of 
this group report any financial payment difficulty. 
• Using the W&AS for 2014-15, we analysed net financial wealth across income 
deciles, household types and geographical regions. From this analysis we 
developed two probabilistic proxy indicators which could be recreated in 
UKHLS: ‘wealth1’ (15% of all under-40 households) approximates those with 
                                                          
11 Financial Conduct Authority Mortgage Lenders and Administrators’ Statistics (MLAR), published quarterly by 
Bank of England. 
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enough to cover a typical 10% deposit, while ‘wealth2’ (17%) corresponds to 
those with a large enough lump of financial wealth to overcome the income 
constraint. However, when we exclude those who already had enough income 
to buy, and also those receiving Housing Benefit, this drops to 8.4% overall, but 
with a notable regional skew (12.5% in London, 7.7% in South, 3.2% in North 
and Midlands). We use this indicator at (sub)regional level in our modelling of 
ability to buy.  
To sum up, we make two offsetting adjustments to the estimated proportions of 
younger households able to buy, a reduction for those unable to save the deposit, and 
an enhancement for those receiving a lump of wealth who would not otherwise have 
been able to buy.  
Low Cost Home Ownership.  
There have been a range of Low Cost Home Ownership (LCHO) products available 
over the years, whether promoted by RSLs, private developers or other bodies. Many 
of these are variations on the themes of (a) new build (or resale) shared 
ownership/equity; (b) discounted low cost sale (with possible resale restrictions), (c) 
portable discounts/cash incentives/DIYSO etc. I would propose using the typical 
current ‘Help to Buy Shared Ownership’ product offered by RSLs at a representative 
lower share/tranche level  (suggested 40%12) . Typical 50% SO used to be similar in 
cost to a 25% discount or a 25% equity loan (where no rent is paid initially), as in the 
Help to Buy Equity Loan scheme (which is typically delivered through developers);  so 
such a product would represent this broad class of provision. Shared ownership may 
partially or wholly overcome deposit constraints. These products are presumably now 
often combined with the government’s assisted savings scheme (Help to Buy ISA). 
We would argue that we should not treat the ‘Starter Homes’ scheme heavily promoted 
by the Cameron government around 2015-16 as a meaningful LCHO option. The 
scheme was very poorly designed and tended to produce units that were very often 
not more affordable than the secondhand market, and tended to distort the pricing of 
the new build market.  
Market rent 
Again the focus would be on the mainstream private rental market, dominated by small 
scale BTL landlords, and not specifically on particular new build products by RSLs or 
Institutions (who would in any case need to keep their rents competitive with this 
market). Data on rent levels enabling identification of lower quartile thresholds by size 
are available in statistics published by ONS (formerly VOA).  As noted above, this level 
of affordability is normally the benchmark dividing those who can secure housing in 
                                                          
12 Providers are normally expected to provide a range of tranches between  25% and 75%, although the 
predominant demand from people struggling to afford to buy will be for lower tranches. Providers have to 
balance out the financing costs with this range of tranches, and could not generally afford to provide only 25%. 
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the market and those who potentially need some form of subsidised ‘affordable 
housing’. 
Intermediate Rent 
Rental housing products with rent levels pitched between social and market levels 
have been around for a couple of decades, initially developing somewhat as a ‘key 
worker’ offering mainly in London and SE, but subsequently diversifying somewhat. 
Then along came ‘Affordable Rent’, basically as a device to stretch subsidy and milk 
the HB system, but never satisfactory as a substitute for social housing, particularly as 
the holes in the benefit system become more apparent. This remains a mainstream 
product promoted by Homes England alongside Rent to Buy. In both cases the 
maximum rent is 80% of market value, typically applied in most locations outside 
London, but in London the scheme has typically operated with rent around 65% of 
market value.  
The problem with ‘Affordable Rent’ is that it is often not affordable to many traditional 
clients of social housing. There is an argument about whether it would be better value 
for money for the government in the longer term to have a more moderate level of 
social rents, except perhaps for people whose need for subsidy (through HB and UC) 
is likely to be shorter term or transitional, as they have the prospect of getting into work 
on a regular basis. This may save money, allowing for the reduced HB costs, or not 
cost much more, while helping with admin costs and work incentives (i.e. all the 
arguments for traditional social rent or living rent). Indeed, the 2015 budget, which 
reduced social rents in order to save on HB costs, suggests that government partially 
accepts these arguments. There is also increasing evidence of RSLs being reluctant 
to take on many of the poorest social housing clients, including homeless households, 
because of concerns about their ability to pay rent under UC.   
So while Affordable Rent is not, we would argue, a suitable substitute for social rented 
housing, it may be an appropriate benchmark for ‘Intermediate Rent’ as previously 
conceived (and still promoted e.g. in Scotland). Its role is to provide a good quality 
rental alternative for those working households who cannot afford to buy and/or are 
not ready to buy yet, and who might struggle with affordability in the open market 
(Theresa May’s JAMS, alias ‘Generation Rent’). It might be used as an exemplary offer 
entailing not just good quality management/maintenance/standards but also greater 
security of tenure than the Assured Shorthold Tenancy (AST) which is typically on offer 
in AR or RtB. It may also be seen as a product which, thanks to its more moderate 
rents, better enables people to save deposits for future purchase (implicitly the aim of 
RtB).  
LHA Rent 
We were asked to consider/model this rental variant, which is essentially a form of 
intermediate rent where the rent is set at the level of the LHA, whatever that is 
(currently a product of what the 30th percentile was in 2010, a small amount of inflation 
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since then, less any measured drops in rent, in the BRMA). The practical rationale for 
this is clear enough, given the current state of LHA – this is a form of intermediate rent 
which can, at least in the immediate future, guarantee that tenants would be eligible 
for full housing support through HB/UC, so long as they were not affected by any of 
the other restrictions (2 child limit, total benefit cap, bedroom tax). As such, it is a 
somewhat more acceptable version of AR as a substitute for social renting, but not 
massively so, given the increasing problems with the benefit system, work incentive 
issues, and the potential affordability problems for low income tenants who are just 
outside the reach of the HB/UC system.  
It is easy to model but it may be argued to be a bit of a stop-gap option, which is 
contingent on LHA continuing to be frozen at its present level with unreformed BRMA 
geography. In fact given recent NAO report and other evidence (e.g. Homelessness 
Projections) there is going to be increasing pressure to flex the LHA ceiling and change 
the geographical areas. Therefore this stop-gap may not last long in its present form.  
Living Rent 
It was decided not to model a further rental variant, the Living Rent. This proposed 
scheme has been under examination and promoted to some extent by various parties, 
but particularly the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. It was examined in the study for JRF 
that fed into Solve UK Poverty. It appears that the basic idea is that it is a rent level for 
social housing which would enable a household with a single full-time earner on the 
(full) Living Wage to pay their rent without assistance from HB/UC within a reasonable 
affordability standard (effectively the one that that we are proposing).  
Based on current data (which may need further updating) living rent may be described 
as being similar to current patterns of social rent but a bit higher overall and in all 
regions. In relative terms, the hike in rents to this level would be greater in the North, 
and especially in Scotland (this might be particularly politically sensitive). LHA rent is 
higher again, by only a modest margin in the North, by a bigger margin in the South, 
and massively in London. Actual market rent is higher again, but again only by a 
moderate margin in the North but massively in London. Affordable rent, which is the 
sort of ‘official’ norm for intermediate renting, lies generally between the levels of living 
rent and LHA. In the northern regions and E Midlands, it is roughly the same as the 
Living Rent while being below LHA. In the West Midlands and southern regions, it is 
greater than the Living Rent but below LHA. In London, it is MUCH higher than the 
Living Rent but still below LHA. In Wales it is similar to both. In Scotland it would be 
above Living but not clearly distinguished from LHA.  
It is not the purpose of this research to devise an optimal rent policy, although 
doubtless NHF would have views on that. We can model all of social rent, living rent, 
affordable rent and LHA rent, but it should be noted that in some cases there will be 
little or no differences, and in particular instances the pecking order may not be the 
same.  
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A more practical concern is that these comparisons reveal that there may be some 
deficiency in the current way the SRHMM models private rents. The figures for the 
period around 2016 look high in some regions compared with the reported actuals 
from VOA, which continue to show a very low growth trajectory in regions away from 
London. Work to enhance the private rental part of the model is ongoing, but it is mainly 
an issue for forward projections.  
Social Rent 
It can be said that at least we have pretty good base data on the level of these rents. 
Also, their movement (downwards) up to 2020 is determined by the provisions of the 
2015 Summer Budget. Thereafter, there is an expectation that some form of indexing 
to just above inflation will be applied. We will assume that this is the lowest, base level 
of rent to be tested. Affordability issues below this level (i.e. households who do not 
meet our affordability criteria even in social housing at this rent level) will have to be 
dealt with by the HB/UC system, however inadequately, but this will not be the main 
focus of the research.  
It is proposed to use the current average rent across the whole social housing stock, 
for the relevant size category. It can be argued that new build social stock would have 
a higher than average rent. But, on the other hand, people moving into social renting 
would most likely move into a re-let.  
Overlaps 
The supply options have been presented here as a sort of hierarchy, stretching down 
from market sale owner occupation at the top to social renting at the bottom (in terms 
of monthly cost, or relative affordability). While that characterisation is broadly true, in 
practice there are significant areas of overlap, i.e. different types of provision which 
cater to essentially the same group in terms of income level. This is particularly true of 
LCHO alongside market rent and also intermediate rent. There will clearly also be 
overlap between LHA rent and intermediate rent. In some cases there will be a lack of 
clear blue water between, say, Living Rent and LHA rent.  The gap between social 
and living rents will not be that  large, and there will a large group assigned to social 
renting even though they will still infringe affordability standards (particularly the 
secondary criterion related to poverty thresholds) within that tenure.  
Where there is overlap, in calculating indicative supply numbers to match that we 
would need to apply some judgements in assigning households to different tenure 
options, e.g. LCHO (shared ownership/equity) vs intermediate rent. Such judgements 
have to capture elements of preference (including over security of tenure), 
appropriateness (e.g. in terms of likely length of stay), and eligibility (creditworthiness, 
etc.).  
It is assumed that, notwithstanding the fact that in affordability terms some households 
may be able to afford market renting, government policy will support the promotion of 
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competing housing products in the intermediate sector, such as LCHO or intermediate 
rent, on the grounds that these provide pathways to owner occupation as well as a 
better product and standard-setting in the market, including for some more valued 
security, and in some instances contributions to regeneration and community balance 
and stability. The extent and scale of these elements are a policy judgement, although 
affordability places an ultimate limit on numbers committed to such programmes.  
It will be noted that in this discussion we are referring to intermediate rather than 
affordable rent. This reflects a feeling that the term ‘affordable rent’ has been 
somewhat tarnished, as well as somewhat confused, by its use in relation to the main 
subsidised rental housing scheme since 2010.  
Summing up on supply options 
We proceeded in this research to test and exemplify the affordability for key groups 
and the indicative potential new supply required for the following options, in generally 
descending order of cost/income threshold: 
• Market sale owner occupation based on whole market including secondhand. 
• Low cost home-ownership represented by a typical RSL New Build Shared 
Ownership product with a 40% tranche purchased. 
• Market rent, at lower quartile market rent by size. 
• Intermediate rent, effectively the same as the current ‘Affordable’ Rent and Rent 
to Buy schemes, 80% of (median) market rent or 65% in London. 
• LHA rent for the relevant size category and BRMA area..13 
• Living rent for the relevant size category. 
• Social rent, based on combination of RSL and LA rents as appropriate. 
Judgement will be applied in apportionment of potential demand/need between 
categories in the case of overlap. 
  
                                                          
13 In the first iteration of the analysis, we do not analyse these options separately. 
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Chapter 4 
Current Profile of Affordability and Need 
 
4.1: Initial affordability profile for England 
We apply the affordability profile involving four bands, as suggested in Section 3, to 
data on households where the head is aged under-40 in the ‘Understanding Society’ 
Survey (UKHLS) for 2015/16. The four bands are defined by the income thresholds 
for buying at market price, renting at market rent, renting at ‘intermediate rent’, and 
social renting (the remainder). Shared ownership effectively overlaps with the second 
band, people able to afford market rent but not market purchase. The under-40 age 
grouping is chosen to be broadly representative of the age range within which people 
form new households, settle down and attempt to find mainstream housing solutions14. 
The modifications to ‘ability to buy’ relating to (a) saving for deposits, and (b) accessing 
larger lumps of wealth, are brought into the picture at a second stage of analysis. The 
analysis is currently presented in more detail for England, given that some of the local-
level indicators involved for Wales and Scotland are different. 
Figure 4.1 indicates that overall 45% of this cohort of younger households can afford 
to buy, based on their income and the norms/standards for affordability and mortgage 
lending as set out in Section 3. A further 14% can afford market renting. Beyond that, 
a further 8% could afford Intermediate Renting, leaving a sizeable group (33%) for 
whom social renting is the only reasonable option based on our affordability norms.  
  
                                                          
14 In the ID2015 study for DCLG it was argued, and accepted, that under-40 was an appropriate age bracket for 
this purpose, in recognition of the considerable evidence of delayed household formation and first home 
purchase over the last decade and a half.  
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Figure 4.1: Affordability bands by existing tenure of all under-40 households in 
England, 2015 
 
Source: as Table 4.1 below. 
A number of caveats should be made at this point. The third of households allocated 
to ‘social renting’ as an affordability band include both those who could afford typical 
social rents under our standard affordability norms and those who could not, a 
significant and large group. Many but not all of these households are receiving housing 
benefit (HB, or increasingly UC), and so it might be said that their housing 
‘unaffordability’ is adequately alleviated by that route. Technically, if they are receiving 
HB this is counted in their income and hence in the various ratios used to assess 
affordability, which some of them still infringe15. An alternative view might be that, for 
some households, HB is inadequate and keeps those households in a situation of 
poverty after housing costs. Even applying a more stringent residual income threshold 
based on evidence of material deprivation as well as low income, a substantial minority 
of social rented tenants could be said to infringe our affordability standard. A further 
extension to this point is the argument that social tenants on HB/UC would be as able 
to afford Intermediate Rent as they are to afford Social Rent, so long as the IR is within 
the HB/UC limits. Counter arguments to this would include that these tenants would 
face worse disincentives to work and more vulnerability to fluctuations and delays in 
entitlements.  
 
Figure 4.1 shows that only just over 70% of under-40 home-owners can afford to buy 
in their locality based on income, although another 8% are on the margins insofar as 
they could afford market rent (or LCHO). How can we account for this? Clearly, a 
significant proportion have been enabled to buy by access to a significant lump of 
wealth, typically from family sources. As noted earlier this probably accounts for the 
larger part of this unexplained gap. Some may have bought some years ago when 
                                                          
15 In our modelling of different options, when we test a different tenure from that where the household was 
observed, then if they were claiming HB we vary the income to reflect the varying level of housing costs that 
would be covered by HB. 
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their income situation was better (e.g. partner working, or working longer hours), or 
when prices were lower. Some may have bought at the very bottom of the price 
distribution rather than at the lower quartile used here (Wilcox and Bramley 2010). 
Some may have bought by borrowing a more than prudent sum, although current 
evidence shows few of this group exhibit signs of financial stress relating to housing 
payments. The low level of interest rates has contributed to this situation. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that relatively few social renters can afford to buy, which is 
unsurprising and consistent with other evidence. However, a considerable proportion 
(nearly a third) could afford market rent, and by implication that suggests a significant 
proportion could probably also afford some LCHO products or right to buy/rent to buy. 
Existing private renters are closer to average in their overall profile, but only a third 
can afford to buy while a clear majority are, or would be, ‘unaffordable’ on our standard 
norms if they were paying the going level of market rents. It is probably true that on 
average existing renters pay a bit less than new let renters, but nevertheless this 
simple finding underlines the major mismatch in the current housing market in England 
– the large number of younger households living at (somewhat or very) ‘unaffordable’ 
rents in the private market.  
 
Table 4.1 below provides more detail by region. 
  
43 
 
Table 4.1: Affordability bands by existing tenure of all under-40 households by broad 
region of England, 2015  
Part (a) percent of total in each region/tenure) 
 
Broad Affordability Current Tenure   
Region Band Own Social Priv Rent 
All 
Hhd<40 
North Can Buy 75% 23% 43% 54% 
  Mkt Rent 4% 28% 5% 10% 
  Intermed Rent 3% 4% 4% 4% 
  Social Rent 17% 45% 47% 33% 
Total   100% 100% 100% 100% 
Mids Can Buy 79% 22% 43% 54% 
  Mkt Rent 4% 34% 11% 13% 
  Intermed Rent 3% 0% 9% 4% 
  Social Rent 14% 44% 37% 29% 
Total   100% 100% 100% 100% 
South Can Buy 65% 9% 36% 44% 
  Mkt Rent 9% 28% 13% 14% 
  Intermed Rent 6% 8% 13% 9% 
  Social Rent 21% 54% 38% 33% 
Total   100% 100% 100% 100% 
GLA Can Buy 42% 1% 13% 19% 
  Mkt Rent 27% 44% 10% 22% 
  Intermed Rent 11% 13% 30% 21% 
  Social Rent 20% 41% 47% 39% 
Total   100% 100% 100% 100% 
England Can Buy 69% 15% 34% 45% 
  Mkt Rent 8% 32% 10% 14% 
  Intermed Rent 5% 6% 14% 8% 
  Social Rent 18% 47% 42% 33% 
Total   100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: author’s analysis of UKHLS (Wave 7) linked to ONS house price and VOA market rents data 
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Part (b) number in each affordability category region/tenure) 
breguk        Total 
    Own Social Priv Rent   
North Can Buy 587,174 81,008 229,506 905,779 
  Mkt Rent 33,079 98,600 28,154 159,833 
  Intermed 
Rent 
23,282 14,430 23,501 61,213 
  Social Rent 134,489 158,185 251,593 544,514 
    778,024 352,223 532,754 1,671,339 
Mids Can Buy 365,423 53,369 141,915 561,188 
  Mkt Rent 20,170 82,314 37,167 139,651 
  Intermed 
Rent 
14,474 622 29,042 44,138 
  Social Rent 64,897 106,428 123,375 297,350 
    464,964 242,733 331,499 1,042,327 
South Can Buy 556,617 34,319 248,351 840,056 
  Mkt Rent 76,142 102,512 89,842 268,496 
  Intermed 
Rent 
50,877 29,238 87,497 170,620 
  Social Rent 176,767 197,353 261,616 636,486 
    860,403 363,422 687,306 1,915,658 
GLA Can Buy 108,634 2,581 55,677 172,278 
  Mkt Rent 69,955 81,557 44,069 196,680 
  Intermed 
Rent 
27,077 23,704 131,125 189,083 
  Social Rent 51,747 76,288 207,814 350,173 
    257,413 184,130 438,685 908,214 
Total Can Buy 1,617,848 171,277 675,449 2,479,301 
  Mkt Rent 199,346 364,983 199,232 764,660 
  Intermed 
Rent 
115,710 67,994 271,165 465,054 
  Social Rent 427,900 538,254 844,398 1,828,523 
    2,360,804 1,142,508 1,990,244 5,537,538 
 
There are large differences between the broad regions of England, particularly where 
London is concerned but also, to some extent, when comparing the South with the 
Midlands and the North. Only 19% of all households in London can afford to buy, 
compared with 44% in the South and 54% in the North. Only a minority of current 
owners in London can afford to buy, underlining the importance of wealth transfers 
there.  The proportion able to afford market renting is higher in London (22% vs 10-
14%). There is an even bigger difference with Intermediate Renting, which only seems 
to be appropriate for 4% of under-40 households in the North and Midlands, but 
reaches an additional 21% in London (not least because IR is set at 65% of market 
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rent there). There is less variation in the group assigned to social rent, which ranges 
from 29% in the Midlands through 33% in the North and South to 39% in London.  
A few of the regional differences within the tenure groups are worth highlighting. In the 
North and Midlands nearly a quarter of social tenants could afford to buy and over half 
could afford either buying or market renting. This could be indicative of some potential 
for low demand for social housing to re-emerge in some areas in these regions, while 
also suggesting that there could be more turnover (re-lets) supply. At the same time it 
could indicate some scope for LCHO products or RTB. The very large share of social 
renters in London able to afford market renting, contrasted with the negligible share 
able to afford full house purchase, is indicative of a significant potential demand for 
LCHO., which occupies the same affordability niche. This is also true to a lesser extent 
across the South.  
Within private renting, there are clearly many households in this sector in all regions 
who would be more comfortable, from an affordability perspective, in social housing. 
However, in London there is also clearly quite a large group who could afford 
intermediate rent.  
We turn now to look at a subset of households, who are mainly within the under-40 
group, namely those who have recently newly formed as a household. Figure 4.2 
summarises their affordability profile, with Table 4.2 providing more regional detail.  
Figure 4.2: Affordability bands by existing tenure of recent newly-formed households 
in England, 2011-15 
 
Source: as Table 4.2 below. 
It is clear that new households close to the point of forming have lower levels of 
affordability than all under-40 households. This implies that on average households 
improve their financial position in the initial years after forming. Only 17% of all new 
households can afford to buy, and this appears to be true of only 40% of those who 
have actually bought. Clearly the ‘Bank of Mum and Dad’ is critical here, notably in 
London and the South. Two thirds of new households in this period formed into the 
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private rented sector. Yet only a fairly small minority (23% of all households, 19% of 
new households in the PRS) appear to have enough income to afford the PRS on our 
reasonable norms, even after allowing for whatever LHA they receive. The 
Intermediate Rent offers only a marginal widening of opportunities at this stage in the 
housing career (4% overall) and this appears to be true across the country.  
 
Table 4.2: Affordability bands by existing tenure of recent newly-formed households 
by broad region of England, 2010-15- 
Part (a) percent of total in each region/tenure) 
 
Broad Affordability Current Tenure   
Region Band Own Social Priv Rent 
All 
Hhd<40 
North Can Buy 56% 5% 21% 25% 
  Mkt Rent 0% 11% 2% 3% 
  Intermed Rent 0% 2% 5% 4% 
  Social Rent 44% 83% 71% 69% 
Total   100% 100% 100% 100% 
Mids Can Buy 53% 11% 24% 27% 
  Mkt Rent 2% 12% 9% 8% 
  Intermed Rent 0% 0% 4% 3% 
  Social Rent 45% 77% 64% 62% 
Total   100% 100% 100% 100% 
South Can Buy 36% 7% 12% 15% 
  Mkt Rent 9% 19% 6% 8% 
  Intermed Rent 8% 5% 5% 6% 
  Social Rent 48% 70% 78% 71% 
Total   100% 100% 100% 100% 
GLA Can Buy 11% 4% 1% 3% 
  Mkt Rent 3% 16% 3% 5% 
  Intermed Rent 5% 1% 4% 4% 
  Social Rent 81% 78% 93% 88% 
Total   100% 100% 100% 100% 
England Can Buy 40% 6% 14% 17% 
  Mkt Rent 
4% 15% 5% 6% 
  Intermed Rent 4% 2% 5% 4% 
  Social Rent 52% 77% 77% 72% 
Total   100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: author’s analysis of UKHLS (Waves 3-7) linked to ONS house price and VOA market rents 
data 
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Part (b) number in each affordability band by region/tenure over 5 years 
breguk        Total 
    Own Social Priv Rent   
North Can Buy 53,115 3,881 70,845 127,841 
  Mkt Rent 0 8,961 7,943 16,904 
  Intermed Rent 0 1,629 17,407 19,036 
  Social Rent 42,253 69,270 233,914 356,171 
    95,368 83,741 330,109 519,952 
Mids Can Buy 26,694 4,649 45,090 78,049 
  Mkt Rent 1,075 4,893 16,830 22,798 
  Intermed Rent 0 0 7,510 7,510 
  Social Rent 22,705 31,925 121,476 178,688 
    50,474 41,467 190,906 287,045 
South Can Buy 46,528 6,130 52,497 105,155 
  Mkt Rent 11,163 17,249 25,125 53,537 
  Intermed Rent 10,566 4,097 21,815 37,364 
  Social Rent 61,884 63,493 346,219 483,180 
    130,141 90,969 445,656 679,236 
GLA Can Buy 5,942 1,932 1,639 9,513 
  Mkt Rent 1,939 7,710 7,591 17,240 
  Intermed Rent 2,807 609 8,820 15,431 
  Social Rent 45,259 36,592 226,180 321,190 
    55,947 46,843 244,230 363,374 
Total Can Buy 132,279 16,592 170,071 320,558 
  Mkt Rent 14,177 38,813 57,489 110,479 
  Intermed Rent 13,373 6,335 55,552 79,341 
  Social Rent 172,101 201,280 927,789 1,339,229 
    331,930 263,020 1,210,901 1,849,607 
 
4.2  Need profile overlaid on affordability 
We would expect housing needs to be associated to a significant degree with 
affordability issues. Bramley et al (2010) and Bramley (2016) showed strong 
systematic relationships between most categories of housing need and poverty, low 
income and/or affordability problems. Bramley and Fitzpatrick (2017) and Bramley 
(2018 forthcoming) show similar results for homelessness, including the categories of 
‘wider’ or ‘hidden’  homelessness which overlap with backlog housing needs (e.g. 
concealed households and overcrowding). This picture is confirmed when we attempt 
to overlay measures of backlog housing needs in the UKHLS survey on the 
affordability bands just described.  
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In this instance ‘housing need’ is defined based on any one or more of the following 
problems applying: 
• Concealed family or concealed single (including nondependent children) 
wanting to move;  
• Overcrowding (bedroom standard); 
• Serious affordability problems based on combination of ratio measures and 
subjective payment difficulties; 
• Serious self-reported physical condition problems; 
• Accommodation unsuitable for families (e.g. high-rise, no garden/yard). 
In view of the inclusion of newly formed households and the tendency of some groups 
to move in and out of need, we take as our marker households experiencing any one 
or more of these problems either in the current year or the previous year. This accounts 
for 20.9% of all households (13.8% if just counting the current year)16. Just taking the 
current year snapshot.  This means that there is a current backlog of 3.66 million 
households in housing need.  
As can be seen in Figure 4.3 (and in more detail in Table 4.4), for the younger and 
new  households considered here, the overall incidence of these housing needs is 
much higher, at 30% of all under-40 households and 56% of newly forming 
households. We focus particularly on private renter households, because this is such 
an important transition tenure for younger and new households and partly because the 
affordability evidence suggests that this is where the main problems (which could be 
addressed by expanding housing supply) exist.  
Figure 4.3 shows that housing needs are much more prevalent among new 
households than among the broader under-40 group, although the difference is less 
marked for those in the lowest affordability band (‘social renting’). Housing needs 
seem to have the highest incidence among those in the middling affordability bands. 
Within each affordability band, there is not much difference between PRS and all 
households. For these groups one can say that a clear majority of new households 
and a large minority of all under-40 households have one or more of these need 
problems.  
  
                                                          
16 It should be noted that this definition differs in some respects from that used in Bramley et al 2010, based 
on S.E.H. data and used within the SRHMM; that definition covered a lower proportion of households, 9.2%, 
due to a narrower definition of concealed households and the exclusion of physical condition problems. The 
definition of concealed households is similar to that used in the Crisis Homelessness Monitor. 
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Figure 4.3: Proportion of under-40 and new households in private renting and overall 
with housing needs by affordability band,  England, 2011-16 (percent of total in each 
band/age-household group) 
 
 
 
Source: as for Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 shows that the regional differences are not so striking. Among all under-40 
households, needs are slightly higher in London. Among recent newly-formed 
households, needs are rather higher in the North and rather lower in London and the 
South. This could be explained by a tendency for new households in the north to be 
more economically marginal than those in London and the South, because in the latter 
case the housing market barriers limit opportunities for economically more marginal 
households to form. But equally it could be partly due just to the lower incomes and 
greater poverty in the north.  
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Table 4.3: Proportion of under-40 and new households in private renting and overall 
with housing needs by affordability band by broad region of England, 2011-16 
(percent of total in each region/tenure/age-household group) 
 
Region Affordability PRS <40 All <40 
PRS 
New All New 
  Band In Need In Need In Need In Need 
North Can Buy 22% 16% 69% 64% 
  Mkt Rent 36% 51% 86% 89% 
  Intermed 
Rent 61% 45% 83% 75% 
  Social Rent 46% 45% 58% 57% 
  Total 36% 30% 63% 60% 
Mids Can Buy 20% 14% 48% 53% 
  Mkt Rent 29% 50% 55% 61% 
  Intermed 
Rent 16% 21% 30% 30% 
  Social Rent 47% 46% 63% 62% 
  Total 31% 28% 58% 58% 
South Can Buy 22% 15% 58% 59% 
 Mkt Rent 39% 39% 74% 85% 
  Intermed 
Rent 28% 33% 69% 69% 
  Social Rent 38% 35% 53% 50% 
  Total 31% 27% 56% 55% 
GLA Can Buy 27% 16% 0% 0% 
  Mkt Rent 43% 46% 61% 83% 
  Intermed 
Rent 55% 48% 92% 80% 
  Social Rent 32% 38% 46% 46% 
  Total 39% 37% 48% 48% 
Total Can Buy 22% 15% 60% 58% 
  Sh Own or 
Mkt Rent 37% 45% 68% 80% 
  Intermed 
Rent 43% 39% 72% 69% 
  Social Rent 40% 40% 54% 52% 
  Total 34% 30% 56% 56% 
Source: author’s analysis of UKHLS (Waves 3-7) linked to ONS house price and VOA market rents 
data: ‘need’ based on any of concealed, overcrowding, serious affordability, serious physical condition 
problems, or accommodation unsuitable for families, in current period or one year earlier.  
Actual versus modelled affordability 
Up until now we have mainly reflected a ‘modelled’ picture of affordability, based on 
the relationships between household’s incomes and a standardized housing cost 
based on threshold market prices or rents in the local area and assumed size of 
accommodation occupied. The affordability norms set out in Chapter 3 are based on 
ratios of housing costs to income and of residual income (after housing costs) to a 
minimum standard. However, the actual ratios based on what people are actually 
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paying for the housing they actually occupy may be different, and it is of some 
interest to examine this. Table 4.4 shows the proportion of under-40 households 
whose current housing costs are unaffordable based on one or both of the two ratio 
tests, broken down by the modelled affordability bands (the tenure they could 
theoretically afford, reading down the table) and the actual current tenure, reading 
across the table.  
Table 4.4: Actual unaffordability and modelled affordability bands by actual tenure, 
under-40 households in Great Britain, 2015. 
Affordability Actual Private Social   All 
 Bands Owners Renters Renters   
Can Buy 2% 0% 0% 2% 
Market Rent 18% 10% 69% 41% 
Intermediate Rent 22% 6% 0% 9% 
Social Rent 42% 33% 40% 37% 
 
Source: author’s analysis of UKHLS (Wave 7) linked to ONS house price and VOA market rents data 
People who can buy have more resources than those who can only rent, so those at 
the top of the table should be less likely to have problems than those further down. 
We would also expect that people who are in a tenure that they can theoretically afford 
should be less likely to report problems than those who are not. This boundary is 
represented by the stepped downward diagonal line through the table. Households to 
the north-east of this line should be less likely to report problems than people to the 
south west of it.  
These expectations are partly but not wholly borne out. People who can buy generally 
do not exhibit unaffordable ratios. As you move down the table, the proportions with 
problematic ratios rise. However, the boundary line is not a perfect predictor. There 
seem to be quite a lot of people who could afford market rent, currently living in social 
rent, who appear to have adverse ratios. Conversely, relatively few households in the 
‘intermediate rent’ band seem to have adverse ratios. However, those in the social 
rent band are rather likely to report adverse ratios whatever tenure they are in, 
including social renting.  
There are plenty of reasons why theoretical and actual affordability may differ – people 
buying at different times paid different prices; people may be over- or under-occupying; 
rental contracts are not revised frequently if people do not move, and may be out of 
line with new let market rates. In addition, the Housing Benefit/LHA/UC system affects 
different households in different ways, keeping some close to the poverty line, while 
withdrawing benefit quickly as income from work increases, and generally not dealing 
well with fluctuating work incomes.  
Although we do not dwell on this point here, there is something of a paradox when we 
look at housing needs by actual tenure. In practice, the tenure with the highest 
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incidence of needs is social renting. The paradox here is that social renting is 
supposed to be decent-quality housing allocated to people whose previous situation 
was one of being in need. In other words, social housing is supposed to be part of the 
solution, not the problem. The fact that the incidence of housing needs within social 
housing remains quite high reflects a number of factors, including the effect of 
including ‘in need one year earlier’ (which would capture people recently rehoused), 
the growth of overcrowding in social housing (reflecting the priority to families 
combined with the shortage of larger accommodation), and more generally the relative 
poverty of social housing tenants (which would be linked to a number of the need 
categories).  
Needs of older vs younger households 
In the analysis developed in this chapter, most of the emphasis is placed upon younger 
households (head aged under 40) and new households. There are good reasons for 
this, because these are the groups who represent new needs and demands being 
placed upon the housing system, people who have often not yet gained an 
established, sustainable position in that system. Most older households have an 
established housing situation and tenure. In some cases, they may have a problem 
with that housing, whether in terms of affordability, security, suitability or condition, 
and in some cases such problems may be progressively exacerbated by health 
conditions or changes in economic circumstances. However, these problems can 
generally be resolved by moving to a more suitable house. In terms of the aggregate 
numerical requirements, this does not in general increase the numbers, because in 
moving they release a unit which may be adequate and suitable for someone else. For 
the individual, if they are an owner occupier or a social tenant, they are in principle 
likely to be able to make such a move within their tenure. This may be more 
problematic for older private tenants.  
More broadly, societal trends in UK over the last 2-3 decades have seen a 
transformation in the fortunes of older households, both in terms of their housing (e.g. 
much more owner occupation, often outright) and in terms of their income and wealth. 
On some measures, retired households are better off than working age households. 
Levels of pensioner poverty have fallen dramatically, and certainly using after housing 
cost or material deprivation based measures, pensioner poverty has shrunk to 
relatively low levels. Also, households in the 40-60 age range tend, in general, to be 
in the lifestage where the balance between income and spending requirements 
becomes more favourable.  
In the analysis of backlog housing needs in this study we can and do refer to the needs 
of all ages of household, both in this chapter and in Chapter 5 (where there are detailed 
differences in the measures and sources used). However, in this chapter, for the 
general reasons given above, we focus mainly on the under-40 group. Nevertheless, 
we can, as in Table 4.5 below, report on a summary comparison of the backlog need 
situations of households below and above the age 40 threshold, for the UK as a whole.  
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In simple descriptive terms, older households (over 40) have lower rates of most 
categories of need, apart from individual concealed households, and overall. 
Households with any of these needs are 12.4% of older households and 17.5% of 
younger households. Relative rates of incidence are particularly higher for younger 
households in the cases of affordability/payment problems and unsuitability for 
families, but this is also true of condition problems and overcrowding.  
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Table 4.5: Analysis of Backlog Housing Needs by Broad Age of Head of Household 
GB 2015 (percent and number of households) 
Household Overcrowded 
Indiv Con-
cealed 
Family 
Conc-
cealed 
Afford'y 
Problem 
Unsuitable 
Family 
Condition 
Problem Any Need 
Group ocrowd2 indconceal2h Concfam affprob1 unsuitfam4h condprb4h anyneed4 
Older 2.5% 7.1% 1.7% 1.5% 0.3% 1.7% 12.4% 
Under 40 5.5% 2.8% 2.0% 5.5% 3.5% 3.3% 17.5% 
Number        
Older 498,407 1,450,251 343,942 306,628 70,034 337,141 2,524,211 
Under 40 407,941 209,894 146,215 412,515 256,904 246,012 1,300,357 
Emerging hhd basis       
Older 249,203 145,025 68,788 306,628 70,034 337,141 988,072 
Under40 657,144 1,515,119 421,368 412,515 256,904 246,012 2,864,060 
        
All Ages 906,347 1,660,144 490,157 719,144 326,939 583,153 3,852,132 
Source: author’s analysis of UKHLS (Wave 7) linked to ONS house price and VOA market rents data 
Note: Lines 1-4 reflect the current household position; lines 5-6 reflect fact that resolving crowding 
and concealed household issues will mainly involve the emergence of new under-40 households 
However, a key point which the table brings out is that, once you reclassify households 
on the basis of their age status once the need has been resolved, which we term the 
‘emerging household basis’, the balance shifts sharply towards the under 40s. Making 
reasonable but approximate assumptions, we can say that an overwhelming majority 
of concealed households, and a substantial proportion of overcrowding cases, are 
likely to involve the emergence of additional under-40 households. On this basis, it 
appears then that under-40 households will account for about three-quarters of 
backlog need.  
As argued above, meeting those (less common) needs of older households can mainly 
be achieved through movement within the existing stock, and/or other forms of 
support. These considerations may be relevant at the more detailed level of assessing 
needs disaggregated by size/type and at local level. Nevertheless, overall estimates 
of backlog need (including among older households) and the impact of different 
programmes on these will feature within the outcome-oriented analysis using the 
dynamic housing market model in Chapter 5.  
The analysis of the incidence of different types of need among the populations of 
particular interest provides a picture of variations in both the level and nature of need 
in different regions and countries, as illustrated by table 4.6. This shows the incidence 
of the six component needs and the proportion of households with any one or more of 
these conditions, for under-40 and older households, across the broad regions of 
England and the countries of the UK.  
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Table 4.6 Backlog Housing Need Incidence by Broad Region/Country and Broad 
Age, Great Britain 2015 (percent of households) 
 
Household Overcrowded 
Indiv Con-
cealed 
Family 
Conc-
cealed 
Afford'y 
Problem 
Unsuitable 
Family 
Condition 
Problem 
Any 
Need 
Group ocrowd2 indconceal2h concfam affprob1 unsuitfam4h condprb4h anyneed4 
Under-40        
North 4.4% 3.3% 2.2% 5.7% 1.1% 3.5% 16.2% 
Mids 3.8% 2.6% 1.5% 7.2% 2.0% 4.1% 18.2% 
South 5.0% 1.9% 1.0% 4.4% 4.6% 3.5% 15.6% 
GLA 12.5% 3.4% 3.8% 6.1% 8.2% 1.9% 25.3% 
England 5.9% 2.7% 1.9% 5.6% 3.7% 3.4% 17.9% 
Wales 2.7% 2.1% 1.1% 4.3% 2.4% 3.5% 12.5% 
Scotland 3.2% 2.6% 1.4% 4.8% 6.0% 2.7% 16.0% 
G B 5.5% 2.8% 2.0% 5.5% 3.5% 3.3% 17.5% 
Older        
North 2.1% 6.7% 2.0% 1.9% 0.1% 1.4% 12.1% 
Mids 1.9% 7.8% 1.7% 1.1% 0.1% 2.6% 13.0% 
South 2.1% 7.1% 1.2% 1.3% 0.3% 1.7% 11.4% 
GLA 6.0% 8.5% 2.8% 2.1% 1.7% 2.0% 18.2% 
England 2.6% 7.3% 1.7% 1.5% 0.4% 1.8% 12.9% 
Wales 2.4% 7.1% 1.1% 1.0% 0.1% 1.0% 11.3% 
Scotland 1.9% 6.4% 0.9% 0.8% 0.4% 1.4% 10.2% 
G B 2.5% 7.1% 1.7% 1.5% 0.3% 1.7% 12.4% 
Source: author’s analysis of UKHLS (Wave 7) linked to ONS house price and VOA market rents data 
The consistently higher level of need among the under-40 households is apparent for 
most indicators other than individual concealed households, which in this table are left 
in their parental/host household. Needs are markedly higher in Greater London than 
in all other regions/countries, both overall and for most components, with a couple of 
exceptions. Affordability problems (combinations of high ratios and self-reported 
payment/arrears/debt problems) are a bit higher in the Midlands, possibly because in 
these regions more lower income households get drawn into housing commitments. 
House condition problems, however, particularly for younger households, are less 
prevalent in London than in other regions/countries.  
Table 4.7 shows the numbers involved across the same needs and regions. This time, 
however, we present this on an ‘emerging households’ basis, reallocating most of the 
concealed and many of the overcrowded to the under-40 group. The headline total in 
this table of 2.8m may attract particular attention, but readers should take note that 
this does not translate directly into a numerical ‘requirement for new housing’. Some 
types of housing need may be better tackled by in situ improvements, and others by 
people moving into different more suitable housing. However, concealed households 
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are generally indicative of an insufficiency of supply, overcrowding of an insufficiency 
of space, and affordability problems of people not being able to access a form or tenure 
of housing which is affordable or a an appropriate level of support from 
benefits/subsidies. In fact, it is the needs which are indicative of an inadequate supply 
which appear to be the largest in magnitude, particularly for the younger households.  
Table 4.7 Backlog Housing Need Numbers by Need Type, Broad Region/Country 
and Broad Age, Great Britain 2015 (number, on emerging households basis) 
Household Overcrowded 
Indiv Con-
cealed 
Family 
Conc-
cealed 
Afford'y 
Problem 
Unsuitable 
Family 
Condition 
Problem 
Any 
Need 
Group ocrowd2 indconceal2h concfam affprob1 unsuitfam4h condprb4h anyneed4 
Under-40        
North 131,575 349,495 117,143 105,102 20,586 64,942 656,234 
Mids 75,999 250,745 59,810 86,321 23,758 48,687 466,866 
South 174,748 439,862 79,782 97,958 101,943 77,897 786,701 
GLA 206,189 218,208 94,189 65,739 88,215 20,863 522,116 
England 588,512 1,258,310 350,924 355,120 234,502 212,388 2,431,410 
Wales 22,046 71,355 12,718 15,642 8,769 12,696 122,271 
Scotland 39,048 122,393 23,280 33,368 41,758 18,992 229,942 
G B 644,096 1,446,779 406,961 412,515 256,904 246,012 2,783,093 
Older        
North 50,017 31,970 19,016 88,113 6,311 64,966 221,619 
Mids 30,554 24,371 10,576 35,081 3,271 80,793 157,922 
South 65,099 44,309 14,585 78,155 20,194 104,252 271,705 
GLA 71,724 20,171 13,331 50,893 39,622 48,415 192,560 
England 217,394 120,822 57,508 252,241 69,398 298,426 845,157 
Wales 12,142 7,081 2,162 9,828 736 9,914 37,329 
Scotland 16,693 11,535 3,315 14,884 7,130 24,899 67,365 
G B 236,155 137,432 65,187 290,573 66,367 319,489 936,338 
Source: author’s analysis of UKHLS (Wave 7) linked to ONS house price and VOA market rents data 
 
Household Type and Size Requirements 
The ‘snapshot’ picture of current backlog needs provided by the UKHLS (or similar 
surveys) can be used to provide a profile of the type of households involved and the 
size/type of housing which they might need. This is clearly useful intelligence for 
planning supply programmes.  
Table 4.8 presents a household type profile of various groups and sub-groups of 
households which are of particular interest, starting with all households aged under 
40. For this broad cohort, single person households are the most common type, 
accounting for a quarter, with couple/2-adult households accounting for a fifth. Most of 
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the rest are families, with over 40% couple families and 10% lone parent families. 
Multi-adult households are relatively rare overall.  
Households in need (with one or more of the above problems) have  different profiles, 
with less singles and couples, less small couple families but significantly more lone 
parent families, larger families and multi-adult households (e.g. flatsharers, lodgers). 
This is one way of looking at the potential client group for social/affordable housing; 
the other way is to look at the affordability bands themselves. The next column in the 
table shows the household type mix for households who, on our affordability norms, 
can only afford social housing. This group has some similarities of profile, but 
compared with the ‘need’ group they include a lot more singles, less larger families 
and less multi-adult. It is interesting to note the different profile, particularly in relation 
to single people, who have tended not to get much priority for social housing (whether 
through waiting lists or homelessness routes, except in Scotland), but who clearly 
often lack the ability to afford market tenures. 
Table 4.8: Household Type Composition of Different Household Need and 
Affordability Groups, GB 2015 
Household  All  Hshlds Hshlds All New  New  
Type Hshlds < 40 & < 40 & New  Hshlds Hshlds 
  <40 in need 
afford 
SR Hshlds in need 
afford 
SR 
Single Younger 24.3% 8.4% 28.6% 43.9% 42.2% 47.1% 
L P Fam 10.2% 25.3% 24.5% 7.7% 8.0% 7.8% 
Couple 20.8% 6.9% 6.9% 26.2% 27.2% 19.5% 
Cp & 1 chd 13.2% 7.7% 7.6% 5.7% 6.0% 6.2% 
Cp & 2 chn 21.4% 18.3% 16.3% 4.1% 2.9% 4.8% 
Cp & 3+ chn 6.9% 11.5% 10.4% 1.2% 0.7% 1.7% 
Multi Adult 2.9% 21.1% 5.4% 8.5% 11.3% 10.2% 
Sing Eld 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 0.7% 2.0% 
Cp Eld 0.3% 0.8% 0.3% 0.7% 1.0% 0.7% 
Source: author’s analysis of UKHLS (Wave 7 for all households, Waves 3-7 for new households) 
linked to ONS house price and VOA market rents data 
The right hand part of the table looks at households who have just newly formed. 
Unsurprisingly, this group is much more skewed towards single person households 
and couples (2 adults) without children. There is not so much difference between the 
profile of the group ‘in need’ (including just before moving to form a new household) 
and the profile of all new households, and indeed a high proportion of new households 
do record current or recent needs. Again, new households whose affordability profile 
suggests social housing is appropriate also have a similar profile, although this time 
with less couples and even more singles. Overall, the picture from this is that future 
social housing requirements could well include a strong element of single person and 
non-family households. This could have implications for both size and type of dwelling 
(e.g. more apartments).  
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In looking at size we use both the conventional ‘bedroom standard’, for social housing 
itself, and at a somewhat enhanced version which as argued in Chapter 3 is certainly 
more appropriate for shared ownership and intermediate rent, and possibly in some 
instances for social housing itself. So the top half of the Table 4.9 looks at the same 
groups as were used in Table 4.7, starting with all households under 40. For the overall 
cohort there is quite a strong emphasis on 1-bed and 2-bed accommodation, with a 
bare 20% in the traditional ‘family’ housing size range (3-bed plus). However, younger 
households in need have a profile more skewed towards family accommodation, 
including a significant need for 4+ bedrooms, and only a more limited proportion of 1-
bed . However, again as we saw with household type, when you look at the client 
group defined by affordability you see much more emphasis on 1-bed units and less 
on the larger sizes. 
New households are much more strongly skewed to small units, two-thirds only 
qualifying for 1-bed and less than 10% for 3+ beds.  
Table 4.9: Dwelling Size Requirements of Different Household Need and Affordability 
Groups, GB 2015 
Bedroom All  Hshlds Hshlds All New  New  
Requirement Hshlds < 40 & < 40 & New  Hshlds Hshlds 
  <40 in need afford SR Hshlds in need afford SR 
1 37.6% 11.1% 33.8% 67.0% 65.4% 64.5% 
2 42.7% 42.6% 39.2% 24.7% 23.6% 24.9% 
3 15.4% 27.3% 19.2% 4.7% 5.1% 5.5% 
4+ 4.3% 18.4% 7.6% 3.5% 5.5% 4.7% 
 All  Hshlds Hshlds All New  New  
Enhanced Bed- Hshlds < 40 & < 40 & New  Hshlds Hshlds 
room Req't <40 aff PR/SO aff IR Hshlds aff PR/SO aff IR 
1 21.6% 9.7% 34.0% 46.4% 26.6% 57.1% 
2 58.1% 62.6% 42.4% 44.7% 68.0% 38.7% 
3 15.4% 20.6% 16.8% 3.2% 2.8% 4.3% 
4+ 4.8% 7.0% 6.6% 5.4% 2.7% 0.0% 
Source: author’s analysis of UKHLS (Wave 7 for all households, Waves 3-7 for new households) 
linked to ONS house price and VOA market rents data 
Note: Top part of table is based on the ‘Bedroom Standard’ conventionally used in Social Renting 
allocation and official housing surveys; Lower part is an enhanced standard more appropriate to 
intermediate sector and market housing.  
When we consider the intermediate rent and shared ownership tenures (the latter 
overlapping in affordability terms with market renting), and apply the enhanced 
bedroom standards, there is a marked shift one 1-bed to 2-bed particularly. So for 
the typical shared owner candidates one would expect 60% plus of 2-bed, relatively 
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few 1-bed, and about 20% of 3-beds. For the intermediate rent candidates there 
would be a bigger role for 1-bed, at about a third, and slightly less larger units. For 
these tenures, the profile for new households and existing younger households is 
fairly similar, although more of the new shared owner candidates would go for 1-bed 
and few would go for 3+ beds, and a majority of intermediate rent candidates would 
be for 1-bed.  
Core and wider homelessness 
In recent research for Crisis we have developed a focus on ‘core’ and ‘wider’ 
homelessness. Core homelessness represents households who are literally homeless 
at a point in time, and most of the groups encompassed within this are either not living 
in the private household population or unlikely to be well-represented in large 
household surveys, even if they are (for example, sofa-surfers). It is difficult to 
determine the exact overlap but a high proportion of cases shown in Table 4.10 below 
are unlikely to be captured by the UKHLS or similar surveys. As can be seen from the 
table, the numbers are significant, approaching 160,000 households in 2016 across 
Great Britain, with a high concentration in London. This group are clearly in relatively 
urgent need and it is clear from widespread evidence that they are overwhelmingly 
poor and lacking in financial capacity to compete in the open housing market. The 
homeless population is not a static group, requiring to be housed once and for all. 
There is considerable turnover, estimated to involve nearly 400,000 households over 
a year across Britain (Bramley 2018 forthcoming Table 7).  
Core homelessness may also be seen as the tip of a larger iceberg of backlog housing 
need. In the same study we estimate that there is a further 1.1 million households we 
class as ‘wider homeless’, in the sense that they are at tangible risk of falling into 
homelessness, or they already have and are still awaiting a longer term resolution of 
their housing needs. This group maps fairly well onto the broader housing needs 
discussed here, including concealed households, sharing households, private renters 
at risk of losing their tenancy, as well as people in adequate but temporary 
accommodation and people leaving institutions.  
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Table 4.10: Core Homelessness Estimates by Type of Accommodation Situation and 
Broad Region/Country, 2011 and 2016  
 2011 2016 
Rough Sleepers 6,100 9,100 
Hostels 42,900 37,200 
Unsuitable Temporary Accommodation 10,100 19,300 
Sofa Surfing 43,900 67,000 
Other 18,000 25,800 
Total 121000 158400 
 2011 2016 
Core Homeless by Broad Region & Country 
Saved 2011 2016 
Scotland 13,100 11,000 
Wales 4,900 5,400 
North 19,300 19,800 
Midlands 14,700 18,400 
South 28,400 39,500 
Greater London + 40,600 62,700 
Great Britain 121,000 156,800 
Source: Bramley (2017). 
4.3  A first estimate of housing requirements 
As discussed briefly in the methodology chapter (2), our first approach to assessing 
‘Housing Requirements’ entails an essentially ‘static’ projection and re-allocation of 
households into more appropriate tenures. This exercise follows in some respects 
from the mainstream tradition in housing needs/requirements assessments in UK and 
elsewhere (Holmans, 1995, 2001; McDonald & Whitehead 2015), by taking household 
projections as a starting point, modifying these in various ways and then combining 
information on affordability and existing housing needs. We characterise this approach 
as ‘static’ because it does not assume or represent any changes in market conditions 
(particularly ‘affordability’), nor any adaptive behavioural changes in response to 
changed conditions, including enhanced supply. These more dynamic aspects are 
better captured by the model described in the following chapter. Insofar as enhanced 
housing supply leads to moderation of affordability and access barriers, then there 
would be a general expectation that, in the medium term, things would almost certainly 
turn out better than in the static projection, and it might not be necessary to build so 
much (affordable) housing as indicated here. However, on the other hand, if the 
external conditions and economic events meant that things were likely to get worse 
(as implied in the homelessness projections research mentioned previously), then that 
may push things in the other direction.  
The advantage of this approach is that it does present a set of numbers which many 
practitioners would recognise and could relate to, and the steps reached in generating 
these numbers are probably easier to grasp than the full workings of an economic 
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model. As the findings presented below will demonstrate, it does bring out some 
features of the current situation rather clearly.  
We focus in this approach in particular on two groups of households: 
A. The existing stock of ‘under-40’ households 
B. The ongoing flow of ‘new’ households.  
These groups represent the cohort of households making new demands on the 
housing system and often finding difficulty in becoming established. Some reasons 
why the needs of older households are less critical to this calculation were discussed 
in section 4.2 above. We make extensive use of data derived from the analysis of the 
recent UKHLS survey data, already referred to descriptively above, where we 
presented the current profile of under-40 and newly forming households, in terms of 
affordability bands, existing tenure, and existing housing needs. We go through a 
process of reallocating households into more appropriate (affordable) tenure options.  
Having done this separately for the two groups, we then combine them by converting 
each to an annual flow, dividing A. by 15 and B. by 5. (15 as an appropriate time frame 
corresponding to the programme period 2016-31, 5 because our new household data 
is based on five years pooled). The reallocation applies the following 
rules/assumptions.  
Reallocation rules 
1) A small proportion (3%) of existing owners who are classified in the lowest two 
affordability bands are deemed to be unsustainable owners and are reallocated 
into social rented housing.  
2) 60% of social renters and 75% of private renters who have enough income to 
buy, reduced by the proportion estimated to be unable to save a deposit in 5 
years (averaging 16% but varying by region), are reallocated to owner 
occupation.  
3) 10% of social renters and of private renters who have enough income to buy 
(at market level), reduced by the proportion estimated to be unable to save a 
deposit in 5 years, are allocated into shared ownership 
4) The same number as in 3) above are allocated into Intermediate Rent 
5) 50% of social and of private renters with enough income to rent at market rates, 
but not to buy, are allocated to shared ownership 
6) 50% of social and private renters with enough income to rent at intermediate 
rent levels are allocated to intermediate rent. 
7) 75% of private renters whose affordability band indicates social renting and who 
are in need (as defined in s.4.2) are reallocated from private renting, 80% of 
these to social rent and 20% to intermediate rent.  
As a general comment, these rules could be said to pitched towards the maximum end 
of what might be considered feasible/reasonable. It would be possible to vary these, 
and we could explore some variations, partly related to feasibility concerns. At this 
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stage we are aiming to generate a comprehensive picture of what would be needed to 
achieve a good match between incomes, needs and actual housing tenure position, 
for both existing and expected newly forming households.  
This quite detailed analysis is then combined with key numbers governing the overall 
growth in housing requirements. We start from the official household projections. 
However, we then step beyond these in one important respect, by taking account of 
‘suppressed household formation’. Significant evidence for this phenomenon has been 
presented in the Crisis Homelessness Monitor (Fitzpatrick et al 2018) and elsewhere 
(e.g. Bramley 2016, 2018). In particular, household ‘headship’ rates (often now called 
‘household representative rates’) for younger adults (up to age 35 or so) have been 
falling significantly since the early 1990s, especially in London and the South, whereas 
previously (up to the 1980s) they had shown quite strong growth. Econometric 
evidence shows clearly that these changes do in significant degree reflect a response 
to housing affordability issues (prices and incomes), other economic drivers (e.g. 
unemployment) and direct housing supply (social lettings), as well as a range of other 
socio-demographic factors (Bramley et al 2010, Bramley & Watkins 2016). We use 
such econometric functions in the dynamic housing market modelling approach 
described in the next chapter. In this ‘static’ approach, we make a reasonable, 
conservative assumption about a level of suppressed household growth which would 
re-emerge given a better level of supply and affordability17. We reverse the decline for 
the younger adults observed since 1992, differentially according to the regional data, 
and we then add a modest additional growth in headship for this group, equal to the 
increase observed in the least pressured region of England (East Midlands) between 
1992 and 2002. The effect is to increase annual household growth in England by 
69,000, from 216,000 to 285,000. 
Table 4.11 below shows the build-up of the overall housing numbers for England 
following this approach. The first two rows show the 2014-based household projection 
average growth number (216,000 per anum), and this is followed by the addition made 
to reflect suppressed household formation, as described above (totalling nearly 
69,000). Certain other additions are also, as always, required when translating this 
into a new dwellings number.  
  
                                                          
17 ‘conservative’ in the sense that we do not suggest a full return to the growth rates in headship observed in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Some reasons for caution about this are rehearsed in McDonald & Whitehead 2015.  
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Table 4.11: Enhancements to Household Projection Numbers as basis for Static 
Housing Requirements Projection, England 2016-2031 (Number per annum) 
      Top down 
ENGLAND            Inputs 
Household projection      216,284 
Additional suppressed household formation    68,884 
Demolitions to reflect baseline (10k) plus estate renewal/Grenfell/cond (20k) 32,000 
Need to increase average vacancy rate (+1.5%pt) to enable more movement  22,000 
Migration contingency  (not included)     13,769 
Recommended new completions (inc net conv/CoU) number  339,169 
  if including migrn contingency         352,938 
 
Firstly, some allowance needs to be made for demolitions. Recent data for England 
show a typical annual number of demolitions of 10,000, which is pretty small for a large 
country. It is assumed that this will need to be increased substantially to provide for 
(a) the larger anticipated programme of large scale estate renewals, (b) dealing with 
some of the worst cases highlighted by the Grenfell tragedy, and (c) dealing with some 
housing in poor condition, particularly in low demand areas. It is further assumed that 
there would need to be some increase in the assumed vacancy rate. Vacancy rates in 
England have been running at very low levels and there is a normative argument for 
increasing this to enable more movement and flexibility in the system. It is also 
inevitable that with a much bigger housing supply programme, vacancies will rise 
anyway, so this is necessary purely on accounting grounds. The table also contains 
provision to allow a further contingency for changes in migration, relative to what has 
been assumed in the projections, which could be positive or negative – no contingency 
is included in the baseline assessment. Even without that, however, it can be seen 
that the new supply requirement for England is actually just under 340,000, which is 
well in excess of the 216,000 basic (2014-based) household projection.  
At the same time, it must be observed that England has struggled to build even 
approaching the latter figure in the last couple of decades. MHCLG have reported ‘net 
additions’ which occasionally reach this level, e.g. in 2016 it was 217,000, but this 
included 5,700 net conversions within housing, 37,200 net changes of use, with only 
9,800 demolitions to offset. The change of use figures are exceptional, relatively 
recent, and of questionable desirability/sustainability in the longer term. Nonetheless, 
the housing supply target we are generating here is for new supply inclusive of 
conversions and changes of use, but with demolitions accounted for separately and 
explicitly.  
Table 4.12 below shows how the ‘reallocation’ of new and existing households 
between tenures is combined with the household growth and dwelling requirement 
information, for England as a whole. The first two rows show the net effects of initial 
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tenure destinations of existing and new households plus the effects of progressively 
reallocating them to more appropriate tenures over the plan period. – the first row total 
is the gross new household formation experienced over the last 5 years; the second 
row is the enhanced household formation derived as described above. The next 
component of household change to be accounted for is migration (net, in household 
equivalent terms). The number shown (69,000) is our interpretation of the underlying 
assumptions of ONS in their population projections (namely that international net in-
migration will remain significantly positive, albeit at lower levels than seen in the last 
decade or so after UK leaves EU in 2022). The tenure distribution is based on that 
observed for recent migrants in UKHLS. The next item is household dissolutions, a 
very important and neglected subject in the study of household demographics. 
Essentially quite a lot of new housing requirements will be met by stock released 
through older households dissolving (through death, institutionalisation, or moving in 
with others), and the predictions here are based on ages of existing household by 
tenure, with the total level essentially a balancing item with net household growth. This 
measure of dissolutions really refers to long term exits from the housing system, rather 
than short term ‘churn’ in the middle years or life, for example associated with 
relationship changes (for further discussion see Bramley 2010b). Finally, the allocation 
of demolitions and vacancies across the tenures is a judgement, partly informed by 
expectations around estate renewal programmes.  
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Table 4.12: :Baseline Static Projection of Housing Requirements by Component of Change and Tenure - England 2016-2031 
(number per annum) 
ENGLAND       Indicative Detailed      
Components of household growth         Target Outcome Own SR PR ShOwn Int rent 
New households (gross) Under-40s  'half in half' reallocation  370,038 368,691 147,113 89,645 92,056 17,595 22,282 
 marginal additional new hhd + realloc 68,884 67,412 24,783 19,154 18,524 1,612 3,338 
Migrants  net inter & domest     68,999 66,273 6,842 11,679 40,992 2,265 4,496 
Dissolutions (balancing)      212,753 219,163 161,525 44,043 13,595 0 0 
Enhanced net household growth     285,169 283,213 17,213 76,435 137,977 21,472 30,116 
Demolitions      32,000 32,000 7,500 16,000 8,500 0 0 
Vacancies      22,000 22,300 6,000 5,000 8,400 1,000 1,900 
Total New Dwellings      341,151 337,513 30,713 97,435 154,877 22,472 32,016 
Quotas                 29%   7% 9% 
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The ‘bottom line’ of Table 4.12 is striking, in a number of respects. Firstly, it suggests 
that in England there is a need to build or otherwise create an additional 340,000 
dwellings per annum in the period to 2031. This is roughly double the average 
performance of recent years, and 57% above the relatively ‘good’ year of 2016. 
Secondly, it indicates that it would be appropriate to build approaching 100,000 of 
these units as social rented housing, which compares with typical recent levels of 
around 20,000 (less if you discount ‘Affordable Rent’). Thirdly, it indicates that there 
could also be a substantial role for intermediate sector housing, both shared ownership 
(or equivalent LCHO) and intermediate rent, totalling 54,000 units per year, with a 
balance slightly in favour of intermediate rent. Finally, this static projection suggests 
that there is a requirement for approaching 185,000 private sector dwellings per year 
in England. This number is not so different from recent levels of output, although 
clearly well above the levels seen in most years since 2008.  
More concerning, from the tenure analysis, is the implication that the bulk of the net 
increase would end up as private renting rather than home ownership. If such a 
scenario were to transpire, this would clearly pose a real challenge to politicians in all 
parties, who emphasise trying to meet the aspirations of ‘generation rent’ for home 
ownership, as well as housing needs and affordability issues in a more general sense. 
This, of course, is only a provisional finding from what is a static projection, which does 
not take account of all of the market and behavioural adjustments which are likely, nor 
of policy, fiscal and regulatory changes (some already implemented recently) which 
might impact significantly on the tenure balance. Growth in home ownership would be 
boosted noticeably by the LCHO (shared ownership) provision implied/recommended 
in this projection, and more generous schemes could increase these numbers. We will 
explore this issue further, both in the next chapter where we look at outcomes from 
the dynamic model, and in the next phase of the research which will examine more 
exhaustively the implications of different assumptions and scenarios.  
An adjunct to the bottom line of Table 4.12 comes in the form of percentage ‘quotas’ 
indicated. This is particularly important in the context of the planning system, where 
major issues concern the setting of targets for appropriate proportions of affordable 
housing, and within that the relative amount indicated for social rent rather than 
intermediate tenures. The overall picture for England from this analysis is that the 
overall quota would be 45% ‘affordable; with 29% within that being for social rented 
housing. Clearly these numbers are above the levels which have typically been 
achieved, except in a few highly pressured localities with particularly strong policies.  
Table 4.12 breaks the bottom line dwelling requirements by tenure down across four 
broad regions of England, showing Wales and Scotland as well for comparison18. The 
table suggests that much more new housing supply is required in London and the 
South than in the Midlands or North, or indeed Scotland or Wales. In particular, the 
                                                          
18 The data sources available for Wales and Scotland do not allow precise comparability in all respects and 
these estimates are provisional and should be treated with more caution at this stage.  
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figure shown for London is roughly double the level of numbers being actively planned 
for by the London Mayor, which themselves represent a massive hike in output relative 
to performance over recent decades. This raises serious questions about the feasibility 
and sustainability of such a further concentration of supply in the capital, and whether 
it might be better to make some of this provision in the wider South, as well as 
questions about regional economic policy19.  
Secondly, there appears to be a significant requirement for social rented provision, 
and also for both types of intermediate affordable provision, in all broad regions. 
Indeed, the percentage quotas look surprisingly even, although the rather lower quota 
for social renting in Scotland is perhaps to be expected. The region with the largest 
absolute and proportional scope for intermediate tenures is the South, again 
unsurprisingly.  Thirdly, the rather perverse looking relationship between private 
renting and owner occupation features across the regions, although London stands 
out as a case where net growth of owner occupation is indicated.  
Table 4.13: Baseline Static Projection of Housing Requirements by Tenure and 
Broad Region and Country, Great Britain 2016-2031 (number per annum and implied 
quota in percent) 
Numbers  Total Private  Social  Shared Intermed All 
 (annual)   Dwellings Sector Rent Own'shp Rent Affordable 
North   68,992 38,354 19,988 4,379 6,271 30,638 
Midlands  56,030 31,034 17,849 3,889 3,258 24,996 
South   90,810 43,119 27,211 8,650 11,830 47,691 
Gtr London  121,682 73,083 32,387 5,555 10,657 48,599 
England total 337,513 185,590 97,435 22,472 32,016 151,924 
Wales  12,951 6,184 4,514 848 1,405 6,767 
Scotland   22,304 11,296 5,088 3,086 2,834 11,008 
GB Total   372,769 203,070 107,037 26,406 36,256 169,698 
Percent         
share (quota)       
North    56% 29% 6% 9% 44% 
Midlands   55% 32% 7% 6% 45% 
South    47% 30% 10% 13% 53% 
Gtr London   60% 27% 5% 9% 40% 
        
Wales   48% 35% 7% 11% 52% 
Scotland     51% 23% 14% 13% 49% 
 
The quotas indicated for affordable housing as a whole range between 40% (London) 
and 53% (South). It has to be said that these are at higher levels than would be 
                                                          
19 Issues and concerns about household projections for London and about the balance of supply between 
London and the surrounding regions were aired in the author’s contribution to the London Housing 
Commission deliberations (Bramley 2016b), as well as in Bramley & Watkins 2016 
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considered ‘viable’ in contemporary planning practice around s.106 agreements and 
would entail considerable public subsidy as well as consideration of the best forms of 
mixed developments. However, subsequent stages of this research reported in 
sections 6 onwards di revisit these, both from a feasibility/viability point of view but 
also having regard to changes in the picture of needs from a more dynamic analysis.  
As part of this, it is therefore appropriate to defer discussion of the specific findings on 
Scotland and Wales, until we have considered the fuller analysis of outcomes and the 
suggested more optimal levels and mixes of supply which emerge from this.  
 It is necessary also to reiterate, again, that this is a static model which only gives a 
first view housing needs and requirements, albeit one which is quite well based on an 
analysis of current affordability and a reasonable interpretation of demographic 
projections and prospects. What it cannot do is provide a full account of all of the likely 
adjustments in housing markets, migration, household formation andhousing turnover 
(including social sector re-lets) which would result from this supply scenario,. A 
sustained large increase in supply is likely to have a substantial impact on affordability 
and on all of these factors over a 15 year time horizon. This is likely, on balance, to 
shift demand/requirements up the tenure/affordability hierarchy, so leading to a 
potentially lower number for the social rented housing requirement. Also, people’s 
behaviour in the housing market may go beyond the norms assumed in our 
affordability analysis.  For example people may trade greater housing outgoings for 
more choice of location or type of accommodation, and regard the risks involved as 
acceptable. On the other hand, generous housing supply and better affordability is 
likely to increase the rate of new household formation, and a lot of these additional 
households will tend to be towards the lower end of the affordability hierarchy. There 
are also issues to be considered about the practical limits to boosted supply, and some 
potential dangers in certain localities where housing markets are relatively fragile, 
namely the re-emergence of ‘low demand’ problems.   
All of these considerations are explored using  the dynamic model to examine a 
balance array of outcomes in Chapter 5.   
4.4     Conclusions on the current profile of need 
Less than half of younger households can afford to buy on income alone, while one-
third have a level of income compatible with social housing. In between these groups 
are those who can afford market renting, or shared ownership, and those who could 
afford intermediate renting, which together comprise rather under a quarter of the total. 
There are large regional differences in affordability, particularly in the ability to buy and 
the potential role of intermediate rent.  
Recently newly formed households are poorer than younger households as a whole, 
with less than a fifth able to buy without additional assistance, and a majority in the 
income range associated with social renting. 
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Around a fifth of all households have experienced one or more housing needs over 
the last 1-2 years, but this proportion is higher for younger households, typically 
around 30-40% for those likely to require rental or affordable housing, and higher still 
(60-70%) for new households in the same position. There is less regional difference 
in the shares of household with these needs than in the case of affordability.  
We use this evidence as a basis for an initial approach to estimating the requirements 
for different tenures at national level and in different broad regions. This entails 
applying a set of rules for reallocating households to more appropriate tenures having 
regard to affordability and the presence of housing needs, and converting stocks to 
flows. This analysis is then combined with basic household growth demographics and 
assumptions about the overall scale of the supply programme. This shows that there 
is a clear case for a greatly expanded level of housing supply across the UK, including 
a major expansion in provision of social rented housing with significant additional 
provision for shared ownership and intermediate rent. Such provision is needed in all 
regions, but the indicated numbers overall are most challenging in London. The results 
of this approach give cause for concern about the ongoing imbalance between private 
renting and home ownership. They also highlight the challenges around the viability 
and financial feasibility of such an ambitious social and affordable housing 
programme.  
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Chapter 5  Forward Projections of the Housing Market and Need 
Outcomes 
 
5.1  Introduction to the modelling approach 
The centrepiece of our preferred approach to assessing future housing requirements 
is the Sub-Regional Housing Market Model (SRHMM). The main character and 
features of this model were set out in s.2.1 above. In essence, the main difference 
between using this model and the kind of approach set out in Chapter 4 is that the 
SRHMM represents a dynamic picture of the housing market incorporating behavioural 
adjustment and feedback mechanisms, whereas the Chapter 4 approach is essentially 
static and mechanistic. To put it another way, in Chapter 4 we have rearranged certain 
pieces on the board, and added some other pieces, whereas in the SRHMM 
everything changes and evolves in an interacting fashion in each scenario. The 
analysis in Chapter 4 should give a reasonable idea of the initial direction of travel, in 
terms of changing the location and mix of housing supply, but is unlikely to reveal all 
aspects of the final outcome.   
The version of the model used in this study (v18w) is similar to that used in the recent 
Crisis Homelessness Projections research, and quite similar to that used in research 
to support the Joseph Rowntree Foundation’s Solve UK Poverty review in 2016 
(Bramley et al 2016). However, it has developed quite a bit from the version reported 
in the article by Bramley & Watkins (Progress in Planning 2016). Among the limited 
updates and improvements are some additional indicators and parameters used to 
control the volume and spatial distribution of planned housing land release and social 
housing output, to facilitate finer tuning out these numbers to apparent need.  
It should also be noted that there has been a particular focus on England, although we 
do also model Scotland and Wales. We have attempted to update key data (e.g. on 
supply, prices and rents) for Wales and Scotland, and to ensure reasonable 
consistency, but there may still be room for improvement in these estimates. 
Scotland’s relatively favourable situation in terms of supply-demand balance in the 
housing market may raise issues in terms of policy priorities. 
In this chapter we run a sequence of scenarios, in order to demonstrate how and to 
what extent expanding different elements of housing supply in different regions 
contributes to more desirable outcomes (key outcome measures are identified in s.5.2 
below).  
We start in Section 5.3 with a baseline scenario which, may be characterised as 
carrying on with policy settings as in 2016. There are some increases in rates of private 
and social housebuilding, but the numbers do not come close to those now being 
proposed by government (for total additions) let alone those implied by our static 
projection in Section 4. Forecast outcomes to 2031 are summarised in Table 5.1.  
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From Section 5.4 onwards we show a sequence of alternative scenarios, all of which 
involve increases in total housing supply, but of varying magnitudes, with differing 
geographical distribution, and with differing amounts of social and affordable housing 
in the mix.  
The first of these scenarios sees overall housebuilding increased in line with the 
Government’s planning guidance issued in autumn of 2017 (bigger increases where 
affordability is worse), but without any particular effort to increase social housebuilding. 
Results are shown in Table 5.2. The next alternative also increases social rented 
supply to 65,000 (Table 5.3) but without particular targeting. The next variant has 
similar total numbers but targets the general supply increase more towards growth 
areas in the south of England and somewhat less to London (Table 5.4).  
Section 5.5 has a stronger theme of targeting, but the next scenario actually brings in 
a package of non-supply measures to help prevent, relieve and reduce homelessness 
(Table 5.5). The following scenario increases social and total housing a bit (to 71k and 
354k), but with geographical distribution of social housing guided more by affordable 
housing need (Table 5.6).  
Section 5.6 explores the upper limits of increasing social housing supply. A scenario 
with a level of social housing output slightly above that derived from Table 4.10 (101k) 
along with a somewhat higher overall total (375k), but without particular needs-based 
targeting, is tested partly to explore this (Table 5.8). This is contrasted with a scenario 
with fairly high social housing (85k) targeted on need as well as fairly high total supply 
(361k), in Table 5.9,  and one with slightly higher social housing, slightly less total 
housing, and somewhat less strong targeting of total or affordable numbers  (Table 
5.10). The last two scenarios are shown to have similarly high levels of favourable 
outcomes, and provide the basis for our overall recommendation on the level of supply 
for affordable housing.  
5.2.  Key Outcome Measures 
As argued in our proposal for this research, we characterise our preferred approach 
to the assessment of housing requirements as being ‘outcome-based’. We use the 
SRHMM to generate forecasts of a range of relevant outcomes in a baseline scenario 
and then in a range of alternative scenarios, where we vary the quantity, mix and 
geographical distribution of supply. Through an iterative process we seek to find the 
best set of outcomes which can be achieved given the background assumptions, 
including potentially assumptions about resource limits and policy constraints, 
although these are not a main concern in this study (some work on subsidy costs is 
reported in the concluding section 8 and Appendix A).  
The model is capable of generating quite a wide range of predicted values for different 
variables, but we have selected a subset of 20 key indicators (including certain ‘low 
demand’ indicators) of outcomes relating to housing, households, affordability, tenure, 
housing needs and homelessness. A simple summary table format enables us to 
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assess a particular scenario at a glance using these indicators. The main focus is on 
changes from our base year of 2016 to our main target year of 2031, and on 
differences between the outcome on each particular scenario and a baseline scenario 
(described further below). While levels and changes in outcomes are primarily 
measured through national average values, we also look at a measure of regional 
inequality or disparity, and the extent to which this is reduced.  
The key outcome indicators currently reported are as follows 
Supply Numbers 
• Total new housebuilding completions, number per year averaged over 
preceding 5 years, 2016 and 2031. 
• New social housing completions. 
Demographics 
• Number of households total. 
• Household growth, number per year averaged over preceding 5 years. 
 
Affordability 
 
• Affordability to buy, percent of younger households able to afford to buy, 
adjusted for saving for deposit and access to larger lumps of wealth. 
• Affordability to rent in market, percent of younger households. 
• Poverty after housing costs, percent of all households with less than 60% 
median net equivalent income after housing costs. 
• Financial difficulties, percent of households with self-reported difficulties 
maintaining housing payments. 
Tenure 
• Younger homeownership: percent of Under-40 households in owner 
occupation. 
• General homeownership: percent of all households in owner occupation. 
• Private renting: percent of all households in private renting. 
Housing Need 
• Concealed/sharing households as percent of all households. 
• Backlog housing needs – percent of all households with one or more of 
affordability problems, overcrowding, concealed, sharing or unsuitable 
housing.20 
                                                          
20 Based on Estimating Housing Need study definition using English Housing Survey base; see Note 10 
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• Core homelessness: number of households estimated to be rough sleeping or 
in similar situations, or in hostels, unsuitable temporary accommodation or sofa-
surfing. 
• Wider homelessness (households who are statutorily homeless but not in ‘core’ 
group above, plus other households at significant risk of falling into 
homelessness in coming year). 
• Annual net new need for affordable housing; the number of households newly 
forming, plus half of net migrant households to area, who are unable to afford 
market rent, less the annual flow of re-lets of social housing (excluding 
transfers). 
• Chances of rehousing: the annual flow of lettings of social housing to new 
tenants as a percentage of the backlog housing need.  
Low Demand 
• Extent of ‘excess’ private housing vacancies (% over 6%). 
• Proportion of LA’s where social rent re-let rate above 6%.  
• Proportion of LA’s where house prices are significantly (>10%) below 
replacement build cost. 
• We also report in the text model predictions of numbers of demolitions based 
on a proportion of ‘excess vacancies’ at HMA level. 
 
5.3  Baseline Scenario 
The baseline scenario is intended to represent ‘carrying on as we are/were’ as at 
2016/17, prior to the injection of additional major policy measures for increasing supply 
of general or affordable housing. This scenario should be consistent with ONS 
population projections at national level21. It is intended to reflect recent macro-
economic scenarios based on Treasury summaries of short term forecasts and OBR 
assessments for the medium term. Since these reflect a more pessimistic view than 
previously about productivity prospects, this has led to some downward revision in 
GDP and earnings growth. Another difference from previous baselines (including 
Homeless Projections) is that the projection of future GDP/GVA growth puts more 
weight on past local performance, so implying greater regional divergence (this is one 
change designed to try to match market outcomes better to observed changes up to 
2016). Another slight difference is that we include feedback from levels of 
housebuilding activity to GVA levels. In common with other recent scenarios, we make 
some allowance for Brexit effects on growth and we include a mild recession in the 
late 2020s.  
The baseline housing supply scenario is the same as has been used in recent versions 
of the model, essentially reflecting the aggregation of local plan targets which emerged 
                                                          
21 It is currently broadly consistent with a slightly earlier set of population projections; sensitivity tests for 
assumptions about migration, births and deaths were undertaken as reported in Chapter 7 
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from the ‘Localism’ phase of planning policy c.2010-15. The social housing component 
of supply follows previous parameters, being treated as partly a function of past levels 
and partly of new private output, with a starting level similar to recent actual 
completions. LCHO output is put at 57% of social housing output in the baseline.  
Table 5.1 summarises key outcomes in this baseline scenario. It shows total new 
housebuilding languishing at a very low level in the 5 years to 2016 (114k) but more 
than doubling by the target period (5 years to 2031). However, this level of output 
(240k) reflects earlier targets, not the 300k which government now seems to be 
targeting, let alone the 350k suggested in the previous chapter. New social 
housebuilding would only rise by a more moderate amount, from 17k pa to 28k pa. 
Under this scenario, household growth would remain at a subdued level, below that in 
the base period (190k vs 214k) and below the official household projections.  
Under this scenario, average affordability to buy would fall by 12% (from 43% to 38%), 
while affordability to rent would fall by 3.5% (from 62% to 60%). There is marked 
regional disparity in affordability, with the former measure showing a difference 
between the highest and lowest broad region which is 68% of the mean value in 2016 
and still 57% in 2031. Both the other affordability  problem indicators (relative poverty 
AHC and financial difficulties) would also show a moderate worsening, increasing by 
5% and 7.5% respectively, while displaying strong regional disparities (of the order of 
40-90% between best and worst regions).  
Despite the recovery in supply, homeownership overall would continue to fall (by 7%) 
while homeownership by under-40s would fall marginally. There are significant 
regional disparities in home ownership, particularly for the under-40s. 
All measures of housing need would deteriorate. There would be a rise of 
concealed/sharing households by 9%, which corresponds closely with the rise of 9% 
in the wider homeless measure. Overall backlog need would rise by 14%, and the 
chances of a household in need being rehoused would fall by 11% to only 6% (i.e. a 
one-in 17 chance). The annual net new need for affordable housing would rise by 
nearly 40%. Core homelessness would rise by 36% to 191,000 in England.  
There are marked regional disparities in the housing need indicators, with the gap 
between best and worst regions in excess of 100% of the mean value in a number of 
cases.  
  
75 
 
Table 5.1: Key outcomes in baseline scenario, England 2016-31 
Baseline 18 April 2018     
SUMMARY OUTCOMES    Diff % 
England   
Change 
% vs baseline 
 2016 2031 2016-31 in 2031 
Total New Housebuilding 114,338 240,151 110.0% 0.2% 
New Social Housebuilding 16,840 28,165 67.3% 1.2% 
Number of Households 22,920,530 25,617,089 11.8% 0.0% 
Household Growth 214,154 190,030 -11.3% 0.1% 
     
Affordability to Buy % 43.4 38.4 -11.7% 0.0% 
Affordability to Rent  % 62.3 60.1 -3.5% 0.0% 
Owner Occ under 40 % 48.7 48.4 -0.8% 0.0% 
Owner Occ all % 66.7 62.2 -6.8% 0.0% 
Private Rent all % 18.4 22.2 20.9% 0.0% 
     
Rel Poverty AHC % 17.3 18.2 5.2% 19.6% 
Financial Difficulties % 12.2 13.1 7.5% 0.0% 
Concealed/sharing hhd % 4.6 5.0 9.1% -0.1% 
Backlog Housing Need  2,108,064 2,394,219 13.6% -0.1% 
Wider homeless 904,325 981,334 8.5% 0.0% 
Core homeless 137,600 180,100 30.9% -5.7% 
     
Annual net new need AH 77,403 107,358 38.7% -0.4% 
Chance of Rehousing % 6.9 6.2 -10.2% 0.6% 
Low Demand Indicators 2016 2031 
Change 
% 
Diff vs 
baseline 
HMAs Excess Vacancies 
(>6%) 2 39 1850.0% 66.7% 
HMAs High Re-lets (>6%) 16 15 -6.3% 26.7% 
HMAs Price< Cost 55 2 -96.4% 100.0% 
Note: Supply and other policy assumptions as at 2016-17. Total new build (England) rises 
from 114,000 to 240,000 p.a. by 2027-31 with distribution reflecting post-2010 localist 
planning system numbers. Social rented output rising from 17K to 28k with distribution 
partly pro rata past output and partly pro rata new private build. LCHO output 57% of 
social rent number.  
Table 5.1 also includes at the bottom three indicators of ‘low demand’ informed by 
research undertaken in 1999-2000 (Bramley & Pawson 2002). These are expressed 
as the number of housing market areas (out of 114) with (a) vacancy rates in excess 
of 6% in private sector, (b) social sector net re-let rates in excess of 6%, and (c) market 
price for a standard house (3 bed semi) significantl4y less than its estimated building 
cost. In 2016, few HMAs had excess vacancies, while a number (mainly 
Scotland/Wales, and possibly affected by data inconsistencies) had excess re-let 
rates, but quite a lot still had house prices below or near replacement build cost – 
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mainly in north and midlands. By 2031 in the baseline, the incidence of excess 
vacancies grows, whereas that of low relative prices drops away to a low level, while 
re-lets remain similar. These indicators are included to alert the model user and the 
reader to potential problems of excess supply and low demand emerging in certain 
areas.  
Clearly, taking a broad view across outcomes, carrying on as we are leads to bad 
outcomes getting worse, more or less across the board. There is clearly a need to do 
more, in terms of housing supply in general and affordable and social housing supply 
specifically, and other measures may be needed to really bring homelessness and 
some of the other problems down decisively.  
Some summary information about outcomes for Wales and Scotland is provided later. 
These cases will be examined in fuller detail in a later phase of this research.  
5.4  Supply scenarios 
The first alternative scenario considered is one where the general supply of housing 
is increased, without particular regard to tenure or affordable housing, essentially 
through raising the ‘planning numbers’. The basis for doing this is to use the new target 
numbers issued by the MHCLG in autumn 2017, based on a simple formula which 
essentially increased numbers relative to household projections depending on the 
extent to which the house-price-to-earnings ratio exceeded the average. These target 
numbers are LA-specific but we have aggregated them to the level of our HMAs.  
It was found on an initial test that just entering the MHCLG numbers did not have a 
large impact on modelled supply. This reflects a strong feature of the UK/English 
housing market, that the transmission mechanism between additional planning 
permissions and additional housing completions is somewhat weak. Our econometric 
modelling, based on  past local data over time, shows that typically 100 extra planning 
permissions leads to an increase of about 40-50 completions. This general 
phenomenon of planning take-up has been subject to considerable national debate 
and was the focus of a specific inquiry for the government recently, led by Oliver 
Letwin. To get an outcome closer to the Government’s intention, we have simply 
doubled the MHCLG numbers. We would argue that, unless measures are taken to 
increase the direct and timely delivery of planning numbers and permissions into 
actual starts and completions, this situation will persist and it will be necessary to 
substantially over-allocate land in order to achieve target numbers.  
As Table 5.2 shows, under this scenario, completions would be 26% higher in the 5 
years to 2031, which is a 44% increase in the change previously reported(the increase 
would be higher in 2021 and 2041). But planning permissions would have been 
increased by 122% to achieve this. There would be a marked regional skew to the 
increase, which would be 64% in London, 24% in the South, but only 10% in the 
Midlands and 7.5% in the North. Whether such a large concentration of extra new 
supply on London is desirable or achievable is a questionable issue, as it may entail 
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a lot of high density/high rise development and a lot of controversial estate 
redevelopment schemes, and there are good planning arguments for more emphasis 
on medium density new settlements and urban extensions in the South outside 
London  
In this scenario there is some consequential increase in social housing completions, 
but it is less in percentage terms (22%). This would arise as a natural consequence of 
the well-established application of planning policies and s106 agreements for 
affordable housing, given the greater volume of overall housebuilding planned.  
Table 5.2: Key outcome differences in scenario of large increase in general housing 
supply (based on MHCLG planning targets), England 2016-31 
   Difference 
Change 
% 
SUMMARY OUTCOMES  In 
in 
regional  
England   
Change 
% 
 
inequality 
 18 April 2018 2016 2031 2016-31 2031 
Total New 
Housebuilding 4.4% 26.2% 43.7%  
New Social 
Housebuilding 1.8% 21.7% 32.2%  
Number of Households 0.0% 3.0% 3.3%  
Household Growth 0.2% 33.0% 29.0%  
     
Affordability to Buy % 0.0% 3.5% 3.1% -103.0% 
Affordability to Rent  % 0.0% 0.9% 0.9% -35.5% 
Owner Occ under 40 % 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% -0.9% 
Owner Occ all % 0.0% -0.2% -0.1% 0.0% 
Private Rent all % 0.0% 1.4% 1.6%  
     
Rel Poverty AHC % 19.6% 19.6% -0.1% -33.7% 
Financial Difficulties % 0.0% -2.2% -2.4% -21.3% 
Concealed/sharing hhd 
% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% -30.9% 
Backlog Housing Need  0.2% -5.3% -6.2% -31.8% 
Wider homeless 0.0% -2.2% -2.4%  
Core homeless -2.4% -19.4% -23.5% -32.9% 
     
Annual net new need 
AH 1.0% -18.8% -27.2%  
Chance of Rehousing 
% -0.9% 11.0% 10.7% -19.0% 
Note. Planning numbers for overall housing changed to reflect MHCLG guidance, November 
2017, based on household projection enhanced by excess House Price to Earnings ratio. 
Total supply rises by 26-40% (England, 23-36% UK) to reach 303,000 by 2031 of which 
34,000 are social rented and 19,000 LCHO. 
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It should be noted that this increase in housing supply would be accompanied by a 
substantial increase in household growth, 33% in the five years to 2031 which is 
actually larger than the new build boost in that particular time slice. More typically 
household growth responds by about 60-70% of the supply change, but with a different 
time profile, and a stronger response in high demand regions. This change reflects 
additional new household formation and also, in particular affected regions, internal 
migration flows. The fact that this impact is captured in our model is a major difference 
from conventional housing needs assessments which use household projections as a 
fixed base.  
It has been argued by governments and economists, particularly since the Barker 
(2004) review, that a large scale increase in housing supply would have an effect in 
improving housing affordability, although this impact would be proportionally smaller 
and would take time to build up (see Bramley 2013 for a review of this issue). Our 
model suggests that this supply scenario would have a noticeable effect in improving 
affordability to buy, by around 3.5% by 2031.  There would be a more dramatic 
reduction in the extent of regional disparity in affordability, thanks to the regionally 
skewed supply boost. The affordability of home ownership in London would rise by 
86% (from 27% to 48% of younger households), and in the South by 17% (from 42% 
to 49%), even though in the North it would be virtually unchanged - however, the 
London affordability rise is from a very low level, and depends as noted upon a 
questionable large supply boost. It also seems to reflect a particularly extreme 
fluctuation around 2031 as the market reacts, and the longer term trajectory suggests 
an impact of about half of this magnitude. In refining these scenarios we might need 
to look at the phasing of the increased planning numbers, as well as the balance 
between London and surrounding area. 
Affordability of renting does not improve much at national level, although there is a 
substantial reduction in the regional disparity in this indicator as well. Despite the 
dramatic improvement in affordability in London, the overall share of owner occupation 
does not shift very much in this time period. The share of private renting actually 
increases slightly.  
There is a reduction in regional disparity in after-housing costs poverty, given a fall in 
AHC poverty in London and a slight rise in the North. There would be a moderate 
reduction in the average incidence of financial difficulties and a reduction in regional 
disparities. 
Generally the picture on housing needs is of modest reductions, e.g. in backlog need 
and wider homelessness, with a somewhat larger improvement in the chances of 
rehousing for those in need (1%) and a proportionately larger reduction (19%) in core 
homelessness as well as in net new need. There would also be a general reduction in 
the extent of regional disparities in needs measures, unsurprisingly given that London 
is usually the focus of the highest levels of housing need.  
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The overall conclusion of this scenario is that a large increase in general housing 
supply, even without a specific focus on social or affordable housing, would lead to 
generally beneficial outcomes across most of our target outcomes, including 
significant reductions in regional disparities. These findings partly reflect the 
concentration of this planned boost on London (and the South), although the extent of 
this concentration may be questioned. However, the average level of impact on 
affordability, particularly of market renting, is small, and the impact on the share of 
home ownership appears negligible (although absolute numbers of home owners 
would rise).  
Increasing social housing 
The next scenario considered is one where the supply of social housing is substantially 
increased as well, along with general new supply. The spatial distribution of general 
plan numbers remains as in the previous scenario, but social supply is increased partly 
pro rata past social completions and partly pro rata private completions - resulting in 
a more even regional distribution of the additional social units.  New social rented 
completions rise by 131% in the run-up to 2031, which would be around 65,000 
completions. Another feature of the model worth reporting here is that extra social 
completions have some positive knock-on effect on private completions, which also 
increase by an additional 6% points. Again, there is a further positive effect on 
household growth from this scenario, which would be particularly strong in the years 
up to 2031.  
Most of the outcome variables of interest would show a somewhat greater 
improvement than under the previous strategy. That would include a greater average 
improvement and a greater reduction in regional disparities for the affordability 
indicators and pretty well all of the need indicators. Of greater note would be the 10% 
reduction in backlog need, with 41% reduction in regional disparities; the 24% 
reduction in core homelessness, with 40% reduction in regional disparities; the 53% 
reduction in the annual net new need for affordable housing; and the dramatic 60% 
improvement in ‘chances of rehousing’ for households in need, with a 39% reduction 
in regional disparities. These indicators benefit from both the direct effect of new social 
supply on lettings but also the progressive later effect of increased re-lets supply.  
Again, this scenario has only the most marginal impacts on home ownership rates, 
although absolute number of owners would rise.  
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Table 5.3: Key outcome differences in scenario of large increase in general and 
social housing supply (based on MHCLG planning targets), England 2016-31 
   Difference 
Change 
% 
SUMMARY OUTCOMES   in 
in 
regional  
England   Change % 
 
inequality 
28-Mar-18 2016 2031 2016-31 2031 
Total New Housebuilding 16.7% 44.4% 49.7%  
New Social Housebuilding 65.6% 131.0% 65.2%  
Number of Households 0.4% 4.7% 4.9%  
Household Growth 7.7% 49.7% 34.6%  
     
Affordability to Buy % -0.8% 5.6% 5.7% -129.3% 
Affordability to Rent  % -0.2% 1.0% 1.2% -41.9% 
Owner Occ under 40 % 1.3% 1.0% -0.3% 3.2% 
Owner Occ all % 0.3% -0.4% -0.6% 0.6% 
Private Rent all % -0.4% 0.3% 0.8%  
     
Rel Poverty AHC % 19.1 17.5 -1.4 -36.1% 
Financial Difficulties % -0.3% -3.7% -3.7% -24.8% 
Concealed/sharing hhd % 1.7% -0.8% -2.7% -35.8% 
Backlog Housing Need  -0.3% -10.2% -11.2% -40.5% 
Wider homeless -0.5% -4.1% -4.0%  
Core homeless -2.8% -24.3% -29.9% -39.5% 
     
Annual net new need AH -5.1% -53.0% -70.2%  
Chance of Rehousing % 12.7% 60.3% 37.6% -38.8% 
Note: Overall planning numbers and distribution as for Table 5.2 scenario, with enhanced 
social housing pro rata past levels and private completions, achieving 347,000 total 
completions by 2031 of which 65,000 are social rented and 19,500 LCHO.  
We now illustrate a variant on this enhanced supply scenario where we reflect some 
‘good planning’ arguments to shift the emphasis in enhanced growth somewhat from 
London to the rest of the South of England, with a particular emphasis on a set of 
‘growth areas situated in the South East and East regions (Milton Keynes-Luton-
Watford; Greater Reading; Bedford; North Herts-Stevenage-Welwyn Hatfield; Greater 
Oxford; West Northants; Greater Cambridge)22.  The overall social and private housing 
numbers are similar to the previous scenario.  
The broad picture is that on most outcome indicators the result is a further 
improvement in average score, although the impact on regional disparity is in some 
instances rather less. This is clearly the case for the affordability to buy and to rent 
                                                          
22 This group of HMAs is not identical to the arc of growth linking Ox ford and Cambridge which the 
Government is now promoting, but it overlaps heavily and reflects the same general motivation.  
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indicators, financial difficulties, wider homelessness, annual net new need and chance 
of rehousing. For backlog need and core homelessness the average reduction is 
marginally less.  
Table 5.4: Key outcome differences in scenario of large increase in general and 
social housing supply (modified MHCLG planning targets, shifted from London to 
South/East growth areas), England 2016-31 
   Difference 
Change 
% 
SUMMARY 
OUTCOMES   in 
in 
regional  
England   
Change 
% 
 
inequality 
 28 March 2018 2016 2031 2016-31 2031 
Total New 
Housebuilding 17.8% 43.2% 45.2%  
New Social 
Housebuilding 66.5% 131.6% 64.6%  
Number of Households 0.4% 5.0% 5.1%  
Household Growth 7.6% 52.7% 37.2%  
     
Affordability to Buy % -0.8% 8.2% 8.0% -75.7% 
Affordability to Rent  % -0.2% 1.8% 1.9% -21.8% 
Owner Occ under 40 % 1.3% 1.1% -0.2% 3.4% 
Owner Occ all % 0.2% -0.5% -0.7% 0.6% 
Private Rent all % -0.4% 1.2% 1.9%  
     
Rel Poverty AHC % 19.1% 17.2% -1.6% -38.6% 
Financial Difficulties % -0.3% -5.3% -5.5% -26.9% 
Concealed/sharing hhd 
% 1.8% 2.9% 1.2% -48.3% 
Backlog Housing Need  -0.3% -9.4% -10.4% -27.8% 
Wider homeless -0.5% -4.7% -4.6%  
Core homeless -2.9% -21.2% -25.5% -23.0% 
     
Annual net new need 
AH -4.8% -58.7% -78.8%  
Chance of Rehousing 
% 12.0% 71.2% 47.2% -32.8% 
Note: Overall planning numbers similar to Tables 5.2-5.3, but with additional allocations to 
growth areas in Reading-Oxford-Milton Keynes-Cambridge and rest of South East, but less 
to London; with enhanced social housing pro rata past levels and private completions,  
achieving 344,000 total completions by 2031 of which 65,000 are social rented and 19,500 
LCHO 
5.5  Targeting homelessness and need  
Housing supply is not the only way of addressing problems of housing need. At this 
point we illustrate this by drawing in a package of measures identified in the parallel 
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research for Crisis on homelessness projections (Bramley 2017, 2018 forthcoming). 
The measures added to the mix at this point include the following 
• Ending of welfare cuts, including the LHA freeze  
• Maximal application of prevention measures by all local authorities 
• Continued diversification of housing models to address homelessness including 
the development of ‘Housing First’ 
• Resumption of previous fall in crime rates 
These measures, combined with the preceding supply scenario, are reflected in the 
outcomes table 5.5 below.  
We would expect to find the main effects on the core homelessness numbers and sure 
enough the fall in these at 2031 jumps from -21% to -57%, which is in effect a real 
reduction in core homelessness to substantially below the level of 2011 (77,500 
compared with 180,100 in the baseline and 142,300 after the supply boost). There is 
also a substantial reduction in the regional disparities in core homelessness. The 
reductions in the wider homelessness group is much more modest, at 2.4% points.  
However, the additional benefits of this strategy do extend to some of the other 
outcome indicators, particularly financial difficulties (improved by 7% points), backlog 
need (5% points better), annual net new need (5% points better) and the chances of 
rehousing (improved by 13% points).  
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Table 5.5: Key outcome differences in scenario of large increase in general and 
social housing supply plus key homelessness related measures, England 2016-31 
   Difference 
Change 
% 
SUMMARY 
OUTCOMES   in 
in 
regional  
England   
Change 
% 
 
inequality 
Baseline 28 March 2018 2016 2031 2016-31 2031 
Total New 
Housebuilding 17.8% 42.9% 44.6%  
New Social 
Housebuilding 66.5% 131.0% 64.0%  
Number of Households 0.4% 4.9% 5.1%  
Household Growth 7.6% 52.6% 37.1%  
     
Affordability to Buy % -0.8% 7.8% 7.7% -73.4% 
Affordability to Rent  % -0.2% 1.2% 1.3% -20.1% 
Owner Occ under 40 % 1.3% 1.1% -0.2% 3.1% 
Owner Occ all % 0.2% -0.8% -1.0% 0.5% 
Private Rent all % -0.4% 1.4% 2.2%  
     
Rel Poverty AHC % 19.1% -0.5% -17.3% -23.0% 
Financial Difficulties % -0.3% -12.4% -13.0% -25.0% 
Concealed/sharing hhd 
% 1.8% -0.9% -2.8% -50.0% 
Backlog Housing Need  -0.3% -14.5% -16.1% -30.6% 
Wider homeless -0.5% -7.3% -7.4%  
Core homeless -2.9% -57.0% -75.4% -40.5% 
     
Annual net new need 
AH -4.8% -63.5% -85.8%  
Chance of Rehousing % 12.0% 84.3% 57.6% -33.7% 
Note: Overall planning numbers as in Table 5.4, including additional allocations to growth 
areas in Reading-Oxford-Milton Keynes-Cambridge and rest of South East, but less to 
London; with enhanced social housing pro rata past levels and private completions,  
achieving 344,000 total completions by 2031 of which 65,000 are social rented and 19,500 
LCHO. Additional measures to reduce homelessness including cessation of welfare 
cuts/reforms post 2015 and ending LHA freeze, maximal LA prevention activity, phased 
reduction in hostels replaced  by Housing First and other housing-led models, and reduction 
in crime rates.  
One further scenario is reported in this sequence, building on those just described. 
The key difference in this case, reported in Table 5.6, is that the additional new social 
rented housing is targeted to particular localities/HMAs on the basis of needs. The 
need indicator developed for this purpose may be described as a ‘classic affordability-
based needs model’, similar to those used by the author in studies in the early 2000s, 
and reflected in the 2000 edition of the DETR Guidance to local authorities on Local 
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Housing Needs Assessment; it is also very similar to ‘Model 1’ as described in Chapter 
6.  
Under this approach, the net need for additional affordable housing equals 
The proportion of younger households unable to afford market rent 
times 
The gross number of new households forming per year, plus one-half 
of net migrant households 
plus 
The backlog of need, times a quota (10%) 
Minus 
Net re-lets of social rented housing per year (excluding transfers and 
new build supply)  
This number is expressed as a percentage of households. If it is less than zero, it is 
set to zero (this applies to 65 out of 102 HMAs in England, based on data for the period 
2011-15). The mean value is 0.25%, and the maximum 1.14%. In this scenario, this 
factor is used to allocate the part of new social housing previously allocated pro rata 
past delivery; the other part, pro rata new private housing output, remains. That means 
that this is not the most extreme form of needs-based allocation that could be 
considered. 
The differences between this and the previous scenario are relatively modest. Some 
of these might reflect the fact that in practice the average level of social housebuilding 
is slightly higher in this scenario. The general pattern seems to be that the impacts on 
the average level of outcomes is small but generally there is a marked further reduction 
in the regional disparities. This applies for example to the affordability to buy and rent 
indicators, and the relative poverty and financial difficulties indicators, and core 
homelessness. There is a definite reduction in average levels of concealed/sharing 
households and backlog needs accompanied by a greater reduction in regional 
disparities. There is a slight reduction in annual net new need and in the chance of 
rehousing performance, although again in the latter case the reduction in regional 
disparities is marked. 
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Table 5.6: Key outcome differences in scenario of large increase in general and 
targeted social housing supply plus key homelessness related measures, England 
2016-31 
   Difference 
Change 
% 
SUMMARY OUTCOMES  In 
in 
regional  
England   
Change 
% 
 
inequality 
28-Mar-18 2016 2031 2016-31 2031 
Total New 
Housebuilding 7.2% 47.5% 78.9%  
New Social 
Housebuilding 10.5% 151.1% 210.3%  
Number of Households 0.1% 4.7% 5.1%  
Household Growth 1.9% 55.3% 46.4%  
     
Affordability to Buy % 0.0% 6.9% 6.1% -152.5% 
Affordability to Rent  % 0.0% 1.3% 1.3% -35.9% 
Owner Occ under 40 % 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 2.4% 
Owner Occ all % 0.0% -1.2% -1.1% 0.7% 
Private Rent all % 0.0% 2.3% 2.7%  
     
Rel Poverty AHC % 19.7% 0.0% -17.3% -34.8% 
Financial Difficulties % 0.0% -12.0% -12.9% -29.4% 
Concealed/sharing hhd 
% 0.2% -4.2% -4.8% -62.1% 
Backlog Housing Need  0.2% -20.1% -23.0% -59.4% 
Wider homeless -0.1% -7.9% -8.5%  
Core homeless -2.6% -57.0% -75.6% -47.3% 
     
Annual net new need 
AH 0.2% -59.4% -82.8%  
Chance of Rehousing 
% -1.4% 78.3% 72.2% -51.4% 
Note: Overall planning numbers as in Tables 5.4-5.5, including additional allocations to 
growth areas in Reading-Oxford-Milton Keynes-Cambridge and rest of South East, but less 
to London; with enhanced social housing pro rata past levels and private completions,  
achieving 354,000 total completions by 2031 of which 70,700 are social rented and 21,200 
LCHO. Social housing is half distributed on basis of net affordable needs formula. This also 
includes the additional measures to reduce homelessness including cessation of welfare 
cuts/reforms post 2015 and ending LHA freeze, maximal LA prevention activity, phased 
reduction in hostels replaced by Housing First and other housing-led models, and reduction 
in crime rates.  
 
Overall, and perhaps unsurprisingly, better spatial targeting of social housing supply 
leads to a further reduction in regional inequalities in housing need outcomes, while 
making a modest contribution to reducing the average level of some of these.  
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5.6  The Upper Limits on Supply 
In Chapter 4 we presented a ‘static’ projection which suggested that there was a case 
for building 350,000 dwellings per year in England including 97,000 social rented 
dwellings and about 54,000 in intermediate tenures. However, we commented that, 
once you adopt a forecasting approach which takes account of dynamic interactions 
in the market, then it may not be necessary to build that much housing, overall or in 
the social tenures, because of certain ‘virtuous circle’ type effects associated with 
improved overall affordability. In a sense, the scenario just reported, where social 
housing output is at  about 70,000 (but total new build around 350,000), is implicitly 
assuming some such effects.  
We can and should, however, use the model to illustrate what would be expected to 
happen if we did push the level of social housing output up towards 100,000. Part of 
the way of doing that is to increase it across the board rather than in a targeted way. 
This scenario can also be used to illustrate another relevant output from the model, 
namely indicators of emerging problems of ‘low demand’ in some local housing 
markets.  These may provide another line of argument about upper limits, apart from 
the obvious ones about ‘viability’ and financial feasibility.  
At the end of the day, using an outcome-oriented approach, we need to consider which 
outcome(s) is/are paramount and whether there are any particular levels for those 
outcomes which can be argued to be ‘the right’ level. Such a question involves a 
mixture of logic, evidence and value judgement. It can be argued that a good key 
indicator to target in this context is the one shown at the bottom of Tables 5.2-5.5, 
which measures (change in) the chance of a household in need (and unable to afford 
market housing) being able to access social rented housing over the space of a year. 
We can see from Table 5.1 that baseline levels of this indicator are very low, 
particularly in London and the South. But how much higher is the ideal or right level? 
We have examined data from the longitudinal survey UKHLS, where we observe 
households need status in successive years and whether they moved into social 
housing. These findings are summarised in Table 5.7. On average, in 2014-15, the 
probability of a household in need being rehoused in social housing was only about 
5% (column 1). However, it turns out that there is a very high level of churn in the 
housing need population. 37% of those in need in the previous year were not in need 
in 2015, excluding those actually rehoused. People in housing need are often in 
circumstances of change and instability, but very often find solutions to their problem, 
at least for a period, without moving into social housing. Once you allow for that, the 
probability of rehousing for those who were in need and remain in need rises to 8%. 
You can also calculate from this information, allowing for further exits from the need 
cohort each year, that the average waiting time to rehousing would actually be 2.4 
years.  
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Table 5.7: Rehousing probabilities and waiting times, comparing actual and notional 
cases 
Cases Prob'y Prob'y Waiting Prob'y  
  Rehouse  Exit Time 
excl 
exits 
Baseline 0.05 0.37 2.4 8% 
Worst (GLA) 0.04 0.29 3.1 5% 
Best (North) 0.08 0.41 2.1 14% 
Double baseline 0.10 0.37 2.2 15% 
Treble baseline 0.15 0.37 2.0 23% 
Quadruple baseline 0.19 0.37 1.8 31% 
5x baseline 0.24 0.37 1.6 38% 
6x baseline 0.29 0.37 1.5 46% 
Note: based on analysis of need and rehousing data across waves 6-7 of UKHLS 
Successive rows of Table 5.7 show the worst (GLA) and best (North) regions in Britain 
in terms of rehousing prospects, ranging from 5% (3.1 year wait) in London to 14% 
(2.1 years) in the North. The following rows show the effects on these indicators of 
doubling, trebling, quadrupling etc. the probability of rehousing from the baseline 
average level. This is essentially what our high supply scenarios would do, firstly by 
increasing supply directly as new build first lets, secondly by increasing the stock of 
social housing and the base for re-lets, thirdly be easing affordability which will 
increase re-let rates as more tenants move out into the private sector, and fourthly by 
reducing the backlog need which is the denominator for the ‘chances of rehousing’. 
Trebling the baseline is slightly better than the position in the currently most favoured 
region (the North), and roughly the scale of improvement offered by the scenarios just 
discussed across the country as a whole, on average. However, for the South the level 
of improvement is more like quadrupling, while for it is almost five times higher by 
2041. So basically this is saying that these scenarios would offer effective chances of 
rehousing in the 20-30% range with a average time to rehousing rather below two 
years.  
This kind of approach does not readily lead to a conclusion that a particular level of 
social housing supply is optimal. Nevertheless, this indicator is valuable for targeting 
greater interregional equity.  
Another common-sense indicator is the ‘net new affordable need’ number, which 
substracts net re-lets from gross new household formation (and an allowance for 
migrant households) below the threshold for market affordability. If this is much larger 
than the new build programme, it tends to imply that backlog needs will rise, whereas 
if it is smaller then it is more likely that backlog will fall (although of course the backlog 
is also affected by other variables and is characterised by the high level of churn). If it 
is negative, it suggests there is less need for additional new provision and that the 
backlog is more likely to fall anyway. It is worth noting that this indicator was 
substantially negative in Scotland in 2016 and forecast to be a growing negative in 
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future years, one reason for caution about the need estimates for Scotland. Wales had 
a small negative in 2021, but otherwise for forward years all broad regions had positive 
figures in the baseline. The England total in the baseline is 63,000 in 2021 rising to 
107,000 in 2031, orders of magnitude which are not inconsistent with the scenarios 
being explored (allowing for the fact that intermediate rent  would be part of affordable 
supply). However, the figure quickly falls as supply is ramped up – all scenarios 
including social housing new supply exceeding 65,000 also show this indicator as at 
2031 being significantly less than the new supply number, implying that the backlog 
should be being reduced.  
Basically our approach is to refer to a range of indicators, of which two have been 
discussed in more detail here. Other important ones include AHC poverty, backlog 
housing needs, and of course core homelessness. An adequate supply of social 
housing should see significant falls in the former and very large reductions in the latter.  
Table 5.8 shows the summary outcomes from a scenario designed to achieve 100,000 
new social housing units in England as part of a programme of (rather over) 350,000 
in total. In this scenario, for comparability, we keep in place the specific non-supply 
measures geared to reducing core homelessness, as described above, but the 
increased supply is essentially a proportional expansion on past levels and plans, 
rather than the targeted strategy.  
Although this strategy would see an increase in household growth, the extent of this 
is less than in the previous targeted case. We interpret this as saying that, when supply 
is targeted on areas of greatest need/shortage, it releases more pent-up demand for 
household formation than when it is spread around including areas where there is less 
such pent-up demand.  
On the key affordability impacts, this strategy has a somewhat bigger positive impact 
on average affordability to buy, but does much less to reduce regional inequality. 
However, the impact on rental affordability is slightly weaker and does rather less for 
regional inequality. For younger homeownership rates, the average impact is the same 
(small) but the inequality gets worse. For overall homeownership, and also for private 
renting, the outcome is slightly better (more social renting substituted for private 
renting).  
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Table 5.8: Key outcome differences in scenario of large increase in general housing 
with 100,000 social housing units (across board) plus key homelessness related 
measures, England 2016-31 
   Difference 
Change 
% 
SUMMARY OUTCOMES  in 
in 
regional  
England     
Change 
% 
 
inequality 
Baseline 28 March 2018 2016 2031 2016-31 2031 
Total New Housebuilding 44.2% 56.0% 17.3%  
New Social Housebuilding 203.9% 259.1% 30.4%  
Number of Households 1.0% 4.9% 4.3%  
Household Growth 21.7% 42.8% 15.4%  
     
Affordability to Buy % -1.7% 8.6% 9.3% -48.3% 
Affordability to Rent  % -0.5% 0.7% 1.2% -27.0% 
Owner Occ under 40 % 0.7% 0.2% -0.4% 15.5% 
Owner Occ all % 0.2% -0.6% -0.7% 4.5% 
Private Rent all % -0.7% -1.6% -1.1%  
     
Rel Poverty AHC % -1.1% -19.9% -20.0% 2.4% 
Financial Difficulties % -0.5% -13.2% -13.7% -5.9% 
Concealed/sharing hhd % 3.3% -5.0% -8.8% -48.7% 
Backlog Housing Need  -1.8% -18.5% -19.3% -30.2% 
Wider homeless -1.5% -7.8% -6.9%  
Core homeless -1.7% -55.0% -71.0% -37.2% 
     
Annual net new need AH -19.0% -84.9% -112.9%  
Chance of Rehousing % 37.6% 147.3% 71.5% -44.1% 
Low Demand Indicators 2016 2031 Change % 
HMAs Excess Vacancies 
(>6%) 50.0% 100.0% 650.0%  
HMAs High Re-lets (>6%) 6.3% 120.0% 100.4%  
HMAs Price< Cost 3.6% 0.0% -0.1%   
Note: Overall planning numbers further increased beyond Table 5.8 across wider range of 
regions; with further enhanced social housing pro rata past levels and private completions, 
achieving 375,000 total completions by 2031 of which 101,000 are social rented and 30.000 
LCHO. Social housing is distributed pro rata past levels and private completions without 
needs formula. This also includes the additional measures to reduce homelessness 
enumerated under Tables 5.5-5.6. 
For the first three housing poverty/need indicators, the average outcome is slightly 
better but the regional inequality is worse. For the general backlog need and the 
homelessness indicators, the average outcome is a little bit less good and the regional 
inequality is worse. Annual net new need for affordable housing ‘improves’ but in fact 
tends to overshoot (i.e. the change is more than 100%). The chance of a household 
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in need being rehoused increases substantially more on average, but there is less 
reduction in regional inequality. So overall it is a mixed picture on needs, 
predominantly showing some gains on average but less reduction in regional 
inequality. On some indicators the level of improvement appears to be approaching a 
satiation level.  
Three low demand indicators are considered (based on research by Bramley & 
Pawson 2002) – excess vacancies, excess re-let rates, and prices below replacement 
costs. The first two of these show a sharp increase at 2031, in terms of the numbers 
of housing market areas affected doubling (from 39 to 78 in terms of vacancies, and 
from 15 to 33 in terms of re-lets). The model generates additional demolitions as 
excess vacancies exceed a further threshold, and demolitions are shown in the model 
as rising rapidly after 2026. These indicators show clearly that supply is being pushed 
beyond a warrantable level in some areas in this scenario. This provides further 
confirmation that a more targeted strategy is appropriate.  
It is tempting to suggest that if outcomes look relatively good in Table 5.6 with social 
housing output around 70,000, while outcomes with output raised to 100,000 across 
the board are not clearly better, with some evidence of overshoot and adverse effects 
in terms of low demand, then probably the optimal programme is going to involve 
targeting and a total number which could be somewhere in the range 70-90,000. We 
test this further by running a couple of such scenarios, reported in Tables 5.9 and 5.10. 
In Table 5.9 the social housing output is 85,000 (200% higher), with total new build at 
360,000 (50% higher); overall planning numbers are boosted particularly in the South 
of England and social housing is targeted according to the needs formula, and the 
other homelessness reduction measures are included. Table 5.10 goes for a slightly 
higher number with somewhat less geographical targeting. 
Table 5.9 shows modest or significant improvements over Table 5.6 in most of the 
poverty and housing needs measures, apart from annual net new need, considering 
both average levels and regional inequality. The average level of affordability is slightly 
less good while the attempt at regional equity is over-shot in this case. This suggests 
that there is a good case for pushing social housing output up to this level (85k), which 
may be close to the optimum, but that possibly slightly less geographical targeting 
would be appropriate.  
Comparing Table 5.9 with Table 5.8 (the 100,000 untargeted scenario), there is a 
slightly less strong average performance on affordability and poverty, but generally the 
equity performance is markedly better. On housing needs, both average performance 
and equity are better in Table 5.9. So this also tends to suggest that the optimum is 
likely to be nearer 85k than 100k.   
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Table 5.9: Key outcome differences in scenario of relatively large increase in general 
housing with 85,000 social housing units, geographically targeted, plus key 
homelessness related measures, England 2016-31 
   Difference 
Change 
% 
SUMMARY OUTCOMES  In 
in 
regional  
England   
Change 
% 
 
inequality 
03-May-18 2016 2031 2016-31 2031 
Total New 
Housebuilding 6.6% 50.4% 86.2%  
New Social 
Housebuilding 15.5% 201.4% 269.3%  
Number of 
Households 0.1% 4.3% 4.8%  
Household Growth 1.3% 51.2% 43.6%  
     
Affordability to Buy % -0.2% 6.3% 5.7% -166.5% 
Affordability to Rent  
% 0.0% 1.0% 1.0% -40.1% 
Owner Occ under 40 
% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% -1.6% 
Owner Occ all % 0.0% -1.2% -1.2% -0.4% 
Private Rent all % -0.1% 1.3% 1.7%  
     
Rel Poverty AHC % -0.1% -16.8% -17.6% -25.2% 
Financial Difficulties 
% 0.0% -11.5% -12.3% -26.8% 
Concealed/sharing 
hhd % 0.3% -8.3% -9.3% -77.7% 
Backlog Housing 
Need  -0.1% -26.9% -30.4% -85.2% 
Wider homeless -0.1% -8.6% -9.3%  
Core homeless 0.0% -55.2% -72.3% -49.9% 
     
Annual net new need 
AH -0.2% -64.5% -89.4%  
Chance of Rehousing 
% 1.9% 99.7% 86.6% -82.5% 
Low Demand 
Indicators 2016 2031 Change % 
HMAs Excess 
Vacancies (>6%) 0.0% 69.2% 1350.0%  
HMAs High Re-lets 
(>6%) 7.1% 28.6% 20.0%  
HMAs Price< Cost 0.0% 100.0% 3.6%   
Note: Overall planning numbers as in Tables 5.4-5.5, including additional allocations to 
growth areas in Reading-Oxford-Milton Keynes-Cambridge and rest of South East, but less 
to London; with enhanced social housing pro rata past levels and private completions,  
achieving 361,000 total completions by 2031 of which 85,000 are social rented and 25,500 
LCHO. Social housing is half distributed on basis of net affordable needs formula. This also 
includes the additional measures to reduce homelessness.  
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Table 5.10: Key outcome differences in scenario of relatively large increase in 
general housing with 91,000 social housing units, less strongly geographically 
targeted, plus key homelessness related measures, England 2016-31 
   Difference 
Change 
% 
SUMMARY OUTCOMES  in 
in 
regional  
England   
Change 
% 
 
inequality 
03-May-18 2016 2031 2016-31 2031 
Total New 
Housebuilding 8.1% 42.9% 67.5%  
New Social 
Housebuilding 37.1% 222.8% 226.5%  
Number of 
Households 0.2% 2.3% 2.4%  
Household Growth 3.7% 25.3% 18.5%  
     
Affordability to Buy 
% -0.5% 4.8% 4.8% -67.2% 
Affordability to 
Rent  % -0.1% 0.3% 0.4% -29.3% 
Owner Occ under 
40 % 0.9% 0.6% -0.3% -3.5% 
Owner Occ all % 0.2% -1.2% -1.2% -1.2% 
Private Rent all % -0.3% -0.2% 0.1%  
     
Rel Poverty AHC 
% -0.3% -18.6% -19.2% -4.8% 
Financial 
Difficulties % -0.2% -11.3% -12.0% -7.4% 
Concealed/sharing 
hhd % 1.1% -10.3% -12.2% -64.1% 
Backlog Housing 
Need  -0.3% -24.4% -27.3% -50.3% 
Wider homeless -0.2% -8.3% -8.8%  
Core homeless -0.2% -55.5% -72.5% -42.0% 
     
Annual net new 
need AH -3.2% -56.7% -76.6%  
Chance of 
Rehousing % 8.4% 118.4% 91.6% -59.7% 
Low Demand 
Indicators 2016 2031 Change % 
HMAs Excess 
Vacancies (>6%) 0.0% 87.2% 1700.0%  
HMAs High Re-
lets (>6%) 7.1% 42.9% 33.3%  
HMAs Price< Cost 1.8% 0.0% -0.1%   
Note: Overall planning numbers based on broader regional spread including additional 
allocations to growth areas in Reading-Oxford-Milton Keynes-Cambridge and rest of South 
East, but less to London; with enhanced social housing pro rata  private completions and 
less strongly linked to needs formula,  achieving 343,000 total completions by 2031 of which, 
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91,000 are social rented and 27,300 LCHO. This also includes the additional measures to 
reduce homelessness. 
The final scenario considered is shown in Table 5.10, characterised as slightly higher 
total numbers with slightly less geographical targeting. . Compared to Table 5.9, this 
scenario (Table 5.10) produces somewhat lower affordability gains, but more 
generally achieves similar or better average achievements, but with some reduction 
in the extent to which regional inequality is narrowed. Compared with Table 5.8, 
most of the indicators are better or similar. This generally reinforces the view that the 
optimal level of social housing supply for England lies in the range 85-90,000.  
To sum up, we have found that, alongside a generous overall housing supply (c. 
340-350k), increasing social housing supply, with a degree of targeting towards 
areas of greatest need, generally leads to better outcomes as this level rises to 
around 85-90k for England.  Increasing beyond this level produces some evidence of 
overshooting, some less favourable outcomes and in particular, a rapid escalation 
and spread of low demand problems. An overview of the key numbers associated 
with each scenario is provided in Table 5.15 below. 
We expected to find that increased overall supply would ease affordability and 
somewhat reduce the need for social rented housing, compared with that shown in 
static projection in Table 4.13. This does seem to be the case, on balance, but the 
extent of the reduction in requirements for social housing is not that great, primarily 
because of the extent of suppressed household formation which will be released by 
the enhanced supply. This tends to unwind particularly in the 10-15 year horizon 
used here.  
Further work reported in Chapter 6, takes account of land development capacity and 
finer-tuning adjustments at local authority and HMA levels. While this  does suggest  
upper limits on supply in some areas, to a large extent these constraints may be offset 
by greater development in adjacent, less constrained areas.  
5.7  Wales and Scotland 
The conduct of the analysis using the SRHMM model to examine the outcomes 
associated with different housing provision strategies has been primarily developed, 
tuned and reported with a focus on England. There are several reasons for this: Firstly, 
England is a distinct policy entity and much discussion debate and media coverage 
refers to England, including discussion of housing numbers. People are more familiar 
with the English numbers than with the total GB numbers. Secondly, England not only 
accounts for the large majority of population and households but it also clearly has the 
heaviest concentration of housing need and affordability problems. Thirdly, data and 
systems are somewhat different in the different countries of the UK and it is difficult 
and time-consuming to put these all onto a strictly comparable basis – nevertheless 
we have attempted to do this.  
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So this study does have a GB-wide focus, and certainly in the previous chapter (4) we 
carried out an analysis covering all GB countries, making particular use of a valuable 
UK-wide dataset (UKHLS). The SRHMM does include all countries of the UK, broken 
down into housing market areas, and so the analyses conducted of different scenarios 
and their outcomes has also run for Wales and Scotland. However, it makes sense to 
discuss the results separately in the particular context of those countries, and to 
consider varying policy parameters differently in the modelling to reflect those 
contexts.  
Part of the context of devolved policy in Wales and Scotland is that the respective 
administrations have set particular policy targets, and there have also been periodic 
studies of housing needs and requirements for these countries.  
In Wales, and Housing Supply Taskforce report of 2015 suggested an increased 
private completions target of 5,700 for the immediate period together with an 
affordable homes target of around 2,200 pa making a total of 7,900. In 2016 the 
achieved completions were 5,410 private and 1,210 housing association making 6,620 
total, implying a particular shortfall on the affordable side. These numbers are below 
the household growth projection of 8,400, itself reduced from previous projections23. 
The Scottish Government has set a target for the five year parliamentary term 2016-
21 of providing 50,000 affordable housing units of which 35,000 should be for social 
rent, implying an annual programme of 7,000 social rent and 3,000 intermediate 
affordable housing. It is claimed that it is on target to achieve delivery of these 
numbers. Its overall planning target for total new build is unclear, although some years 
ago it was aspiring to see total new build rates of 35,000 pa, compared with the pre-
recession typical level of 20-25,000.  However, it appears to be significantly short of 
achieving this; for example it was only achieving 15,500 in period around 2014-15.  
A relatively recent joint study by Sheffield Hallam University and others (2015) 
concluded that there was a need over the 5-year term for 12,000 affordable homes 
per year, partly in reflection of the underperformance of and prospects for market-led 
development. However, this represents an unusually high proportion of the overall total 
housing requirement for Scotland in that period of 18,700 units per year (based on 
household projections), although that report also argued that this number should be 
higher due to replacement requirements. There are probably several reasons for the 
relatively high affordable need figure in this study, compared with numbers emerging 
from our own work, including the build-up of national from local numbers (e.g. 
accepting some local estimates of backlog, and setting surpluses to zero) and other 
detailed assumptions. 
For reasons given at the beginning of this section, and given the phasing of different 
elements of work within this project subject to a tight timescale, we have not been able 
to do as much exhaustive testing of scenarios for Wales and Scotland, partly due to 
                                                          
23 Stephens et al (2018) UK Housing Review, pp49-49 and 116 
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the need to check and update certain input data. However, by making use of 
information on recent reviews and targets in each country, our own static projection, 
and selected outputs from the SRHMM dynamic simulations, we can present a picture 
of a range of possibilities. Within that, we go on to make provisional suggestions for 
appropriate orders of magnitude for the key numbers in Wales and Scotland, in the 
light of the outcome findings from the dynamic modelling and other considerations. 
Table 5.11 summarises this exercise. 
The top block shows for comparison a couple of key sets of numbers for England, the 
output of the static projection (Table 4.13) and the numbers within the last scenario 
tested (Table 5.10), which may be regarded as the most generous or bullish in terms 
of overall affordable housing numbers, and a compromise between strong 
geographical targeting and a somewhat broader spread of investment.  
For each of Wales and Scotland a block of figures are provided, starting with numbers 
which we currently understand to constitute targets, recent actual numbers, the ‘Static’ 
projection results from Table 4.13, two representative dynamic scenarios, and a 
suggested compromise value having regard to all of the above and to particular 
outcome indicator evidence from the scenarios. Table 5.6 was the first of the series of 
scenarios which could be claimed to represent reasonable, targeted needs-based 
approach but with a more cautious overall level of social housing provision (70,000 for 
England). Table 5.10 is as characterised above and includes much more generous 
overall and social provision for Wales, as suggested by the outcomes analysis. For 
Scotland, the two dynamic scenarios are more similar, for reasons which will become 
clearer.  
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Table 5.11: Comparison of Selected Target Numbers by Tenure and Country, 2016-
31. 
Country Basis for targets Total Private  Social  Shared Intermed All 
    Dwellings Sector Rent Own'shp Rent Affordable 
         
England total 
Table 4.13, 'Static 
proj' 337,513 185,590 97,435 22,472 32,016 151,924 
  Table 5.10 broader 343,000 194,798 91,000 27,300 29,902 148,202 
        
Wales Govt   targets 9,700 5,700 2,600 1,400  4,000 
 Actual 7,810 5,410 1,600 400 400 2,500 
 
Table 4.13, 'Static 
proj' 12,951 6,184 4,514 848 1,405 6,767 
 Table 5.6, targeted 12,232 8,929 1,838 551 914 3,303 
 Table 5.10, broader 18,064 9,954 4,513 1,354 2,243 8,110 
  Suggested 14,000 7,500 4,000 1,000 1,500 6,500 
        
Scotland Govt Targets 18,700 8,700 7,000 1,500 1,500 10,000 
 Actual 16,498 12,576 3,920 1,860 890 6,670 
 
Table 4.13, 'Static 
proj' 22,304 11,296 5,088 3,086 2,834 11,008 
 Table 5.6, targeted 36,016 25,506 6,671 2,001 1,838 10,510 
 Table 5.10, broader 34,367 23,192 7,093 2,128 1,954 11,175 
 Suggested 26,000 16,000 5,500 2,500 2,000 10,000 
        
GB Total 
Eng T.5.10 + 
'Suggested' 383,000 218,298 100,500 30,800 33,402 164,702 
Sources: Actuals and targets: Stephens et al (2018)  UK Housing Review 2018; Welsh 
and Scottish Government Websites.  
For Wales, a key observation is that the 2015 Housing Task Force targets looked 
pretty modest, and not very ambitious relative to the rather subdued actual 
performance. However, the Welsh government have adopted more ambitious targets 
since then and affordable housing output is rising. It is not quite clear whether there is 
an overall housing target – the figure shown combines that from the HTF for the private 
sector with the more recent affordable targets, and is slightly above the household 
projection number (8,400 to 2024).  Our static projection suggested a markedly higher 
figure for total new housing, with most of the increase being in the social and affordable 
sectors (it is not clear how much if any intermediate affordable housing is currently 
provided in Wales). In the Table 5.6 scenario, the social rented and affordable 
contributions fall well short of that, although somewhat exceeding recent actuals. 
Table 5.10 is pretty close to the static projection on social housing but exceeding it on 
intermediate and private sector output and hence on overall numbers.  
What do the forecast outcome indicators tell us about the choice of strategy here? 
Table provides a summary comparison. 
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Table 5.12: Comparison of key outcomes between two scenarios for England, 
Scotland and Wales, 2031 
Outcome England England Wales Wales Scotland Scotland 
percent diff by 
2031 T.5.6 T.5.10 T.5.6 T.5.10 T.5.6 T.5.10 
Total new build 48 43 16 79 15 13 
New social  151 223 65 377 48 79 
       
Affordability to Buy 6.9 4.8 3.4 13.5 2.4 1.4 
Affordability to Rent 1.3 0.3 1.2 4.8 1.3 1.1 
       
Rel Poverty AHC -16 -19 -16 -18 -16 -18 
Financial 
Difficulties -12 -11 -8 -11 -8 -11 
Concealed/sharing -4 -10 3 -1 1 -2 
Backlog Need -20 -24 -1 -10 -3 -8 
Wider Homeless -8 -8 -2 -3 -1 -3 
Core Homeless -57 -55 -11 -33 -19 -23 
       
Annual Net Need -59 -57 -96 -404 9 13 
Chance of 
Rehousing 78 118 8 77 13 25 
Note: Numbers are percent change by 2031 under two scenarios, as summarized (for 
England) in Tables 5.6 and 5.10 
While as noted above the choice between the two scenarios is quite finely balanced 
in England, and this is also true for Scotland, the differences are much more marked 
for Wales, where the differences in both total and social output are much greater. For 
Wales, the T.5.10 scenario is much more favourable in its outcomes, and often 
relatively comparable or in some cases better than in England. Improvements in 
affordability are notable, and performance is good on poverty and homelessness and 
on chances of rehousing. However, the annual net need indicator figure shows that 
there is an overshoot here. Overall, this evidence suggests that the targets should 
tend towards the second scenario, but perhaps not going quite so far because of the 
risks of low demand, of which there is some evidence in Wales (even in T5.6 there are 
excess vacancies in one of four Welsh HMAs, and excess re-let turnover in 3 out of 
4).  The suggested total housing number goes only part way towards the high scenario, 
for this reason, but the social housing number goes most of the way towards it. We 
also suggest higher levels of shared ownership and (particularly) intermediate rent.  
For Scotland, the scenarios are much closer, the main difference being in the level of 
social rent supply. There are some improvements in some outcomes relating to 
housing needs, but these are relatively modest. The absolute level of some outcomes 
for Scotland suggest that social housing supply may be enough, providing a higher 
level of access than any other part of GB. We have already drawn attention to the 
unusually large negative figure for ‘net annual new need’, running at or above 20,000 
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per year, and the fact that the ‘chances of rehousing’ are already well above levels in 
any other region, at around 33%. More broadly, the indicators for low demand suggest 
that this is expected to be more prevalent in Scotland; excess vacancies affecting 3 
out of 8 HMAs, excess re-lets turnover affecting 5, and house prices below 
replacement cost affecting one in 2031. These are the reasons why our suggested 
targets for Scotland are rather lower than those suggested in these high supply 
scenarios, and rather lower in some respects than targets set by the Scottish 
Government. We suggest total dwelling numbers in the mid-20,000s rather than 
around 35,000, and social rent provision around 5,500 rather than the 7,000 adopted 
by the SG (and reflected in T5.10). However, on a more positive note, we see greater 
scope for shared ownership/equity and intermediate rent in Scotland. Allowing for this 
our suggested total affordable number for Scotland is the same as the SG figure of 
10,000.  
5.8  Meeting the needs of homeless households  
One of the aims of this project is to place homeless households clearly in the wider 
picture of housing needs, and to quantify the numbers experiencing different forms of 
homelessness, particularly core homelessness alongside data on housing supply in 
general and specifically supply going to lower income households and households in 
housing need. Because the functions developed to forecast different elements of core 
and wider homelessness in the ‘Homelessness Projections’ project (Bramley 2016 and 
forthcoming) are embedded within the Sub-regional Housing Market Model (SRHMM) 
used as the platform for modelling housing requirements in this study, we are able to 
generate estimates of the key numbers consistent with the preferred scenario as just 
reported. Within that other project, estimates were developed, informed by various 
sources, of the durations of different types of homelessness episodes, and also of the 
overlap between different types of homelessness (e.g. rough sleepers who also used 
hostels), from which we can estimate the average ratio of ‘flow’ (number of unique new 
cases per year) to ‘stock’ (number at a point in time)24.  
Key flow numbers for core homelessness are shown in Table 5.9 for Great Britain and 
for England (these numbers can also be produced for lower level geographies). These 
numbers reflect the positive combined impact of new social housing supply, improved 
overall affordability, and the range of other preventative measures also included in the 
package. All of the numbers show significant reduction between these two points in 
time, although to varying degrees – for example sofa surfing declines less than rough 
sleeping or unsuitable TA.  
                                                          
24 These sources include recent study of ‘Destitution in the UK’ for JRF, which documents frequency of use of 
different services  by groups including rough sleepers and hostel users. The estimates of the flow:stock ratio 
allow for both duration of episode and double counting between different services. However, they are treated 
as constant by category of homelessness and over time.  
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Table 5.13: Number of New Core Homeless Cases per year under Scenario of High, 
targeted social and total housing output plus other homeless reduction measures, 
2016 and 2031  
Flow Estimates   
Great Britain 2016 2031 
Rough sleepers 22,466 13,402 
Hostels 157,689 92,688 
Unsuitable temp accom 4,049 1,641 
Sofa surfing 60,720 44,943 
Tents, cars, p t 13,544 7,976 
Squatting & nonres 
accom 17,173 10,931 
Shelters, refuges 18,003 10,550 
   
Total 293,644 182,131 
   
   
Flow Estimates   
England 2016 2031 
Rough sleepers 19,824 10,908 
Hostels 144,542 84,704 
Unsuitable temp accom 3,546 1,117 
Sofa surfing 53,643 36,551 
Tents, cars, p t 12,194 6,710 
Squatting & nonres 
accom 15,775 9,359 
Shelters, refuges 18,003 10,550 
   
Total 267,528 159,898 
Note: Scenario as summarised in Table 5.8 above 
The numbers in Table 5.13 are indicative of the level of demand for services, support 
and advice, as well as housing itself, generated by these groups. For core homeless 
(most of whom are single) many of these services are provided by voluntary 
organisations, although in Scotland the local authorities perform a more 
comprehensive role. Some will be rehoused into social housing (more in Scotland), 
others will be supported into private tenancies, while others again may find other 
solutions or drop out of the process for differing reasons.  
In 2016 in England, around 59,000 households were accepted as homeless (inflow to 
statutory system), while about 26,000 were rehoused by social landlords. This number 
is only about one-tenth of the flow estimate of core homelessness given in Table 5.13.  
The total core homeless flow of 267,500 in England in 2016 compares with an 
estimated number of social lettings to new tenants of only 174,00025, which helps to 
underline the point that, with the best will in the world, it would be impossible for local 
authorities and their social landlord partners to directly rehouse all of the single 
homeless at present. By 2031, given this proactive scenario, the balance would have 
                                                          
25 Stephens et al (2018) 2018 UK Housing Review, pp.221-224.  
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changed, with 274,000 lettings to new tenants alongside a flow of new core homeless 
cases of 160,000. The balance is already more favourable in the rest of the UK, where 
there are 80,000 lettings confronting 26,000 core homeless flow, so enabling 
administrations in Scotland particularly to follow a more inclusive policy.  
The discussion above is focussed on core homelessness, but for policy 
implementation and service delivery purposes it is necessary also to consider the 
‘statutory’ homeless and others at immediate risk of falling into homelessness within 
a year. In the parallel research on Homeless Projections we have examined this 
relationship, which can be summarised as in the Figure 5.1. The size of the bars 
represents the numerical size of the relevant parts of the ‘stock’ of homelessness at a 
point in time, while the colours represent the main types of accommodation occupied. 
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Figure 5.1: Analysis of Snapshot Homeless Stock showing relationship between core 
homelessness, statutory homelessness and others at risk of homelessness (core or 
statutory) within one year, Great Britain 2016 
 
  Stock  Breakdown   
  Core Core+Stat 
Stat 
Noncore Wider Risk 
Temp Accom  0 19,300 42,400 0 
Other Private hhd  67,900 4,000 13,000 77,316 
Instit/other  64,300 8,000 4,000 8,918 
Source: authors’ analysis in Homeless projections report (forthcoming) 
The first bar shows the larger part of core homelessness, who are not recognised in 
the statutory system (particularly in England); this group are roughly equally divided 
between private households (i.e. sofa surfing) and institutional/other accommodation. 
The second bar shows the smaller part of core homelessness which is recognised, 
particularly those in ‘unsuitable’ temporary accommodation, refuges, etc. The third bar 
shows a somewhat larger group who are statutorily homeless but are not in our core 
category; the main part here are those in temporary accommodation which is 
adequate, plus some people who are ‘homeless at home’ (accepted as homeless or 
at imminent risk but still remaining in their previous accommodation). Finally, the fourth 
bar shows the subset of our wider ‘at risk of homelessness’ population (concealed and 
sharing households, exiting private renters, ex institutional, unsupported TA and 
temporary dwellings) who may be expected to become homeless (core or statutory) 
within the next year. In other words it is a quantification of the risk they face (5-6% for 
concealed or sharing, up to 22% for the identified sub-group of exiting private renters). 
Most of these people (other than ex-institutional) are in the private household 
population.  
Clearly, with the implementation of the Homelessness Reduction Act in England, it 
may be expected that there will be a significant change in the balance of Local 
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Authority activity in response to homelessness, with more prevention and relief activity 
with the non-statutory core group, as has already been observed in Wales. This is 
consistent to a degree with the scenario reported in Table 5.9, which assumed 
‘maximum prevention activity’ by all local authorities.  
Concern has been expressed that, given the total volumes of recent and expected 
core and statutory homelessness, particularly in England, there might still not be 
enough social rented lettings to meet the needs of this group as well as other new 
households with needs and unable to afford market accommodation. Table 5.14 looks 
at the relationship between the estimated annual flow of core homeless and the 
forecast number of social rented lettings by broad region/country over time, under one 
of our more generous supply scenarios. 
Table 5.14: Core homeless annual flow of cases as percentage of social rented lettings 
under high supply scenario by broad region and year 
Broad Region and 
Country 2016 2021 2026 2031 2041 
North 91% 113% 77% 79% 70% 
Midlands 111% 104% 68% 63% 50% 
South 301% 131% 68% 50% 36% 
G London + 804% 165% 93% 55% 48% 
Wales 48% 63% 42% 51% 37% 
Scotland 42% 37% 34% 30% 23% 
      
      
England 194% 138% 84% 70% 56% 
GB 142% 104% 70% 60% 47% 
Note: Supply scenario as in Table 5.10 above.  
The table confirms that the position is very adverse in 2016; only in Wales, Scotland, 
and potentially the North, are there enough lettings to house the core homeless. 
Things do not improve a lot by 2021, except in London. However, by 2026 additional 
supply and lettings combine with forecast fall in numbers (also affected by more 
favourable welfare, prevention and other measures) to bring all of the numbers below 
100% and the GB average to 70%. There is a further improvement to 2031, by which 
time the GB average is 60%, and indeed the London figure has fallen below that at 
55%. Indeed, the fact that London and the South now fall below the north is indicative 
that, as suggested earlier, this scenario is slightly overshooting in terms of regional 
rebalancing. The figures for Scotland provide further confirmation of our cautionary 
stance on the total scale of social rented housing need in that country.  
It should be emphasized, however, that the figures in this table are not a simple 
prediction of the actual proportion of social lets which will go to core homeless 
households There are reasons why a social rented letting may not be the most 
appropriate solution for some homeless people, why some would not choose this or 
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would be likely to move into some other tenure, or to live with other people, in some 
cases reflecting changing circumstances or other support needs. 
It is worth at this point reflecting on the experience in Scotland over recent years. This 
suggests that, if you have a system with relatively generous supply and generous 
homelessness legislation, then you find that only about three-fifths (61%) of homeless 
households entering the statutory system end up being rehoused in social rented 
sector. Like the broader group of households ‘in need’, there is considerable ‘churn’ 
within the group experiencing homelessness, with circumstances often changing over 
relatively short time periods. If you applied that ratio (61%) to the numbers in Table 
5.14 you would find that the proportions of new lettings going to homeless look more 
manageable from 2026 onwards (43% in 2026, 37% in 2031). Strictly, it is necessary 
to add back in to the core homeless numbers a proportion of non-overlapping statutory 
homeless (some of those going into ‘adequate’ temporary accommodation or directly 
into social housing) but we do not have a precise estimate of this number (it would be 
the flow equivalent of the non-overlapping part of the third column in Figure 5.1 above). 
A further question which this analysis of homelessness rehousing requirements 
suggests is whether this level of commitment of social letting resources to homeless 
households would leave enough margin to house other lower income newly forming 
households or household experiencing existing needs. While it is fair to ask about the 
situation facing other new households, it should be remembered that (a) a lot of the 
homeless are also new households (b) the proportion of new households unable to 
afford market housing would be significantly less than in 2016, because of the 
improved affordability; (c) they would also have access to intermediate tenures which 
would be in significant supply- and indeed some homeless households could be 
rehoused in intermediate rent lettings as well.  
5.9  Interim conclusions on projections and outcomes 
We have in this draft chapter provided the first higher-level version of an outcome 
oriented approach to assessing requirements for general and social/affordable 
housing over a medium-longer time horizon, based on a behavioural model of the 
housing market which operates at sub-regional level. This exercise has been 
successful in several respects. Firstly, at the most basic level it has been possible to 
identify, generate and tabulate a reasonable bundle of 20 outcome measures. 
Secondly, it has been possible to run a number of scenarios and review the impacts 
on these outcomes, which have mainly been in line with expectations. Thirdly we have 
demonstrated, through successively adding elements to the scenarios, that certain 
conclusions can be drawn, regarding planning targets, the role of social housing, and 
the role of certain non-housing policies in influencing housing need outcomes.  
In more substantive terms, it is clear that a major increase in planned housing numbers 
is needed to generate a meaningful increase in supply of new general/private housing, 
although innovations in the development process might increase the rate of delivery 
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from given planned numbers. The favoured scenarios examined involve total new 
housing supply of around 340,000 in England or 380,000 across GB. (Table 5.15 
below provides a summary of the scenarios in numerical terms). It is also clear that 
this increase should be skewed towards regions where the pressures are greatest, 
which is currently London and the South, although the exact optimal balance between 
within-London, near-to-London and the ‘Greater South East’ is an issue for more 
careful consideration. With those provisos, we can demonstrate that an increase in 
general housing supply would help to improve a range of outcomes in housing 
affordability and housing need.  
It is further clear that a very substantial increase in social housing supply, increasing 
its level to somewhere in the range of 85-90,000 units p a in England, or around 
100,000 for UK, is justified to make further progress in meeting needs and levelling 
the inequalities in access to decent housing, including meeting targets to greatly 
reduce and resolve core and statutory homelessness. This should also be targeted 
more to areas of pressure. The requirement for a further 50-55,000 intermediate 
affordable housing in England (67-62,000 for GB), as identified in Section 4, would be 
an appropriate addition to that and is reflected in the scenario modelling. This would 
include similar numbers of low cost home ownership, such as shared equity, and 
intermediate rental products. Beyond this, to reduce core homelessness substantially, 
additional measures both within housing policy (e.g. full application of prevention 
measures, housing first) and beyond housing policy (limiting or possibly reversing 
some welfare reforms/cuts, particularly in relation to the LHA freeze; crime prevention 
and reduction) are needed.  
These targets for social and intermediate affordable housing are set within scenarios 
which see total housing supply rise to around 340,000 (c. 380,000 for GB), again as 
suggested by the static model in Chapter 4. However, some outcome indicators, 
particularly those around the dangers of low demand, suggest that these high supply 
scenarios are beginning to create unhelpful outcomes in some localities, with the 
number of such localities increasing. The analysis so far has not, however factored in 
feasibility constraints relating physical land capacity, or to affordable housing 
contributions or other resource issues. The former of these issues is incorporated in 
the local level analysis in Chapter 6. 
We have examined the particular situation of and targets for Wales and Scotland 
specifically, as well as the broad regional pattern across England. In sum, our findings 
suggest that England requires more ambitious targets across the board, that Wales 
would benefit from more investment in affordable housing and its recently enhanced 
targets are not unreasonable. For Scotland, we have some more nuanced findings, 
suggesting that care should be exercised about the total housing volume target in view 
of issues of low demand and housing surplus in some areas, and that the balance of 
the affordable supply programme should probably be shifted somewhat from social 
renting to intermediate tenures.  
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The inadequacy of orthodox household projections as a fixed base for determining 
future housing requirements is exposed by the modelling scenarios. On the medium 
term timescale which we have focused on, there is a strong feedback from additional 
supply to additional household formation and (more locally) migration, so household 
growth is very much a moving target. In our ‘static’ projection we made the (somewhat 
conservative) estimate that the extent of suppressed household formation was of the 
order of 69,000 p.a. for England. This largely borne out by the dynamic model, which 
shows household growth increasing by around 50,000 p.a. in the period to 2031 in 
response to the generous supply scenario and associated improvement in 
affordability.  
While more fine-grained work on the spatial strategy is needed, it appears that there 
may be greater benefits overall from boosting supply in the South East and East 
regions to take some of the pressure off London. However, it should also be pointed 
out that we have not yet run any scenarios involving changing the spatial configuration 
of economic growth across the UK, although certain policies (Industrial Strategy, City-
region devolution) appear to be geared to changing this. These are addressed through 
one variant scenario examined in Chapter 7 (section 7.3).   
It appears that some outcome targets are difficult to shift at all, from the runs of the 
model reported so far. This is most obviously true of the tenure target of increasing the 
share home ownership, overall or more particularly for the younger population26. Such 
a target is likely to be politically salient, even though it does not fall under the rubric of 
‘housing need’. It should be underlined that the projection does not imply no increase 
in the absolute number of home owners, overall or in the younger population; only that 
their share of the total does not increase significantly27.  We need to examine more 
closely whether it is a shortcoming of our model or of reality which accounts for this 
obstinate fact. There are also additional policy instruments which might be considered, 
including private rental regulation or tax changes.  
  
                                                          
26 In simple terms a 20,000 p a programme of shared ownership would add 1.6% points to owner occupation 
by 2031, if it were targeted to be ‘additional’.  
27 The higher supply scenarios examined do indicate an increase in the absolute number of home owners in GB 
of the order of 1.3 m by 2031.  
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Table 5.15: Summary of Scenarios 
 Characterisation of 
Scenario 
Annual Numbers for England (thousands 
per year) 
Homelessness 
Outcome (% change 
from baseline at 
2031) 
(Table reference no.) Total Private SR SO/LCHO IR Wider Core 
4.13. Static Projection  338 186 97 22 32 NA NA 
5.1 Dynamic Baseline 
Scenario  
240 180 28 16 16 0.0% 
(8.5% 
above 
2016) 
0.0% 
(31% 
above 
2016) 
5.2 MHCLG supply 
target 
303 231 34 19 19 -2.2% -19.4% 
5.3 MHCLG supply with 
‘double’ social 
347 242 65 20 20 -4.1% -24.3% 
5.4 South East focus 344 239 65 20 20 -4.7% -21.2% 
5.5 South East focus 
and max mitigation 
344 239 65 20 20 -7.3% -57.0% 
5.6 South East focus, 
max mitig, enhanced 
SR need-targeted 
354 241 71 21 21 -7.9% -57.0% 
5.8 High social, wider 
regional spread, max 
mitigation 
375 214 101 30 30 -7.8% -55.0% 
5.9  South East focus, 
max mitig, fairly high 
SR, need-targeted 
361 224 85 26 26 -8.6% -55.2% 
5.10 Less strong 
regional targeting, max 
mitig,  high SR, partially 
need targeted 
343 198 91 27 27 -8.3% -55.5% 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUB-REGIONAL LEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
6.1  Introduction 
The analysis so far has been largely conducted, and exclusively presented, at the 
geographical scale of broad regions of England and the countries of Great Britain. 
What we have termed the ‘dynamic model’, which makes scenario forecasts and looks 
at their outcomes, in fact works at a sub-regional level, using a set of 114 geographical 
‘Housing Market Areas’ (HMA) as its analytical units, but we have not as yet reported 
detailed results at that level. The focus on broad regions also fits with the fact that we 
have made heavy use, particularly in the so-called ‘Static Model’, of data from a large-
scale household longitudinal survey, Understanding Society (UKHLS). Such a survey, 
being based on a sample, is not robust as a source which can be used directly at either 
HMA or Local Authority level, by which we mean District/Borough or Unitary Authority, 
LAD for short. There are 326 such authorities in England and 380 in total across GB. 
It is important to take the analysis to the local authority level, because it is at this level 
that key decisions are made, in both planning and housing delivery systems, and it is 
from local authority level data that regional figures can be built up. There are marked 
differences in the physical planning constraints on new housing supply at this level.  
Furthermore, other agencies including housebuilding development companies and 
Registered Providers need to see where they should be focusing their efforts.  
In taking the analysis to the local authority level, there are broadly two key challenges: 
• Finding and utilising data at local level which can at least approximately 
replicate the key variables needed to estimate housing needs at this lower 
geographic scale; 
• Adapting models developed at a higher level to operate at this scale, and/or 
appropriating other models which are based at the local authority level to 
answer the key research questions. 
There is a great deal of data available at local authority level, much of it highly relevant, 
including housing market data, demographic data, labour market data, social 
indicators, planning and housing data. There are some limitations, for example that 
Census is only available once every ten years (the last in 2011), that some annual 
data is subject to sampling error, that there is no official household income data at this 
level (although we have models to estimate this). A more general limitation is that, in 
contrast with the use of UKHLS at broad region level, we cannot look in a flexible way 
at the combination of housing circumstances of particular types of household, for 
example the number and profile of households who currently live in tenure X but can 
only afford tenure Y. Such numbers would have to be estimated indirectly.  
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The adaptation of models raises various challenges, and this is particularly so for what 
we have hitherto termed the ‘static’ model, because of this issue just mentioned. The 
‘dynamic model’ is more adaptable, at the cost of adding large extra blocks of 
data/variables to the spreadsheet on which this runs. It is already disaggregated to 
HMAs, which are based on combinations of local authorities28, and a high proportion 
of the variables in the model are derived from base data compiled at LAD level, so that 
disaggregation back to that level is possible. As a matter of principle, it is assumed 
that the housing market interaction/resolution processes happen primarily at the HMA 
level, so it would not be appropriate to simply run the model on LAD units. But we can 
use the predictions of the model at HMA level to derive consistent forecast changes 
for the constituent LADs. These may be simply equal proportionate changes for each 
LAD within each HMA, but in key instances we utilise slightly more subtle composite 
functions to forecast these changes. There are also arguments for considering 
planning targets at the HMA level, and recognising trade-offs between LADs within 
those, as under the ‘Duty to Cooperate’.  
After due consideration of these factors, it was decided to bring another model into 
exercise at the LAD level, to complement the two modelling approaches already in 
play. This model is the ‘affordability-based local housing needs model’ (ABLHNM) 
developed by the author in the 1990s and used in a range of national and local studies 
in the 2000s (Bramley & Pawson 2002, Barker 2004, Bramley & Karley 2005, Wilcox 
& Bramley 2010). This model informed guidance developed for local authorities on 
how they should assess housing need in 2000 and later (DCLG 2007, 2014). The 
reasons for using this model as well as the existing two approaches, may be 
summarised in this way: 
1. Practitioners may have more familiarity with this model; 
2. It is directly designed to be derived from a limited range of data sources at local 
level and follows a simple, comprehensible formula which can be replicated 
with variant assumptions (and which cannot so easily be criticised as a ‘black 
box’); 
3. While the ‘static’ model can be made to work at LAD level, the process of 
estimating down from the higher regional level leads to a substantial degree of 
averaging and loss of local specificity; as such it is less able to discriminate 
between places which really do need additional investment in social /affordable 
housing from those which have needs which can be met from existing stock.  
In fact we have already used a version of this model to provide a needs indicator to 
‘seed’ initial values for some the simulations reported in Chapter 5. However, in this 
chapter we deploy a revised and updated version of this model as a key part of 
estimating local housing requirements, particularly for social rented housing. For the 
                                                          
28 ‘Whole’ local authorities, on pre-2009 boundaries; the introduction of additional unitary authorities at that 
time led to some cases where a single LA may be partly in several HMAs, particularly Wiltshire, Durham, 
Northumberland, Cheshire. 
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remainder of this report, we refer to this affordability-based local housing needs model 
as ‘Model 1’, while we refer to the local version of the Static Model as ‘Model 2’, so 
that the dynamic forecasting model becomes ‘Model 3’.  
While the main emphasis in this analysis is upon the need for extra housing of different 
kinds, it also recognises that in reality there will be constraints on the ability of some 
local authorities to deliver the enhanced levels of housebuilding output which this study 
suggests are necessary. Although available data are patchy and somewhat dated, we 
do try to factor in the likely impact of physical/environmental and planning constraints 
on the ability of some local authorities to actually achieve target levels of new 
housebuilding based on need. In the case of London these constraints are region-
wide, whereas elsewhere they are specific to individual authorities. There are two 
reasons for doing this: 
• To try to ensure that the numbers have a degree of credibility with policy-
makers and practitioners; 
• ‘no local authority is an island’ and neighbouring authorities have a ‘duty to 
cooperate’, so that for example adjacent authorities in the same HMA should 
pay attention to the HMA-wide need situation as well as the LAD-level numbers, 
and also the constraints which may affect neighbouring authorities. 
It is the wish of the clients of this research that the results should distinguish between 
‘needs’ as calculated without the imposition of such capacity constraints, and a second 
stage of need-based targets modified to recognise such constraints while 
compensating for them elsewhere in the system. We therefore calculate the local level 
need figures before and after imposition of constraints. However, both sets of figures 
add up to the same totals, which are based on analyses in Chapters 4 and 5.  
This chapter proceeds by firstly describe the modelling approaches in rather more 
detail, showing the steps in the analysis and highlighting key assumptions. It then 
presents and comments upon the local level implications of the central scenario 
underpinning the key national recommendations presented in Chapter 5 above. These 
implications include reporting on local level patterns in key outcomes including 
affordability, housing-related poverty, backlog needs, rehousing prospects for those in 
need, and supply adequacy to tackle core homelessness. Some consideration is given 
to how far a further ‘fine-tuning’ of the targets might lead to further overall gains across 
key outcomes. 
The final substantive chapter, which follows, subjects this set of estimates and 
forecasts to a range of sensitivity tests. These examine how far the forecast outcomes 
would be changed by different assumptions about future trends and changes in 
demographics, the economy, regional development, inequality, welfare policies and 
other factors. The main purpose of these ‘what if’ exercises is to establish how robust 
our central estimates are, and whether there are significant risks of outcomes being 
less favourable than shown in our central forecast.  
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6.2   The modelling step-by-step 
Three models in outline 
For reasons outlined in the preceding section, local level analysis derives from three 
analytically distinct models, although in practice significant elements within these 
models may be common across two or more of the differing model frameworks.  
Model 1: is the ‘Affordability-based local housing needs model’ derived from the work 
of Bramley et al (2002, 2005, 2006). This uses local authority level data sources to 
estimate the annual need for additional social rented and affordable housing units, 
generally as a snapshot at a point in time. It does not independently assess the overall 
requirement for total new housing provision but may share estimates of this with other 
models. Similarly, application to future points in time will require forecasts of change 
in key variables like house prices and incomes, which may be imported from another 
model such as our ‘dynamic’ sub-regional model 3 – however, in this application we 
mainly use base period estimates for 2015.  
Model 2 is what is termed in Chapter 4 the ‘Static model’, which entails adjusting 
demographic household projections and ‘re-allocating’ households between tenures 
on the basis of affordability norms. The direct estimation of these reallocations can 
only be performed at a broad regional level using data directly derived from UKHLS. 
Therefore it is necessary to go through an indirect estimation process to get down from 
the national to the local level, using information or estimates available at the local level 
on (a) tenure shares and (b) affordability profiles of younger households.  These 
affordability profiles, based on market prices/rents and ‘modelled’ household income 
distributions, are effectively shared with Model 1. Some of the demographic numbers, 
particularly estimates of gross new household formation, may also be shared with 
Model 1.  
Model 3 is what has been termed in this report the ‘dynamic model’, namely an 
econometrically-based sub-regional housing market model (SRHMM) designed to 
forecast outcomes of the housing system in annual steps over 25 forward years, 
although  in this study we focus mainly on the 15-year period to 2031. The model runs 
at the ‘sub-regional’ geographic level of 114 Housing Market Areas (HMAs, 102 in 
England). Therefore, output information (key housing numbers and outcomes) needs 
to be disaggregated from this to the LAD level (N=380 (326)) and compared with 
targets set at the lower level, while conversely targets need to be aggregated up to 
HMA level and fed into the SRHMM to generate the forecasts. Proposed scenarios 
are assessed in terms of their performance in generating more desirable levels (and 
disparities) in a basket of outcome indicators. Where possible we carry these outcome 
indicator predictions down to LAD level, but of course this generates a lot of 
information which can mainly be comprehended through summary statistics. 
In More Detail 
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Model 1.   
The essential formula to summarise model 1 is as follows 
The net need for additional units of social/affordable housing each year is equal 
to 
The proportion of younger (<40) households unable to afford to buy or rent in 
the market  
Times 
The average number of new households forming each year (gross household 
formation), plus a proportion (one-third) of net migration in household 
equivalent 
Plus 
A quota (in this study 1/15th)29 of the estimated backlog of households with 
existing housing needs 
Minus 
Net re-lets of social (affordable) housing units per year 
The affordability profile involves linking market data at local authority level (house 
prices and market rents, ideally lower quartile by size), via the affordability norms set 
out in Chapter 3, to the estimated distribution of incomes of households aged under 
40 in each local authority. This income distribution is generated by a model, which 
entails drawing on detailed national micro-survey data (UKHLS) to characterise the 
general shape of household income distribution for each of a range of sub-categories 
of household as well as to develop predictive formulae to establish the extent to which 
these income distributions vary between different areas. This model is a development 
of earlier versions including Wilcox & Bramley 2010, Bramley & Watkins 2013, and 
recent research for the Scottish Government and for the English Indices of Deprivation 
exercise. Affordability to buy rates are adjusted using the wealth and savings 
adjustment factors developed as part of the modelling from UKHLS described in 
Chapter 4, at broad region level. Local authority level affordability profiles are an 
additional new output from this study which authorities may find useful as a  
benchmark.  
Gross household formation is not a direct output of official household estimates and 
projections, but it can be derived from data on the household headship (household 
representative rates) by age. The basic concept is that these rates rise progressively 
                                                          
29 The rationale for the quota is that backlog needs can only practically be addressed over a planning period, 
which in the case of this study is 15 years. In  practice the backlog is not a fixed population but subject to 
considerable turnover, and households in more urgent need will typically be dealt with more quickly than the 
average rate of rehousing. 
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over the early adult years, levelling off in the late 30s or early 40s, and that gross new 
household formation is the increment in new household representatives which results 
from one year of ageing of the population (i.e. the slope of the HRR rate times the size 
of the age cohort, for the relevant age segments). 
In this study we are working from the assumption (based on evidence) that there is a 
degree of suppressed household formation in the system, and the overall assessment 
of requirements entails an unwinding of this suppressed household formation over the 
plan period (15 years). We use the historic household representative rate data from 
censuses back to 1991 to estimate the extent of this for each LAD, with totals 
controlled to the same level as the estimate of this key number used in the static model 
in Chapter 4. This number (c.70,000 pa for England) is added to both gross household 
formation and to target household growth, and this is a common element between 
Models 1 and 2.  
The backlog of existing need plays a distinctive role in Model 1, and requires estimates 
at local authority level to correspond to estimates already reported in Chapter 4 at 
broad regional level using UKHLS. While local authorities typically make their own 
estimates based on combinations of local housing waiting list/register data and 
occasional local surveys, we do not regard these sources as consistently robust or 
comparable to use in this national study, because of great variations in recording and 
review practices, policies under ‘localism’, and varying deterrence to application 
depending on the above and on the overall availability of accommodation (Bramley et 
al 2010). Comparisons of data returns from local authorities on waiting list numbers 
confirms this conclusion that they are unsuitable.  
We therefore make estimates based on different sources for different elements. For 
overcrowding and concealed/sharing households, we use 2011 census data on 
relevant indicators, trended forward to 2015 using the SRHMM forecasts, and rescaled 
for consistency with the UKHLS-based analysis of these indicators reported Chapter 
4. For indicators of households with existing affordability problems and those with a 
range of housing suitability problems (e.g. health or child related), we use a composite 
of (a) UKHLS 2012-15 estimates as described in Chapter 4 at level of ONS LAD 
typology ‘groups’ and (b) previous EHS-based estimates and forecasts embedded in 
the SRHMM, at HMA level. When combining these elements an allowance is made for 
overlap (households with more than one need). In line with most local housing needs 
assessment practice, we do not include house condition problems in the backlog, 
assuming that broadly such problems can be resolved in situ, although we include a 
moderate overall allowance for demolitions.  
Specific elements for homelessness are added to these backlog numbers, including 
the half of core homeless not in the private household population and elements of 
wider homeless in a similar position (e.g. those in communal establishments). Another 
point to note about the backlog is that it is apportioned between those only able to 
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afford social renting and those able to afford intermediate renting, using the 
affordability band data used to drive Model 2.  
Net re-lets are the annual lettings of social rented housing to new tenants less the 
number of new social rented units added to the stock, which is equivalent to the 
number of social rented units released by households dissolving or leaving the tenure 
to move into the private sector, adjusted for any units taken out of management for 
demolition or refurbishment. In fuller accounting in future this should also include 
resales of shared ownership and re-lets of intermediate rent, when looking at the wider 
affordable need number. The annual number of net re-lets is substantially larger than 
the number of new build, even with the proposed enhanced programme of provision, 
and is the main means by which priority needs for social housing are met from day-to-
day and year-to-year in most areas of the country. Use of these numbers is also a key 
distinctive feature of model 1. 
Model 1 can also estimate the potential requirement for shared ownership among new 
households and migrants (i.e. people moving into a local authority), but we do not have 
enough data to estimate potential among the ‘backlog’ (although there is some 
overlap). Model 2 provides a fuller estimate of shared ownership and intermediate rent 
potential, taking account of existing households who may wish to move from other 
tenures.  
A key feature of Model 1 is that the net additional need (on given assumptions) may 
be negative, in which case it may be set at zero (at least at HMA level, after allowing 
for some movement between LADs). We also reduce the requirement for intermediate 
tenures if there is an indicated surplus of social rented lettings. In  our baseline model 
run the number of local authorities in England with net social rent need in Model 1 set 
at zero is 136, 42% of the total.  
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Model 2.  
This model is essentially the same in concept as the static model reported in Chapter 
4.  
The basic formula for model 2 is as follows: 
Number of net additional households in tenure (3 cats, Own/SR/PR) 
Equals 
Number of new households forming into that tenure 
Plus or minus 
The net re-allocation of new households to most appropriate tenure 
Plus or minus 
The net re-allocation of existing households aged under 40 to most appropriate 
tenure, phased over plan period  
Plus or minus 
The share of net migrant households associated with that tenure 
Minus 
The estimated number of households dissolving through old age or infirmity or 
moves in with others in that tenure 
Plus 
Estimated number of demolitions expected in that tenure 
Plus 
Estimated additional vacancy reserve required or expected in that tenure 
The key issue here is how to translate these estimates down to the local authority 
level.  
The starting point is a matrix of proportions of all under-40 households in each of the 
following four affordability segments (buy, market rent, intermediate rent, social rent) 
by each of three tenures (own, social rent, private rent) and six broad regions (North, 
Midlands, South, London, Wales, Scotland), as measured in the UKHLS for 2015. 
Then, working in a dataset at LAD level derived from the local incomes and affordability 
model (aggregated up from MSOA level), again with 2015 values, we first control these 
matrix values for consistency with the LAD-level tenure proportions, by making a 
proportional adjustment. Then we control them for consistency with the LAD-level 
affordability proportions, again with a proportional adjustment. Then we repeat the 
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cycle of adjustments two more times. This technique is known as ‘iterative proportional 
fitting’. The resulting matrix is a reasonable estimate of the true values for each local 
authority, which is reasonably consistent with known marginal totals for tenure and 
affordability and the known broad regional values. 
Affordability rates for new households are assumed to bear a fixed ratio to those for 
all under-40 households within each broad region. Wealth and savings adjustments to 
ability to buy, at broad regional level, are applied to these affordability-to-buy 
estimates.  
The local affordability matrix is then used to simulate the progressive reallocation of 
households into tenures which they can more appropriately afford, as in Chapter 430. 
This was repeated for new households as well as all under-40 households. Having run 
this sequence of calculations in SPSS, the resulting values (propensities) were 
transferred into the main SRHMM model spreadsheet.  
If we refer back to the basic formula for Model 2 above, we can say that certain 
elements in the local version are effectively the same as in Model 1. The total number 
of new households formed (gross household formation) and the associated net 
household growth are effectively the same. The gross household formation is as 
described in the immediately preceding section, and includes both the expected base 
level plus an estimate of the element of ‘suppressed’ household formation, derived 
from headship information. These numbers are controlled to the same national total 
as in the static broad regional model described in Chapter 4.  
Local authority level net migration numbers for 2014 are used as the base for this 
element, with the average persons per household set at 3.0 (rather above the national 
average for all households) and the tenure split based on fixed relativities from the 
static model (based on UKHLS analysis for all migrant households); migrant 
households are assumed to use the private rented sector disproportionately. . 
Household dissolutions are generated from a formula involving a weighted sum of 
households by broad age of HRP (strongly weighted to the older ages) interacted with 
the age-standardized mortality rate. In the case of owner occupiers, the SRHMM 
already estimates the broad age profile of this tenure, while for the other tenures the 
formula is simpler. Social renting is assumed to have higher dissolution rates, other 
things being equal, and private renting lower. The total number of dissolutions are 
controlled to ensure that net household growth is consistent with the household 
projection plus the allowance for suppressed household formation.  
The rate of demolitions is assumed to be distributed proportionally to the average 
dwelling density (dwellings per hectare of residential land) with a tenure split of 20% 
own/50% social/30% private rent. The rationale for the density factor is that 
                                                          
30 In programming this for local authorities, it was identified that one specific type of move had been omitted 
from the Chapter 4 analysis, moves from social renting into private renting; in effect,  this was effected by 
diverting half of the social rent to shared ownership moves into private renting.   
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demolitions are likely to be driven by a combination of poor quality older (often flatted) 
stock, the drive to further intensify housing in estate renewal and other redevelopment 
schemes in London and other cities, and the need to deal with problematic high rise 
post-Grenfell. The totals are consistent with those used in Chapter 4.  
Additional vacancies are partly based on estimated ‘excess vacancies’ (private sector 
vacancies over 6%) in 2015 and partly on the demolition rates modelled as above. 
Again the national totals are consistent with Chapter 4.  
It is important to note that several elements of this Model 2 are effectively the same at 
local level as Model 1, namely enhanced gross household formation, total net 
migration, total demolitions and vacancies. The main differences lie in the way existing 
as well as new households are re-allocated into most appropriate tenures based on 
affordability (rather than only marginal new households), but also in the use of 
estimated dissolutions in Model 2 vs re-lets in Model 1, and the fact that there is no 
direct equivalent of the backlog quota used in Model 1.  
These differences, along with the ‘modelling down’ of affordability propensities, mean 
that Models 1 and 2 tend to produce somewhat differing patterns of results. Model 1 
uses more locally-based information (particularly on backlog and re-lets) and tends to 
produce a more sharply differentiated picture, wherein substantial numbers of 
authorities are shown as having no (i.e. negative) additional needs for social renting 
(and possibly for shared ownership), while at the other extreme some authorities 
appear to have ‘impossibly’ high need for additional social renting (impossible to 
achieve purely by new build within the overall growth totals). . By contrast, Model 2 
tends to produce a more a more ‘averaged’ picture with less sharp variation and few 
‘negative net increases’ indicated for social housing.  
Our approach is to combine the two sets of estimates, essentially by taking the 
average of the two (including any negatives), but setting the resulting values to zero if 
they would otherwise be negative. In arriving at the ‘average’, we also incorporate two 
need-related adjustments. Firstly, for a number of authorities (46), where our baseline 
forecast indicates that it would be difficult to meet the needs of core homeless, we 
increase the social rent need figure somewhat. Secondly, where for a similar number 
of authorities (62) our baseline forecast indicates that the chances of rehousing for 
households in need in 2031 would be relatively high (over 12%) we reduce the need 
estimate proportionately. This generates our unconstrained need figure for additional 
social rented housing provision per year.   
A further modified or ‘constrained’ figure is then derived. This takes account of land 
availability constraints on total new build activity, estimated as set out below. It also 
applies, in a very few cases, a constraint on total new social rent building related to 
the level of total new building. Logically, this cannot exceed 100%. There may be policy 
reasons to hold this down to a figure such as 50% or less, for example on grounds of 
viability and/or social mix. However, for the purposes of this study we have set it at 
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close to the logical maximum, at 80%. It should be emphasized that his only affects a 
handful of local authorities. Since we are working to a total need figure already 
determined from Chapter 5, of around 90,000 for England, these downward 
adjustments will be balanced by upward adjustments, mainly in those authorities 
whose total housing numbers are being increased based on evidence of high demand/ 
poor affordability, as described below.  
Deriving the overall additional dwellings target.  
Our approach to setting an overall dwelling target starts from a similar-looking 
approach to that taken by MHCLG in setting planning targets for local authorities, but 
is more ambitious and takes a more explicit approach to capacity. Whereas MHCLG 
used the household projection as the starting point, we use the average of that and 
the pre-existing local plan target number. This may be characterised as a sort of ‘status 
quo’ estimate. We then apply progressive mark-ups, the higher is the level of the 
house-price-to-earnings ratio (HPER) above a threshold of 6.031, with the multiplier 
raised to the power 2.032 and a maximum target multiplier set at 2.0.  
This level of new housing delivery is then compared with an estimate of capacity at 
the LAD level. This capacity calculation derives from some work done by the author 
for the Lyons Inquiry in 2014 and reported in conference papers at that time (Bramley 
& Watkins 2014). This used data from certain sources, some of which have not been 
updated since 2011, but which still give a reasonable general picture of potential 
capacity, given broad brush assumptions. These data sources include the Generalised 
Land Use Database (land use stock areas by broad categories based on OS 
Mastermap), Land Use Change statistics (LUCS), ‘National Land Use Database’ 
(identified brownfield land capacity), and the areas covered by Green Belt, AONB and 
National Parks. We estimate brownfield and greenfield capacity separately using 
different density assumptions, assuming potential use of up to 2% of greenfield land 
over 20 years, but discounting greenfield progressively the more remote it is from 
major service centres. We add an additional element in high demand/pressure areas 
close to urban centres, allowing a modest take from the existing Green Belt (up to 20% 
over 20 years), which mainly affects the area immediately around London (much of 
which is actually in our Greater London plus HMA).  
We also take account of indications from consideration of the Greater London Plan 
and the latest associated SHLAA that there is an effective realistic maximum capacity 
for housing delivery in London (GLA area) of at least 65,000 units per year. After 
comparing the SHLAA figures with our own, borough by borough, and taking the higher 
                                                          
31 We use the median values for prices and earnings for this ratio, as these are readily available in the SRHMM 
and LAD datasets, rather than the lower quartile, and this threshold appeared to be appropriate using that 
measure. 
32 This is an approximation to the average ‘elasticity of affordability’ with respect to additional housing supply 
at HMA, as revealed by the SRHMM simulations; the MHCLG markup factor is much lower and does not appear 
to be evidence-based.  
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estimate in each case, we obtain a somewhat higher figure of c.74,000. This basically 
assumes strong effort continues to be given to maximising housing potential in 
London, consistent with planning policies. Most individual London boroughs are 
‘capacity constrained’ on the basis of our algorithms, but we also if necessary apply a 
general downward adjustment to London to reflect the overall capacity estimate. 
Relatively few non-London authorities (25) are constrained by the capacity target; 
these tend to be core cities (Bristol, Bournemouth, Reading, Southend, Milton Keynes, 
Brighton & Hove, Cambridge, Oxford) or close to major cities or in the area around 
London. The target numbers which cannot be delivered in these capacity-constrained 
districts are redistributed to other unconstrained districts with relatively high HPER.  
In a subsequent stage of adjustment, a further more selected set of local authorities 
are assigned a further increase in target. These authorities are not capacity 
constrained and are not showing indications of low demand over the plan period but 
are forecast in the baseline scenario to still have a higher HPER (over 7.0) in 2031. At 
the same time another group of authorities, exhibiting low demand indications (e.g. 
excess vacancies or re-lets) and/or low HPER have their targets reduced. At this stage 
the decreases and increases broadly balance, at around 33,000 so the resulting 
targets have approximately the same total (340,000).   
At a final stage, we fine-tune the scenario in the simulation model (Model 3)  by varying 
parameters governing the actual planning numbers at sub-regional level to achieve a 
reasonable equity-related target in terms of a key outcomes, including the proportion 
of under-40 households able to afford home ownership and the chances of rehousing 
for a household in need. This involves a slight moderation in the emphasis on the 
South of England and some general increase in the Midlands and North. This gives 
an outcome where in 2031 the affordability rate to buy is almost as high in London 
(48%) as in the Midlands (49%) and the South (50%), although it does not sustain that 
level after 2031. That is a dramatic improvement for London (from 23-24% in 2016 or 
2007. Nevertheless, low incomes hold affordability back in much of the North (40%). 
Affordability to rent in the market would remain worse in London (51%) than the other 
broad regions including the North (60%). For our other key indicator, the chances of a 
household in need being rehoused, this would be at a similar level in London (13-15%) 
as in the other broad English regions, a massive change from earlier years. Core 
homelessness as a percentage of households would still be higher in London (0.60%) 
but the other broad regions would be similar (around 0.23-25%).  
Combining and adjusting the social renting target numbers 
As already noted, we take a combination of the social rented targets derived from 
Model 1 and Model 2, essentially an average of the two numbers but with some needs- 
based adjustment (upwards where core homeless pressures are expected to be high, 
downwards where chances of rehousing would already be high). We express the 
combined needs-based social renting target number as a ‘quota’ of total target new 
build. This exercise can be done at either sub-regional HMA level or LAD level. It is 
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argued that both indicators are relevant, particularly where several local authorities 
share the same HMA, have varying local level needs but also face different 
constraints. We would argue that under the Duty to Co-operate, authorities should take 
account of needs indicators at both levels, and consider the best planning strategy to 
meet the needs of the HMA as a whole. It should be noted that at this final stage these 
averaged quotas are applied to the adjusted total new build target number, i.e. taking 
account of land supply constraints, high and low demand, and so forth. This has the 
effect of redistributing some of the social rented need to authorities which are in a 
better position to meet it.   
For example, in the East of England the Greater Cambridge HMA has a need quota 
of 28%, but the four component local authorities have differing individual figures. 
Cambridge is a land-constrained core city and these adjacent authorities should be 
expected to cooperate in provision of overall housing numbers and social rented 
housing within that. Other similar examples include Greater Bournemouth/Poole, 
Greater Bristol/West of England, Brighton & Hove/Sussex, Oxford/Oxfordshire. Even 
where core cities or particular authorities are not strictly land-constrained, there is a 
good case for invoking the duty to cooperate where there are wide differences 
between LAD-level need quotas within an HMA.   
Similar combining of the two models is applied to the intermediate tenures, although 
with less subsequent fine tuning. Under model 1, part of the backlog is assigned to 
Intermediate Rent, based on the relative numbers of under-40 households able to 
afford the two tenures.  
6.3   Key assumptions 
In stepping from the above rather technical account of the modelling procedures used 
to derive local estimates and targets towards the main findings, it is perhaps desirable 
to restate and remind the reader of the key assumptions which underlie our approach. 
1. The affordability norms set out in Chapter 3 are accepted as a reasonable basis 
for planning, allocation and provision of social rented and intermediate 
affordable housing tenures 
2. ‘Housing Requirements’ comprise the sum of effective demand in the market 
plus the number of households wishing to form and live in an area in subsidized 
tenures, based on the above affordability norms. 
3. New household formation from a given population is influenced by economic 
and housing market conditions and supply availability, and in conditions of 
scarcity and unaffordability, some household formation may be suppressed, 
particularly among the younger population.  
4. The HMA is the primary geographical level at which housing market processes 
are resolved, and these response functions will work broadly proportionally 
across the constituent LADs within each HMA.  
120 
 
5. Local authorities accept the duty to cooperate in meeting housing requirements 
and housing needs across sub-regional HMAs while respecting the constraints 
on housing delivery in some neighbouring authorities.  
6. It is an aim of policy to reduce substantially the geographical disparities in key 
housing outcomes, including affordability and housing need, as well as to 
improve these outcomes to a significant degree on average.  
7. It is an aim to policy to move to a situation where core homeless households,, 
and other homeless households owed a duty to provide appropriate housing, 
have a good prospect of timely rehousing in social or intermediate affordable 
housing within the locality or HMA where they are experiencing homelessness. 
8. While respecting existing urban land uses and designated areas including 
Green Belts, AONBs, and National Parks as limitations on the capacity of 
particular localities to deliver larger volumes of new housing, it is assumed that 
policy acknowledges some trade-off between the Green Belt designation and 
contemporary evidence of housing need and demand in some locations. Green 
Belt is ultimately an urban growth management tool, and not necessarily a 
permanent designation of land which is of such intrinsically high value in its 
undeveloped state that this overrides all consideration of social need or 
economic development requirements. As such, it may be appropriate to review 
Green Belt boundaries at certain times in certain places, particularly where it 
can be demonstrated that a new urban extension or settlement on Green Belt 
land is the most sustainable solution to meet housing and other needs in that 
region.  
9. There will be practical and policy limitations on the maximum share of new 
housing which can be social and/or affordable housing in any locality. These 
limitations include considerations of neighbourhood social mix and the viability 
of developments. However, these potential constraints have not been imposed 
on the needs estimates and targets generated in this exercise, except in a 
handful of extreme cases.  
Clearly, if individuals or organizations wish to take issue with our analysis or 
conclusions, it is likely to be around differences over one or more of these 
assumptions. However, it is important to emphasize that some of these assumptions, 
particularly 8. and 9., and to some extent 5., are really relevant to the stage of the 
exercise where we move from unconstrained needs estimates to adjusted targets for 
new housing provision.  
What would happen if these targets were not met? 
The targets and programmes proposed in this report for England (in particular) are, at 
the very least, challenging. They entail levels of overall and social rented housing 
provision which have not been seen since the 1970s, although of course numbers of 
this order were routine in the decades leading up to the mid-1970s. It would not be 
surprising, given the vagaries of economics, politics and policy priorities that such a 
programme might not gain or maintain sufficient or consistent enough support over the 
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15 year time horizon to be delivered in full. Therefore it is probably appropriate to 
consider, briefly, the likely effects of a shortfall in delivery.  
It should be noted, as a preliminary in this context, that (as will be further discussed in 
a subsequent section) that even with consistent goodwill and attention towards the 
implementation of this programme, the realities of implementation may mean that not 
all of the target numbers would be achieved in full on the ground, even if they were 
adopted as targets. This seems to apply in particular to the social rented housebuilding 
targets, particularly if factoring in viability and availability of finance/subsidy (which we 
do not do here, although possible costs are briefly considered in Chapter 8 and 
Appendix 1). However, for the analysis presented as our core target scenario, we have 
ensured that (a) the adjusted targets are consistent with the needs-based targets and 
with the recommendations from Chapter 5, and also (b) that the forecast outturn 
numbers (total new build and social rented completions) are consistent at national 
level.  
If the total level of new housebuilding fell significantly short of the target set in this 
report (340,000 for England), what consequences would follow? ‘Other things being 
equal’, this would have a range of impacts on affordability, housing need, household 
formation, and potentially wider impacts on the economy (Barker 2004). Market 
housing would be less affordable, so there would be likely to be less people able to 
become home owners and more forced to rent privately or do so for longer. More 
people would experience problems of financial stress in paying for their housing, in 
some cases being pushed into poverty. At the same time, there would be lower levels 
of new household formation among younger adults and more people would have to 
remain living for longer with parents or others, in some cases leading to delayed family 
formation. Overall housing supply shortfall would impact on the situation of people in 
or at risk of housing need and homelessness, by reducing the scope for delivering 
social and affordable housing, reducing re-lets as fewer existing tenants move on to 
buy or market rent, and increasing pressures within the private sector leading to more 
overcrowding, sharing etc.  Possible economic effects might be a restriction of growth, 
particularly in dynamic city regions with strong growth potential but tight housing 
constraints. There could also be more long-distance commuting with environmental, 
congestion and health/wellbeing costs.  
Similar comments apply in relation to potential shortfalls in the delivery of social rented 
or intermediate affordable housing. This would (according to our model findings) tend 
to reduce the supply of market housing as well, because the two are so often linked in 
mixed developments. It would reduce both directly available new build lettings but also 
turnover and re-lets across the social stock. These would mean people being forced 
to live for longer in situations of housing need, and would directly impact on levels of 
core homelessness. Many local authorities would find it difficult or impossible to meet 
targets and aspirations in relation to homelessness reduction and rough sleeping 
without an adequate supply of social rented housing, as was emphasized in Chapter 
5 (section 5.8).  
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A general characteristic of the current housing market in Britain is that a lot of 
households are exposed a significant degree of risk, particularly in the private rented 
sector, where they are spending high proportions of their income on rent, while 
enjoying little security of tenure. The value judgements underpinning the standards set 
in Chapter 3 are that people should not be expected to bear such risks for extended 
periods of their lives. The corollary is that, if the numbers of affordable homes we 
suggest as targets in this study are not provided, then many more people will be forced 
to bear such risks for much longer.  
6.4   Key local housing requirements targets 
We now turn to the results of the above analysis. Although the analysis has been 
conducted at local authority level, we mainly focus on results at the level of regions 
and types of local authority within broad regions33.  
The results can be expressed in terms of key targets and forecast numbers for each 
area or group of areas. We derive an initial total housing requirement figure, based on 
household projections and existing plans, enhanced proportionally where affordability 
is currently worse. This is changed to an adjusted planning target, based on the 
process described in the section above on ‘Deriving the overall additional dwellings 
target’, allowing for higher or lower levels of demand/affordability and physical 
constraints, as well as need/homelessness and low demand factors. Authorities which 
are ‘capacity constrained’ (by limited land availability) are flagged at this point. We 
also derive from the SRHMM a forecast actual level of output for the mid-2020s, both 
overall and for the part which would be in the private and intermediate sectors. Social 
housing requirements can be expressed as percentage figures, indicating the new 
social rented ‘quota’ (as a percent of total completions); in developing targets we look 
at quotas both at local authority level for the wider Housing Market Area (HMA) level. 
These are both needs-based, combining Models 1 and 2 with further needs-based 
adjustments. The needs-based social rented number is derived as an average of the 
LA and HMA targets, but this is subject to further adjustments to take account of 
changes in the adjusted planning target (e.g. due to physical capacity constraints) and 
final adjustments to fine tune for homelessness pressures and possible oversupply. 
Again, forecast levels of social housing completions from the SRHMM in the mid-
2020s can be shown alongside the adjusted targets. Alongside this are also derived 
the targets for shared ownership (SO) and intermediate renting (IR), again based on 
a combination of Models 1 and 2. If an authority has more social lettings than it ‘needs’ 
(on a common basis), then it is assumed some of these would be allocated to 
households in the intermediate affordability groups, so somewhat reducing the 
requirements for shared ownership or intermediate rent.  
                                                          
33 The typology used here is the revised 2011-based ONS classification of local authorities, which is based on a 
detailed cluster analysis of census and other data, at the middle ‘Group’ level. The names of area types are as 
given in the published classification.  
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Regional patterns 
There are some broad patterns in the analysis, which to a considerable degree reflect 
the regional structure. With this in mind it is useful to present Table 6.1 below, which 
shows the key numeric totals for the English regions. The initial total requirement 
targets are smallest for the North East and largest for Greater London, followed by the 
South East, East and South West regions. This southern emphasis follows the pattern 
of affordability. However, the adjusted targets see the largest numbers in the South 
East, as this takes up the larger part of the 22,000 reduction required to bring Greater 
London down to its maximum capacity. There are also sizeable increases for the East 
of England and South West regions, which partly also offset some reductions for the 
Midlands. The actual forecast numbers show a similar pattern, but with a tendency for 
the North and Midland regions to rather over-perform relative to their subdued targets, 
while the South East and London tend to underperform against their very demanding 
increased targets. There is a moderate overall apparent over-performance of forecast 
output relative to the target, but this is a spot figure for 2026, and the averaged 
subregional figure to 2031 is slightly lower than target (337,000).  
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Table 6.1: Total, Social and Intermediate Affordable Housing Supply Targets and 
Forecast Outputs at 2031 by English Region 
 Total Req- Adjusted Forecast Social  Adjusted Shared Intermed Forecast 
Region  uirement Target Total Rented Soc Rent Ownership Rent 
Soc 
Rent 
        Need         
North East 6,930 6,963 10,116 702 828 400 1,190 1,577 
Yorks & H 18,954 18,868 21,313 1,552 1,795 1,477 2,216 3,454 
Nth West 23,471 22,574 28,982 4,329 4,324 3,297 3,288 5,412 
East Mids 19,177 17,248 22,314 2,227 1,867 2,202 1,929 3,727 
West Mids 23,645 21,102 25,286 3,485 3,129 3,268 2,458 4,764 
Sth West 36,739 42,171 41,328 7,352 8,340 3,980 2,540 8,870 
East Eng 41,773 46,104 45,236 9,435 10,999 3,851 3,143 10,314 
Sth East 72,150 90,179 84,939 20,593 26,250 6,466 5,319 20,231 
G London 96,864 74,464 70,741 42,291 32,983 2,308 10,523 31,128 
         
England 339,702 339,673 350,256 91,965 90,515 27,249 32,605 89,477 
Note: the ‘forecast’ numbers are spot figures for 2026.  
The social rented need numbers are more differentially skewed between regions, with 
relatively low numbers in the northern and midland regions, and much bigger numbers 
in London and the South East, with East and South West also having substantial 
numbers. The adjusted social rent target numbers show a redistribution of c.9,000 
units pa from London, principally to the South East but with slight additions in the East 
and South West.  
Intermediate Rent targets show a similar pattern to social rent, while Shared 
Ownership tends to have lower targets in London, but larger ones in the South East 
and other regions, not confined to the South. Differential need/potential for shared 
ownership arises from the interaction of several factors: the relative new-secondhand 
price premium (shared ownership prices are based on new build, whereas market 
purchase is based on the whole market); the fact that the shared ownership 
affordability test is somewhat different; and the fact that the shared ownership 
affordability zone is pitched much higher up the income distribution in London, which 
is more thinly populated.  
Recurrent patterns at local level 
In this section we review the pattern of housing requirements generated in this part of 
the study, based on the local authority level of analysis, relating this to different generic 
types of local authority set in broader regional context. Analysis at this level brings out 
more sharply the differences in need for additional housing provision of different kinds 
in the coming period, while also reflecting differing constraints and opportunities within 
regions and housing market areas. However, while based on the best data available 
on a common basis across the country at the time, we are mindful that there may be 
more recent or detailed data available in some cases, as well as particular plans and 
joint working arrangements in particular areas which might lead to different numbers 
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for particular local authorities. We therefore do not present the estimated requirements 
at individual local authority level, but focus on the more generic patterns.  
Table 6.2 looks at the overall housing supply numerical targets and at the role of social 
renting within that, with the annual numbers expressed as a percentage of resident 
household population for each type of local authority within three broad regions (North-
Midlands, South, London).  
The areas assigned the highest level of overall planning target for new housing are in 
the areas classified as ‘Prosperous England’, particularly in the South but also, at a 
somewhat lower level, in the North and Midlands. These areas have high affordability 
pressures but also high growth potential and trajectory, being less land-constrained 
than London and other cities.  
Next highest come ‘Multicultural Suburbs’ in London and South, and ‘London 
Cosmopolitan Suburbia’, again areas of high affordability stress and demographic 
growth pressure. In these and the previously mentioned areas, overall planning targets 
in excess of 2% of existing households per year are indicated. Another area type in 
this league is ‘Rural Coastal and Amenity’ in the South, followed by ‘Heritage Centres’ 
in the South. ‘Growth Areas and Cities’ in London and the South come next; these 
include some former new towns and cities which still have a strong growth trajectory. 
Cosmopolitan Central London comes next, clearly an area of intense housing need 
but capacity constrained.  
‘Rural hinterland’ areas in the South have above-average overall housing 
requirements, while other Rural England (South) and Hinterland areas (Midlands) are 
close to the average.  
At the other end of the spectrum, the area types with the lowest indicated requirement 
for additional housing are ‘Mining Heritage’ and ‘Manufacturing Traits’, particularly in 
the North and Midlands, where these types of district are concentrated. Other 
particularly low cases include ‘Business and Education Centres’ in the Midlands, 
‘Coastal Resorts and Services ‘in the North, and ‘Rural Coastal and Amenity’ in the 
Midlands and North.  
Generally, there is an association between areas with a high level of target and areas 
with a large increase in target relative to recent actual housebuilding rates. 
The targets for London would have been even higher were it not for the effects of 
capacity constraints, which are the governing factor for most boroughs. Boroughs with 
higher targets are those with more brownfield land potential. Capacity constraints also 
affect 25 other authorities outside London, mainly cities or larger towns in the South 
of England. 
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Table 6.2: Adjusted Housing Supply Targets for Total Housing and Social Renting at 
2031 by ONS Local Authority Group and Broad Region of England (number per 
annum as percent of household population) 
  
Adj 
Planning Adj Social 
ONS Local Authority Group Broad  Target Rent Targ 
  Region  % of hhd % of hhd 
Business and Education Centres North-Mids 0.79 0.16 
 South 1.40 0.44 
 London 1.65 0.59 
  Total 0.97 0.25 
Coastal Resorts and Services North-Mids 0.34 0.04 
 South 1.69 0.48 
  Total 1.54 0.43 
Growth Areas and Cities North-Mids 1.00 0.18 
 South 1.91 0.65 
 London 1.83 0.64 
  Total 1.59 0.49 
Heritage Centres North-Mids 1.09 0.30 
 South 2.04 0.58 
  Total 1.65 0.46 
London Cosmopolitan Central London 1.86 0.85 
  Total 1.86 0.85 
London Cosmopolitan Suburbia London 2.32 1.13 
  Total 2.32 1.13 
Manufacturing Traits North-Mids 0.60 0.06 
 South 1.47 0.41 
  Total 0.68 0.09 
Mining Heritage North-Mids 0.60 0.06 
 South 1.48 0.47 
  Total 0.64 0.07 
Multicultural Suburbs South 1.93 0.85 
 London 2.44 1.03 
  Total 2.38 1.01 
Prosperous England North-Mids 1.45 0.31 
 South 2.73 0.71 
  Total 2.55 0.65 
Rural Coastal and Amenity North-Mids 0.67 0.11 
 South 2.29 0.35 
  Total 1.90 0.29 
Rural England North-Mids 0.87 0.11 
 South 1.51 0.36 
  Total 0.97 0.15 
Rural Hinterland North-Mids 1.38 0.09 
 South 1.70 0.25 
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  Total 1.55 0.17 
Total North-Mids 0.81 0.11 
 South 2.10 0.53 
 London 2.11 0.94 
  Total 1.49 0.40 
 
Table 6.2 also presents the estimated requirement for new social housing. It can be 
seen that there is some general similarity in the rankings here, although of course the 
absolute levels are lower (social rent ‘quotas’ generally lie in the range from just under 
10% to 33%, across area types).  
The areas with the highest additional social housing requirements are London 
Cosmopolitan Suburbia, Multicultural Suburbs (London and South), London 
Cosmopolitan Central, Prosperous England (South), Growth Areas and Cities (South 
and London), Business and Education Centres (London and South), Heritage Centres 
(South), and Coastal Resorts and Services (South). High figures here reflect high 
levels of affordability-based and backlog needs but also low levels of existing supply 
in the form of existing stock and re-lets.  
At the other end of the spectrum, again, are areas of Mining Heritage and 
Manufacturing Traits, particularly in the North and Midlands. Needs for additional 
social housing are also relatively low in rural, coastal and hinterland areas in the North 
and Midlands. Even within the South, rural area types have below average need for 
additional social housing. In the Midlands (particularly), Growth Areas and Cities, 
Business and Education Centres and Heritage Centres have relatively low needs for 
additional social housing.  
In fact 37 local authorities (11% of the total) are assigned zero target need for 
additional social housing, generally implying that re-lets supply exceeds new need and 
appropriate contribution to reducing backlog, and that this is true in the wider Housing 
Market Area as well as in this particular local authority. These cases include some 
remote peripheral areas, a number of former manufacturing towns, some cities in the 
North and Midlands, and quite a few former mining areas.  
Table 6.3 presents the targets for the two generic forms of intermediate tenure, shared 
ownership and intermediate rent, analysed in a similar fashion. For shared ownership, 
the targets tend to be higher in the South, and lowest in the North, but also in London. 
The low potential in the North reflects easier affordability of mainstream owner 
occupation, the secondary affordability test relating to residual income, and the high 
availability of social rented re-lets in some areas. 
In London, shared ownership potential is relatively low, partly because of the way the 
affordability is calculated but mainly because London house prices are so high that 
even shared ownership is only affordable to people in a more thinly populated upper 
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part of the income distribution. However, there is much more potential for intermediate 
rent in London, across most but not all boroughs.  
Table 6.3: Housing Supply Targets for Shared Ownership and Intermediate Renting 
at 2031 by ONS Local Authority Group and Broad Region of England (number per 
annum as percent of household population) 
  Shared  Intermediate 
ONS Local Authority Group Broad  Ownership Rent 
    Region % hhd % hhd 
Business and Education Centres North-Mids 0.18 0.19 
  South 0.24 0.19 
  London 0.09 0.25 
  Total 0.20 0.19 
Coastal Resorts and Services North-Mids 0.03 0.08 
  South 0.16 0.11 
  Total 0.15 0.11 
Growth Areas and Cities North-Mids 0.09 0.11 
  South 0.19 0.19 
  London 0.09 0.23 
  Total 0.14 0.17 
Heritage Centres North-Mids 0.19 0.12 
  South 0.22 0.14 
  Total 0.21 0.13 
London Cosmopolitan Central London 0.04 0.31 
  Total 0.04 0.31 
London Cosmopolitan Suburbia London 0.08 0.34 
  Total 0.08 0.34 
Manufacturing Traits North-Mids 0.06 0.09 
  South 0.17 0.13 
  Total 0.07 0.09 
Mining Heritage North-Mids 0.04 0.08 
  South 0.17 0.12 
  Total 0.04 0.08 
Multicultural Suburbs South 0.26 0.22 
  London 0.07 0.28 
  Total 0.09 0.27 
Prosperous England North-Mids 0.23 0.09 
  South 0.17 0.13 
  Total 0.18 0.12 
Rural Coastal and Amenity North-Mids 0.10 0.06 
  South 0.13 0.08 
  Total 0.12 0.08 
Rural England North-Mids 0.12 0.06 
  South 0.14 0.09 
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  Total 0.12 0.07 
Rural Hinterland North-Mids 0.07 0.04 
  South 0.09 0.06 
  Total 0.08 0.05 
Total North-Mids 0.10 0.10 
  South 0.17 0.13 
  London 0.07 0.30 
  Total 0.12 0.14 
 
The highest potential for shared ownership appears to be in Multicultural Suburbs and 
Business and Education Centres in the South and Midlands, and in Heritage Centres 
in the South and North. Prosperous England areas in the North and Midlands appear 
to offer better prospects for this form of provision. 
The lowest potential for shared ownership appears to be associated with opposite 
ends of the housing market spectrum, London Cosmopolitan Central at one end and 
Mining Heritage, Manufacturing Traits and Coastal Resorts and Services in the North 
at the other. Rural Hinterlands also appear to have lower potential for this form of 
affordable housing.  
Intermediate Rent, by contrast, has much the largest potential in London, with 
relatively less in most of the North and Midlands. This reflects the degree of 
unaffordability of market renting and whether this coincides with the greatest bunching 
of households in terms of income. The highest potential in London is in the 
‘Cosmopolitan’ areas. Within the South, the greatest potential is in Multicultural 
Suburbs, Business and Education Centres and Growth Areas and Cities, while he 
least is in Rural Hinterlands. The greater potential in the second of these categories is 
also apparent in the Midlands and North, where generally the potential is rather low.  
6.5   Local patterns in key outcomes 
A key principle underlying this study is that the ultimate criterion, to judge whether 
housing requirements are being met, should be the evidence of outcomes, particularly 
in relation to the housing needs and experiences of those who are at greater risk, 
namely lower income households and homeless people. Evidence of recent/current 
outcomes have formed part of the basis of setting targets. However, we are ultimately 
interested in outcomes achieved at the end of the planning period (2031 in this case). 
It remains to be seen what actual outcomes will turn out to be. We can, however, use 
the SRHMM to run forecasts and examine the patterns of forecast outcomes.  
In Chapter 5 we did this using the sub-regional HMA-level of analysis, but with results 
only summarised at the level of four broad regions for England. Having extended the 
relevant parts of the SRHMM to make explicit the implications for individual local 
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authorities, we are now in a position to review the pattern of outcomes across all of 
the 32434 local authorities in England.  
The main scenario developed here is a modified version of the preferred strategy 
emerging from the Chapter 5 analysis, as summarised in Table 5.10. As described at 
the end of section 6.3 above, we start from the ‘status quo’ numbers, then use certain 
key measures of affordability and need at local level to derive first a set of needs-
based targets. Further adjustments are then made to reflect development capacity 
constraints, and forecast levels of key indicators reflecting the prospects for 
households in need or experiencing core homelessness to be rehoused. Some broad 
regional parameters are also applied, to ensure some interregional parity at the end 
of the process. So, although the scenario is similar in general shape and intent to 
Table 5.10, it differs in detail, and to some degree in some of the national and regional-
level outcomes. Some of these differences arise from constraints emerging from the 
local-level analysis, such as capacity constraints. 
Before looking at the local level results, we should briefly review the regional/national 
summary impacts, shown in Table 6.4. 
Despite the similar level of output, the resulting level of household growth is higher in 
this scenario, probably because increased output is more focussed on higher need 
localities where there have been more concealed potential households. This new 
scenario improves affordability marginally less than Table 5.10 (3.9% vs 4.8%). The 
impacts on after housing costs poverty and financial difficulties, and on core 
homelessness, are similar but marginally less than that in Table 5.10. There is 
somewhat more difference in the impacts on backlog housing needs, although these 
would still be down by 19%, while core homelessness would be down by 53% (vs 
56%). The chances of a household in need being rehoused would improve by 102%, 
compared with 118% in Table 5.10.  
  
                                                          
34 Owing to an error in some input data files, caused by changes in LA codes between 2011 and 2014, two 
Hertfordshire districts are omitted from the LA database and analysis.  
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Table 6.4.: Key outcome differences in scenario of relatively large increase in 
general housing and social housing units, with local level targeting and constraints, 
plus key homelessness related measures, England 2016-31 
   Difference 
Change 
% 
SUMMARY OUTCOMES   in 
in 
regional  
England   
Change 
% 
 
Inequality 
Optimised September 2018 2016 2031 2016-31 2031 
Total New Housebuilding 15.3% 41.9% 48.0%  
New Social Housebuilding 73.6% 216.3% 136.2%  
Number of Households 0.4% 3.3% 3.3%  
Household Growth 8.1% 35.4% 21.8%  
     
Affordability to Buy % -0.8% 3.9% 4.2% -93.5% 
Affordability to Rent  % -0.2% -0.1% 0.1% -29.6% 
Owner Occ under 40 % 0.7% 0.5% -0.3% -1.6% 
Owner Occ all % 0.2% -0.9% -1.0% -0.4% 
Private Rent all % -0.4% -1.0% -0.7%  
     
Rel Poverty AHC % -0.5% -17.6% -18.2% -1.2% 
Financial Difficulties % -0.3% -9.8% -10.4% -11.3% 
Concealed/sharing hhd % 1.6% -7.9% -10.2% -46.3% 
Backlog Housing Need  -0.6% -18.5% -20.4% -42.6% 
Wider homeless -0.5% -7.6% -7.7%  
Core homeless -0.4% -52.6% -65.3% -35.9% 
     
Annual net new need AH -5.4% -47.1% -66.3%  
Chance of Rehousing % 14.6% 102.3% 63.1% -59.6% 
Low Demand Indicators 2016.0% 2031.0% Change % 
HMAs Excess Vacancies 
(>6%) 0.0% 72.7% 2400.0%  
HMAs High Re-lets (>6%) 16.7% 300.0% 40.5%  
HMAs Price< Cost 2.2% #DIV/0! 4.3%  
________________________________________________________ 
Note: the outturn forecast housing output is c.340,000, with social housing output at around 
90,000; these are consistent with initial and adjusted targets at national level. 
When we look at outcomes at local authority level, the same approach applies; while 
measures of change are of interest, the key measure is the difference between the 
outcome measure under the recommended supply scenario and its value under the 
baseline scenario. Therefore the key working table shows these differences, 
essentially in percentage point values.  
There is a lot of information in this table, but we can summarise it quite effectively, as 
in Table 6.5. We have selected a subset of eight representative indicators of relevant 
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outcomes relating to housing needs, homelessness, rehousing prospects, affordability 
and tenure. The first row of the table shows the direction of change which we would 
interpret at favourable (positive in some cases, negative in others).  
Table 6.5: Summary of changes in outcomes across English local authorities under 
core scenario with local targets and constraints 
     
Core 
Hless Able to  
Afford 
Mkt Share 
  Backlog Chance 
Core 
Hless flow as % Buy % Rent % Private 
  Needs Rehouse % hhd rehousing < 40s < 40s Rent % 
   2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 
         
Favourable 
direction  - + - - + + - 
         
Absolute change  -2% 8% 0% -77% 10% 3% -18% 
Proportional chg  -19% 94% -53% -69% 23% 5% -1% 
         
Number of LA's 
fav  320 299 323 319 278 245 262 
Percent of LA's  
fav  99% 92% 100% 98% 86% 76% 81% 
. 
For most of these indicators, a very large majority of local authorities display a change 
in the favourable direction. The main exception to this is last indicator shown, tenure, 
measured here by the proportion of private rent, which we assume is the least 
preferred tenure. 
For housing needs and homelessness the picture is overwhelmingly positive, in terms 
of the average value of change and the fact that nearly all authorities report a 
favourable change. The proportional changes here are consistent with those reported 
in Table 6.4. Affordability changes in a favourable direction in 86% of authorities (76% 
looking at private rental affordability). The average change appears slightly higher from 
the LAD-level estimates.  
So, we may conclude from this review of summary measures of impacts across the 
local authorities in England, that this strongly confirms the picture of significant 
favourable changes in key need and affordability outcome indicators, which are shared 
across most local authorities (virtually all in the case of core homelessness).  
Regional Impacts 
Before looking at some detail local variations, it is appropriate to look at the patterns 
across the standard regional breakdown for England. Table 6.6 presents the key 
outcomes, firstly as levels in 2031 and secondly as changes (in percentage points). It 
follows from one of our key assumptions that a desirable end position for this plan 
period is that the need/outcome indicators should show relatively similar levels across 
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regions, as a result of reducing regional disparities. As a broad generalisation, Table 
6.6 (a) suggests that the overall picture shows more similarity than difference across 
the regions, although there are still some remaining differences. Backlog need remains 
higher in London and to some extent in the North East and Yorkshire-Humber, 
compared with the southern regions. The chances of rehousing for households in need 
are similar between London and North East, but higher in the North West and South 
West. Core homelessness remains higher in London but otherwise fairly uniform. Core 
homelessness takes more of the rehousing flow in the NE and London compared with 
southern and E Midlands regions. Ability to buy is better in south and midlands, poorer 
in London and worst in NE, but affordability to rent in market remains clearly lower in 
London than all other regions, at the same time that the share of private renting of all 
households is much higher in London. These findings underline that some of London’s 
pressures are hard to fully relieve, but also that the problems of the North East may 
be in danger of some neglect. 
Table 6.6: Key Outcomes of Core High Supply Scenario by Region  
(a) percentage levels 
    
Core 
Hless Able to  
Afford 
Mkt Share 
Region Backlog Chance 
Core 
Hless flow as % Buy % Rent % Private 
 Needs 
Rehous
e % hhd 
rehousin
g < 40s < 40s Rent % 
  2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 
North East 11.4% 10.2% 0.3% 60.6% 34.2% 52.4% 21.1 
Yorks & H 10.4% 15.4% 0.3% 42.9% 41.8% 65.7% 22.1 
Nth West 9.3% 20.6% 0.3% 45.8% 45.6% 62.6% 18.9 
East Mids 9.7% 13.4% 0.2% 29.1% 50.0% 74.1% 19.0 
West Mids 8.5% 14.3% 0.3% 37.6% 51.3% 67.4% 18.3 
Sth West 7.5% 20.1% 0.2% 24.7% 52.5% 62.2% 20.5 
East Eng 9.5% 18.7% 0.3% 27.4% 53.2% 71.6% 19.8 
Sth East 8.7% 19.1% 0.2% 21.9% 58.4% 72.0% 20.6 
G London 13.8% 11.7% 0.7% 52.9% 42.9% 43.7% 32.7 
        
England 9.4% 16.5% 0.3% 36.3% 48.4% 66.0% 20.1 
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(b) percentage point differences from baseline 
    
Core 
Hless 
Able 
to  
Afford 
Mkt Share 
Region Backlog Chance 
Core 
Hless flow as % 
Buy 
% 
Rent 
% Private 
 Needs Rehouse % hhd rehousing < 40s < 40s 
Rent 
% 
  2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 
North East -0.6% 1.7% -0.2% -70.4% 0.8% -0.2% -0.2 
Yorks & H -1.2% 7.7% -0.2% -70.2% 3.1% 0.7% -0.1 
Nth West -1.8% 13.3% -0.2% -62.3% 6.4% 2.5% -0.1 
East Mids -1.1% 4.9% -0.2% -46.0% 3.8% 0.7% -0.2 
West Mids -1.2% 4.9% -0.2% -55.2% 6.4% 2.3% -0.1 
Sth West -1.9% 8.4% -0.2% -46.8% 8.0% 2.9% -0.2 
East Eng -1.8% 7.7% -0.2% -41.8% 8.4% 2.9% -0.2 
Sth East -2.7% 10.4% -0.2% -61.4% 17.0% 6.0% -0.1 
G London -6.6% 7.7% -1.5% -275.5% 18.0% 7.2% -0.5 
        
England -1.5% 7.4% -0.2% -56.8% 6.7% 2.2% -0.1 
 
Table 6.6(b) shows the extent of the changes (generally improvements) in outcomes 
across the regions resulting from the higher supply strategy. The general pattern is of 
bigger impacts in London and the South, especially the South East, with lesser impacts 
in the northern regions, although for some indicators the improvements in the north 
are sizeable. This pattern of results is expected and broadly as intended, based on a 
strategy to targeting areas of higher need, albeit subject to some constraints. The 
homelessness-related indicators show more of significant improvement across all 
regions because the core strategy modelled also involves measures other than supply, 
particularly in the fields of welfare and prevention, which would apply across the 
country.  
Varying local impacts 
However, there is also still quite wide variation between individual local authorities, 
within each region. This is illustrated by the following examples, which shows key 
outcomes for three or four selected authorities in each of four regions. These are 
selected to illustrate variations in the degree of reduction in need/improvement in 
rehousing prospects, and also urban-rural differences.  
To take a northern region as an example, Authority A is a deprived urban authority 
with significant needs, and new housing targets set are relatively low and, although 
forecast new build somewhat exceeds these. Backlog needs reduce by 0.6% points 
and households in need would see a modest (3%) improvement in chances of 
rehousing. Core homelessness would fall and the share of rehousing for this group 
would fall by 11%. Younger households’ ability to buy would fall by 1% points, while 
rental affordability would not change, and there would be a very small net reduction in 
the share of private renting. Authority B is a neighbouring urban authority, 
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characterised by low demand, with new housing targets set low. In this case there is 
little change in needs and a marginal fall in homelessness, with a marginal fall in 
affordability (-2% to buy or to rent). Authority C is a rural authority where targets are 
somewhat more positive and forecast new build is higher. There are moderate 
improvements in backlog housing need (-0.3%) but more significant reductions in core 
homelessness (-0.33% points) and in the share of rehousing devoted to this group (-
43%), but again marginal negative changes in affordability.  
Looking at a Midland region we highlight and contrast a core city (D), a smaller town 
associated with a former coalfield area E, and one of the more rural districts (F). 
Authority D has a reduced target and forecast with a moderate social renting quota; E  
has a reduced target with zero net social renting need;  F has a stable target with an 
increasing forecast and  limited local social renting need. For the city authority D there 
are quite sizeable reductions in need (2.6%) or improved chances of rehousing (+3%), 
with particularly improved situation for core homeless households (-0.83% of share of 
households; ratio of flow to rehousing -103%), although the change in affordability to 
buy is modest (+1%).  In the other two cases E and F, the changes are more modest, 
although in the right direction for needs and homelessness. In case E backlog needs 
fall by 1.3% points, chances of rehousing for households in need rise by 13%, core 
homelessness drops by 0.03% of households or 8% as share of rehousing, but 
affordability to buy rises by a useful 4%. The changes in authority F are generally 
small.  
In a southern region we highlight one of the main cities, albeit also a coastal resort (G) 
characterised by high market demand pressure, a small heritage city also with 
significant development constraints (H), and a larger, less pressured rural area (I). 
While capacity constraints force a reduced target on case G, case H sees an increased 
target and forecast, and both have significant positive social rented needs. Case I has 
a steady target, a higher forecast, and zero net social rented needs. The outcomes 
show sizeable reductions in need and homelessness and improved rehousing 
chances in all cases, and improved affordability, but with generally the largest impacts 
in G and the smallest in I. Backlog need would fall by 4.7% points in G and 3.1% in H; 
chances of rehousing would be up by 10% (G) and 16% (H); core homeless rate would 
fall by 0.37% (G) and 0.50% (H), while the ratio of core homeless flow to rehousing 
would fall by more than 100% in both cases. Affordability to buy would improve by 
19% in G and 9% in H, while affordability to rent would improve by 6% and 3%. The 
outcomes in case I would also all be in favourable directions, but smaller in magnitude.  
Finally, in London there is a lot of similarity between the boroughs, most of which have 
capacity constrained reduced targets and high social need quotas. Insofar as there 
are some differences we try to capture these by contrasting a poor, inner borough (J) 
with an affluent, outer borough (K) and an intermediate more mixed case (L). All cases 
see big reductions in backlog needs (between 4% and 9%) and in chances of 
rehousing (6% to 18%), with the largest impacts in the poor inner borough.  Core 
homelessness is down by between 0.3% and 4.1% of households, with massively 
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improved prospects for this group especially, albeit the scale of change is somewhat 
less for K. There are large improvements in affordability for home ownership (18-25%) 
and quite large improvements for private renting (4-10%). To reiterate, this core 
strategy has been designed in part to achieve its greatest impacts in the region with 
the highest housing needs and pressures, London, so these outcomes are in line with 
that intention. 
6.6   Conclusions 
In this chapter we have described a process of extending our approach to assessing 
housing requirements from a broad regional level down through Housing Market Areas 
to the level of Local Authorities, initially for England. This has been a challenging task, 
for several reasons. Firstly, it became clear that, when going to this level, it was 
necessary to introduce a third model into the methodology, albeit a more familiar 
established approach to assessing local housing requirements. Blending what we now 
term Models 1 and 2, we derived a set of targets at HMA and local authority level, 
designed to level up affordability conditions between different areas and meet needs 
for social and affordable housing proportionately. A second challenge overcome at this 
stage was to find sufficient robust data sources to actually measure conditions at local 
authority level in our base year (2015).  
Thirdly, local authorities vary greatly in their geographical characteristics and capacity 
to actually accommodate new housing. Using some earlier work on potential 
development capacity we introduced this as a potential constraint, modifying targets 
in some areas to reflect this. Then, using the forecasting capabilities of the SRHMM 
we looked at certain key indicators of the extent to which key housing need and 
homelessness targets would be met, and further adjusted the targets to try to improve 
achievement against these targets.  
However, at this point we had to draw a line and take stock of the picture as it emerged, 
both in overall terms and in detail. At this stage, the fourth challenge kicked in, which 
was to summarise and make sense of the detailed model results for all 324 local 
authorities in the system. Given that we are not working with a single number answer 
approach to housing needs, but a looking at a basket of outcome indicators, this is 
challenging in terms of the amount of information that has to be reviewed.  
Given the significant nature of these challenges, we would claim that this study has 
succeeded in meeting its objectives in providing a realistic, forward-looking 
assessment of housing requirements in a unique and innovative fashion. It has 
combined elements from traditional demographic, affordability-based and survey 
based methods of looking at housing needs, with an econometric-based forecasting 
approach focussed on the most appropriate geographical framework of housing 
market areas, but still deriving the implications for individual local authorities.  
Working through the analysis at the local authority level brings out certain features of 
the system which may not be revealed in broad national or regional assessments. 
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Firstly, this brings out the extent to which targets need to change substantially from 
those inherited from the planning system, and the household-projections-dominated 
approach used therein, in order to have targets which are likely to deliver meaningful 
impacts on affordability and housing need. We show that these differences are much 
greater than the modest adjustments made to local planning targets by MHCLG in the 
2017 guidance. Secondly, however, setting targets which differ greatly from previous 
figures will not guarantee that new build numbers achieved will follow closely in step 
– there are implementation issues which intervene between plan allocations and actual 
completions in a finite time period, momentum effects, the legacy of existing 
permissions and varying levels of economic viability. Thirdly, there are greatly varying 
physical capacity constraints affecting some localities (particularly core cities in higher 
demand regions), and indeed dominating the picture for the London region. Fourthly, 
there are probably upper limits to the quotas of social and affordable housing which 
are likely to be acceptable in policy terms, let alone economically or financially viable. 
For this exercise, which is mainly focused on needs, we set these limits at close to the 
highest logically feasible level  80% maximum social rented housing). However, this 
limit only affects a handful of authorities. Much more important is the effect of flexing 
the overall housing target when interacted with social housing quotas, taking account 
of the HMA-level values. These processes have the effect of strongly nudging 
authorities into cooperating with their regional and especially HMA neighbours.  
The exercise has shown that the needs estimated through the analysis in Chapters 4-
5 can be mapped out across the system of local authorities in England in a defensible 
fashion. In this way it shows that it could be feasible to deliver such need numbers, 
even allowing for physical development constraints, although this could involve in 
some cases proportions of social housing within new developments which might not 
be considered desirable. Financial feasibility had not been considered at this stage, 
but it should be noted that the correlation of high need with high house prices and the 
implied high land values would make for considerable potential contribution from 
Section 106 and equivalent mechanisms of land value capture. We go on below to 
report on an attempt to quantify this potential contribution, with associated implications 
for public subsidy.  
Review of the targets, forecasts and outcomes at local authority level, which we have 
only been able highlight and illustrate key features and examples of here, suggests 
that our core scenario and set of targets would broadly achieve ‘what it says on the 
tin’. In other words, they are meeting housing needs overall, including affordability and 
the ability of younger people to actually form households and enter the system, as well 
as tackling backlog needs and in particular core homelessness, in a proportional way. 
In other words, the areas with the highest needs/worst problems get the most 
help/improvement in outcomes, directly or (especially in the case of London) indirectly. 
Areas with relatively low demand and relatively little indicated need for additional social 
rented or affordable housing are assigned low or zero targets respectively for new 
housing provision overall or for these specific forms.  
138 
 
Fine tuning 
While most of the local authority level target and outcome numbers appear to make 
sense from this perspective, there may be few cases where particular numbers look 
anomalous. Such cases may arise from errors in some input data, but they may also 
arise where particular authorities have unusual or extreme combinations of 
circumstances, outside the range of prediction of our models.  
Leaving aside such anomalies, it may also be felt that certain classes of local authority 
are showing more adverse outcomes than is really warranted, and that in the interests 
of fairness, cohesion or other considerations some adjustment of targets may be 
warranted on those grounds. This issue is picked up in the following chapter, in terms 
of the broad North-South regional balance.  
It may also be argued that some of the assumptions made about capacity, for example 
relating to the Green Belt, may not be appropriate or realistic, and that the scenario 
should be changed to reflect this. Another issue to factor in may be the argument that 
a more explicit assessment of development viability should be included in the local 
authority level analysis, to reveal the extent to which levels of social and affordable 
housing indicated here would or would not be viable, given assumptions about levels 
and volumes of subsidy availability. Our model is analytically capable of such 
analyses, but these should probably be done in dialogue with other independent work 
on costs, subsidy and viability issues. This issue is addressed in Chapter 8 and 
Appendix A.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it may be argued that key assumptions in our 
core scenario are questionable, either as a picture of likely trends in key drivers 
(population, migration, economic growth, financial conditions) or as a representation 
of what key policy settings should be (e.g. regional imbalance, welfare policies). The 
main way that we can address these issues is through running alternative scenarios 
and looking at the impacts on our housing programme outturns and outcomes, at both 
regional and local levels. That is the focus of the next, penultimate chapter in this 
report.  
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CHAPTER 7 
DIFFERING STRATEGIES AND CONTEXTS 
 
7.1   An Uncertain World 
It is a cliché to say that we live in an uncertain world, although political events over the 
last 4 years underline this, just as financial and economic events of 10 years ago did. 
Assessing housing requirements starts from current evidence of problems on the 
ground but inevitably becomes an exercise of projecting into the future, making very 
many assumptions. We have used a set of models and tools to do this, and have 
produced a core scenario which embodies our best current view of what housing is 
required across the country over the next 15 years. We have compared this with a 
baseline, which represents roughly ‘carrying on as we are’, and shown that the 
outcomes under our core scenario would be substantially better, and in at least some 
senses ‘good enough’.  
But it would be an illusion to say that there is a single right answer to the question of 
how much housing is required, or rather a single set of numbers (for each tenure type, 
region and locality). We need to acknowledge the uncertainty, which affects 
• Economic prospects for the British economy  
• Demographic trends 
• Political events which could significant change both of the above (e.g. Brexit) 
• Policy changes which may result from the interaction of the above 
• Possible behavioural changes by households/businesses/markets, which may 
happen in future, or may already have happened but not been detected or 
reflected in our models 
• Inadequacies or limitations in the way our existing model, calibrated on past 
data, represent key relationship 
The normal analytical practice in the face of such uncertainties is to run a series of 
sensitivity tests, feeding in different assumptions under any or all of the above 
headings, and see what substantive effect this has on the main findings and 
conclusions, in this instance about the scale of needs for different kinds of housing 
across Great Britain. It has always been our intention to include such analyses in this 
research, and we do report here on some limited but important examples of alternative 
scenarios. 
However, a couple of limitations to this exercise must be acknowledged. Firstly, the 
time and resources available for this project are finite and the priority has been given 
to developing working models. Secondly, the fact that a local authority level of analysis 
has been adopted makes the task of reporting and interpreting the results of any 
analysis, but particularly sensitivity analyses, very challenging (comparing impacts for 
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324 LA’s versus four broad regions). For these reasons, we confine the discussion in 
this chapter to a very limited number of variant scenarios, effectively two main 
alternatives.  
7.2    Lower Growth Scenario 
The first alternative scenario focuses on the not unrealistic scenario that growth may 
be lower than in the baseline. By ’growth’ we mean both demographic growth in 
population and economic growth in GDP (or GVA as it is more commonly called now). 
There are two reasons why population growth could well be lower.  
Firstly, migration from Europe is expected to fall as a consequence of Brexit, both the 
vote itself and the negotiated deal, whatever that turns out to be. One may hazard the 
judgement that reducing migration (at least from EEA) was a key motivator for at least 
part of the Brexit vote and that Governments will feel obliged to restrict ‘free movement’ 
in some way. Recent data do indeed show a fall in EEA net migration, but less noticed 
has been the tendency for the rest of net migration to rise. Our core assumption for 
net migration from 2020 has been 200,000, which although miles higher than 
government ‘targets’ is below actual figures observed over the  whole of the last 
decade and a half. Our low variant assumption would halve this to 100,000. In the 
author’s judgement, it is not credible that net migration can fall to ‘a few tens of 
thousands’ when there are so many pressures from Industry, services, the Health 
Service, agriculture and the Universities for various groups of migrants to be allowed 
in, leaving aside controversial issues over asylum/refugees and the so-called ‘hostile 
environment’ policy. 
Secondly, the long-term fall in mortality (rise in life expectancy) has been halted in the 
last few years, and ONS has recently adjusted population projections to recognise 
this. Our baseline scenario did not include this adjustment, but it is prudent to make 
some allowance for it, at least in the recent period and immediate future. Birth rates 
may also be falling, but that will not impact significantly on household numbers in the 
coming 15 years.  
Economic growth could be lower in the coming period than in our baseline scenario, 
again for two reasons. Firstly, Brexit is forecast by a broad consensus of economic 
forecasting organisations to have some negative impact on GDP growth, in the short 
and medium term, although the extent of this impact is generally seen to depend on 
the nature of the trade and regulatory alignment deal agreed, or not. Current prospects 
appear to be moving in an adverse direction. Secondly, the British economy has 
performed very poorly even in the recovery from the financial crisis, in term of 
productivity and real earnings growth, although employment rates have been high and 
rising. Economists have not got to the bottom of this so-called ‘productivity puzzle’, 
and although the government aspires to raise productivity (one key aspect of the 
Industrial Strategy) official forecasts from the OBR and Bank of England have been 
revised downwards to reflect this continuing problem.  
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Our lower economic growth scenario entails a reduction in GDP growth of 0.3 % points 
over the 15 years to 2031 (from 2.48% to 2.20%). It should be noted that there is some 
interaction between GDP growth and the growth of the working age population, which 
relates again to migration (less to mortality rates). We would generally expect lower 
growth to be associated with lower net migration, with the causality running in both 
directions (Bramley et al 2016).  
We have run the low growth scenario both with the baseline level of supply and with 
our recommended core strategy higher level of supply. It is worth noting that lower 
growth would reduce new housebuilding by about 14% over the period, because new 
building would be less profitable /viable in some areas and developers may exercise 
more caution about starting certain sites. It would also reduce household growth by a 
similar amount (13%), because of the direct effects of lower population numbers and 
some indirect effects from income. Despite these effects, low growth would be 
moderately ‘good’ for most of our housing outcomes, including home ownership 
affordability ( up 4%), backlog need (down 9%), core homelessness (down 13%) and 
chances of households in need being rehoused (up 26%). In other words, economic 
growth linked to population growth puts pressure on the housing market, if 
planning/supply parameters are fixed, and conversely lower growth reduces pressure.  
Perhaps more important, however, is to focus on our core higher supply scenario and 
see what the effects are of this happening at the same time as this lower growth. The 
national (England) headline results are shown in Table 7.1. In this scenario, although 
the targets are the same as those described in Chapter 6 (underpinning Table 6.2), 
the forecast outturn falls slightly short, peaking at 329,000/88,000 in 2026 and falling 
back somewhat by 2031. Over the plan period total output would be up by 31%, rather 
than 42% in Table 6.2 or the 43% from the regional version presented in Table 5.10. 
For social housebuilding these numbers would be up 123% compared with 136% or 
146% respectively.  
Despite these apparent shortcomings, this scenario delivers good results on many key 
outcomes, including affordability to buy up 7.5% (better than Tables 5.10 or 6.2), 20% 
reduction in AHC poverty, 27% reduction in backlog needs, 12% reduction in wider 
homeless and 69% reduction in core homeless (again better than those comparable 
scenarios), while the chances of a household in need being rehoused are increased 
by 126%, better than Tables 5.10 and 6.2. The reason these results are generally 
better is that the effects of eased pressure, described above, are combined with the 
effects of the much greater supply and its targeting to higher need areas.  
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Table 7.1: Summary Outcomes for England of Scenario of lower Demographic and 
Economic Growth combined with Core strategy of enhanced housing supply, 
England 
Table 7.1   Difference 
Change 
% 
SUMMARY OUTCOMES   In 
in 
regional  
England   
Change 
% 
 
inequality 
Optimised Aug 2018 2016 2031 2016-31 2031 
Total New Housebuilding 13.9% 30.7% 30.7%  
New Social Housebuilding 72.3% 200.0% 123.0%  
Number of Households 0.0% 1.2% 1.4%  
Household Growth -0.8% 19.5% 17.6%  
     
Affordability to Buy % -0.8% 7.6% 7.5% -115.2% 
Affordability to Rent  % -0.2% 0.7% 0.8% -32.8% 
Owner Occ under 40 % 0.8% 0.5% -0.4% 3.2% 
Owner Occ all % 0.2% -0.7% -0.9% -0.8% 
Private Rent all % -0.5% -2.3% -2.2%  
     
Rel Poverty AHC % -5.1% -22.7% -19.7% -15.8% 
Financial Difficulties % -2.8% -15.1% -13.7% -17.2% 
Concealed/sharing hhd % -1.3% -10.3% -10.0% -64.3% 
Backlog Housing Need  -4.5% -26.8% -26.5% -60.5% 
Wider homeless -3.6% -14.1% -11.8%  
Core homeless -2.8% -56.6% -69.1% -40.3% 
     
Annual net new need AH -12.1% -67.1% -94.2%  
Chance of Rehousing % 23.2% 126.0% 68.8% -63.4% 
Low Demand Indicators 2016.0% 2031.0% Change % 
HMAs Excess Vacancies 
(>6%) 0.0% 130.3% 4300.0%  
HMAs High Re-lets (>6%) 16.7% 800.0% 111.9%  
HMAs Price< Cost 2.2% #DIV/0! 4.3%  
_____________________________________________________ 
Note: The targets are the same as those underpinning Table 6.4. but forecast output 
levels are somewhat less (329,000 total and 88,000 social rented) 
Perhaps to be expected, however, this scenario gives slightly greater cause for 
concern in terms of potential low demand problems becoming more common. 
Table 7.2 shows the regional summary, based on the full analysis by Local Authority. 
The top part of the table shows the (simple) average score, the lower part showing the 
difference from baseline in percentage points. 
Backlog needs see bigger reduction impacts in London and the south, although all 
regions see improvements, but at the end London still remains higher than the north  
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Table 7.2: Summary Outcomes for English Regions of Scenario of lower 
Demographic and Economic Growth combined with Core strategy of enhanced 
housing supply, England 
(a) Absolute scores 2031 
    
Core 
Hless Able to  
Afford 
Mkt Share 
 Backlog Chance 
Core 
Hless flow as % Buy % Rent % Private 
Region Needs Rehouse % hhd rehousing < 40s < 40s Rent % 
  2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 
North East 11.1% 10.9% 0.3% 57.9% 36.0% 54.3% 20.8 
Yorks & H 10.0% 17.7% 0.3% 38.8% 45.2% 67.1% 21.8 
Nth West 9.2% 17.8% 0.3% 42.3% 48.3% 63.4% 18.7 
East Mids 9.5% 13.3% 0.2% 25.8% 51.8% 74.4% 18.7 
West Mids 8.3% 14.8% 0.3% 35.8% 53.9% 68.1% 18.1 
Sth West 7.4% 21.1% 0.2% 23.1% 55.0% 62.9% 20.2 
East Eng 9.3% 19.2% 0.3% 28.2% 53.3% 71.4% 19.5 
Sth East 8.1% 21.2% 0.2% 20.9% 62.9% 72.8% 20.2 
G London 12.2% 13.0% 0.6% 47.8% 48.4% 44.5% 31.8 
        
England 9.1% 17.0% 0.3% 34.1% 50.8% 66.8% 19.8 
 
(b) Differences from baseline 
    
Core 
Hless Able to  
Afford 
Mkt Share 
 Backlog Chance 
Core 
Hless flow as % Buy % Rent % Private 
Region Needs Rehouse % hhd rehousing < 40s < 40s Rent % 
  2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 
North East -0.9% 2.4% -0.2% -73.2% 2.5% 1.7% -0.5 
Yorks & H -1.6% 10.1% -0.2% -74.3% 6.5% 2.1% -0.4 
Nth West -1.9% 10.6% -0.2% -65.7% 9.1% 3.3% -0.3 
East Mids -1.3% 4.7% -0.2% -49.3% 5.6% 0.9% -0.5 
West Mids -1.5% 5.5% -0.2% -57.0% 9.0% 3.0% -0.3 
Sth West -2.0% 9.3% -0.2% -48.3% 10.5% 3.6% -0.5 
East Eng -2.0% 8.2% -0.2% -41.1% 8.6% 2.7% -0.6 
Sth East -3.3% 12.5% -0.2% -62.4% 21.5% 6.8% -0.5 
G London -8.2% 8.9% -1.6% -280.6% 23.6% 7.9% -1.4 
        
England -1.8% 7.9% -0.2% -58.9% 9.2% 3.0% -0.4 
 
Chances of rehousing increase most in South East and North West and least in East 
Midlands and North, but at the end chances remain low in London, and quite low in 
the North East and East Midlands. Core homelessness is reduced most in London and 
the change in rehousing share is greatest there. Yet the end of the period London still 
has higher core homeless, with relatively low rates across the other regions.  The 
share of lettings required for core homeless is high in both London and the North East.  
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Affordability to buy or rent increases much more in the south and London, with modest 
improvements in the north.  At the end of the period affordability to buy is similar in the 
North West and Yorkshire to London, although lagging in the North East, while being 
higher in other areas particularly in the South. Affordability to rent remains much lower 
in London, and higher in the south and midlands.  There is a small reduction in private 
renting share in all regions, with a slightly larger reduction in London. 
These patterns are not very different from those generated by the core supply strategy 
when using baseline economic and demographic assumptions. On balance outcomes 
are better in this scenario because pressure on the housing system is reduced a bit. 
However, it may be argued, on the basis of these regional analyses, that perhaps the 
core supply strategy is rather too weighted in favour of the south and London, at the 
expense of the northern regions. That may be an area for more exploration, although 
we would argue for some caution and selectivity in boosting supply in the north.  
7.3   Regional Rebalance Scenario 
One response to the observations made here and earlier about the balance of housing 
supply between the London, South and North is to consider a scenario involving some 
rebalancing of economic growth between these broad regions. Concerns about the 
growing disparities between the economic performance of London, and the Greater 
South East region which supports it, and the rest of England have grown in recent 
years (Beatty and Fothergill 2007, 2016, 2018). It is a stated intention of the 
Government’s Industrial Strategy, as well as some of its urban/local government 
initiatives (City Region deals, Northern Powerhouse, Midland Engine) to achieve some 
such rebalancing. After several decades of largely ‘hands off’ approach to regional 
economic development (or rather, some delegation of elements of regional policy to 
the EU), this may be regarded as a welcome change, but it is unclear how strong the 
substance of this policy is or how easy it will be to change actual economic 
performance.  
While Bramley et al (2016) exemplified such a strategy and found its impacts on 
poverty and the housing market to be very positive, it is probably fair to say that the 
assumptions used in that scenario were optimistic, particularly on a short-medium time 
horizon. Therefore, the scenario tested here is a more moderate version of that, 
entailing closing about a third of the gap in GDP performance between the most 
lagging region and London. We combine this with a somewhat modified version of the 
core housing supply strategy, entailing somewhat reduced emphasis on London and 
areas of greatest affordability pressure, removing the element of Green Belt land take 
in highest pressure areas, and allowing targets to rise a bit more, or reduce a bit less, 
in the midlands and north. As a result forecast new build would increase more in the 
North than in the South or London. The national summary of outcomes is shown in 
Table 7.3. 
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Table 7.3: Summary Outcomes for England of Scenario of partial Regional 
Rebalancing, with modified Core strategy of enhanced housing supply, England 
Table 7.3   Difference 
Change 
% 
SUMMARY OUTCOMES   in 
in 
regional  
England   
Change 
% 
 
inequality 
  2016 2031 2016-31 2031 
Total New Housebuilding 12.3% 37.8% 47.2%  
New Social Housebuilding 57.8% 191.6% 140.6%  
Number of Households 0.2% 3.1% 3.2%  
Household Growth 3.7% 34.4% 25.5%  
     
Affordability to Buy % -0.9% 4.6% 4.9% -101.5% 
Affordability to Rent  % -0.2% 0.4% 0.5% -28.4% 
Owner Occ under 40 % 0.6% 0.3% -0.3% -7.2% 
Owner Occ all % 0.1% -0.7% -0.8% -2.2% 
Private Rent all % -0.4% -0.2% 0.2%  
     
Rel Poverty AHC % 1.5% -8.5% -10.4% -7.0% 
Financial Difficulties % 0.9% -6.2% -7.6% -13.6% 
Concealed/sharing hhd % 2.8% -6.8% -10.1% -50.3% 
Backlog Housing Need  0.6% -16.7% -19.5% -38.1% 
Wider homeless 0.7% -10.8% -12.3%  
Core homeless 0.6% -50.9% -63.8% -28.8% 
     
Annual net new need AH -3.0% -50.6% -73.8%  
Chance of Rehousing % 12.7% 103.7% 66.7% -44.8% 
Low Demand Indicators 2016.0% 2031.0% Change % 
HMAs Excess Vacancies 
(>6%) 0.0% 63.6% 2100.0%  
HMAs High Re-lets (>6%) 0.0% 200.0% 33.3%  
HMAs Price< Cost 2.2%   4.3%   
 
A number of indicators in this table are quite similar, on average, to those in the 
previously considered core high supply scenario, including the overall level of new 
housebuilding, household growth, backlog housing need, wider and core 
homelessness and rehousing prospects for the homeless and households in need. 
Progress in improving affordability is marginally greater, although the reduction in 
poverty and financial difficulties is less. For some indicators, there is a change in the 
direction of greater regional inequality, or less reduction in regional inequality in certain 
poverty and housing need indicators, although this effect is not as strong as expected. 
The local results are given in the form of regional summaries in Table 7.4 below. 
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Table 7.4: Summary Outcomes for English Regions of Scenario of partial Regional 
Rebalancing combined with modified Core strategy of enhanced housing supply, 
England 
a) Absolute scores 2031 
 
 
   
Core 
Hless Able to  
Afford 
Mkt Share 
 
 
Backlog Chance 
Core 
Hless flow as % Buy % Rent % Private 
Region  Needs Rehouse % hhd rehousing < 40s < 40s Rent % 
   2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 
North East  11.6% 10.3% 0.3% 58.8% 32.2% 50.9% 21.2 
Yorks & H  10.4% 16.9% 0.3% 41.9% 42.6% 65.0% 22.2 
Nth West  9.5% 17.0% 0.3% 45.7% 45.0% 61.9% 19.0 
East Mids  9.7% 13.6% 0.2% 30.0% 50.9% 73.2% 19.2 
West Mids  8.5% 14.8% 0.3% 37.4% 51.4% 66.6% 18.5 
Sth West  7.7% 20.6% 0.3% 24.6% 54.9% 62.1% 20.7 
East Eng  9.6% 19.4% 0.3% 30.0% 54.7% 70.8% 20.0 
Sth East  8.7% 20.0% 0.2% 21.4% 60.5% 71.2% 20.9 
G London  13.4% 13.3% 0.8% 52.3% 44.5% 42.8% 33.2 
         
England  9.5% 34.9% 0.3% 36.2% 49.0% 65.2% 20.2 
 
 
(c) Differences from baseline, % points 
    
Core 
Hless Able to  
Afford 
Mkt Share 
 Backlog Chance 
Core 
Hless flow as % Buy % Rent % Private 
Region Needs Rehouse % hhd rehousing < 40s < 40s Rent % 
  2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 
North East -0.4% 1.9% -0.2% -72.2% -1.2% -1.7% 0.0 
Yorks & H -1.2% 9.3% -0.2% -71.2% 3.9% 0.0% 0.1 
Nth West -1.7% 9.5% -0.2% -62.4% 5.8% 1.9% 0.0 
East Mids -1.1% 5.0% -0.2% -45.1% 4.7% -0.2% -0.1 
West Mids -1.2% 5.5% -0.2% -55.3% 6.5% 1.5% 0.0 
Sth West -1.7% 8.9% -0.2% -46.8% 10.4% 2.8% -0.1 
East Eng -1.8% 8.4% -0.2% -39.2% 10.0% 2.1% 0.0 
Sth East -2.7% 11.4% -0.2% -61.9% 19.1% 5.2% 0.2 
G London -6.9% 9.2% -1.4% -276.1% 19.6% 6.2% 0.0 
        
England -1.5% 25.8% -0.2% -56.8% 7.4% 1.4% 0.0 
 
There are many similarities in the patterns revealed here with those in Table 7.2. The 
larger reductions in need or improvements in chances or rehousing of affordability in 
the market tend to be associated with London and the southern regions. Nevertheless, 
there are meaningful improvements in all regions in all indicators, except the share of 
private renting. One quite anomalous result is the apparently very high figure of 
chances of rehousing in the North West.  At the end of the period, while regional 
variations have generally been reduced, higher levels of need are still recorded in 
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London and the northern regions, compared with the southern regions, and chances 
of rehousing as well as affordability are better in the south (although not in London)  
One could conclude from this analysis that, while a regional rebalancing is desirable, 
to the extent that this is realistically achievable this would lead to only a moderate 
redirection of new housing investment and a moderate change in the general pattern 
of outcomes. It would leave open the question of whether the balance between broad 
regions in social or general housing investment was right from all points of view.  
7.4   Conclusion 
In this chapter we have made the case for subjecting model scenarios to sensitivity 
testing, again with a particular focus on key housing need outcomes. We illustrated 
the approach with a couple of important variant scenarios, one focusing on lower 
demographic and economic growth, and the other on countering regional economic 
imbalance. It is possible to model and consider a wide variety of other sensitivity tests, 
but limits on time and space in this report put limits on this.  
The main conclusion from the tests so far are that the core strategy for housing supply 
put forward, based primarily on the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 but then implemented 
through a more detailed local level approach, appears to be robust to some of the 
obvious variations in conditions or policies which might be regarded as important 
possibilities. By robust we mean that the general approach to target allocation seems 
to still work, with some detailed modification, and most importantly that the pattern of 
outcomes still seems to be broadly appropriate. 
That is not to say that, if somewhat different priorities were explicitly adopted, then a 
somewhat different target allocation scheme might be optimal. Furthermore, 
consideration of particular cases, which might be regarded as anomalous or 
problematic, might lead to a modification of the targets for particular authorities.  
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CHAPTER 8 
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Main Substantive Findings 
This study confirms the widespread perception that housing needs have increased 
and current levels of housing supply are inadequate in scale and scope. There is a 
current backlog of households with housing need of 3.91million households in Great 
Britain with 3.37m in England. Adding in various core and wider homeless people not 
within private households, and private renters with affordability problems would bring 
the total up to 4.75 million across Britain.  
It is clear that we cannot meet all of these needs instantaneously. What is needed is 
a government-led plan for a really effective housebuilding programme to address 
these existing needs plus expected future needs and demands. 15 years is a 
reasonable time frame to plan for such a programme. 
Over that time horizon, the total level of new housebuilding required is estimated at 
around 340,000 per year for England (380,000 for GB).  We estimate that the target 
level of new social housebuilding required is around 90,000 per year (GB 100,000), 
with additional provision of 27,000 shared ownership (or equivalent LCHO) and 33,000 
for intermediate affordable rent (32,000 and 36,000 for GB). 
These estimates are derived from employing three partially distinct methodologies in 
complementary fashion: two based on a traditional demographic framework enhanced 
to reflect affordability; and the other based on a dynamic sub-regional housing market 
model and consideration of a wide range of key outcome measures, relating to 
affordability, poverty, housing need and homelessness. As with any such models and 
estimates, these rest on a set of assumptions and norms which have been clearly set 
out.  
The emphasis in this study has been on housing requirements and needs, and we 
have not exhaustively examined all aspects of feasibility. However, we have 
demonstrated that our suggested targets, at local authority level, are consistent with a 
reasonable interpretation of evidence on available land capacity. Other factors which 
may affect the achievability of these targets depend upon policies adopted on issues 
of tenure mix and on levels of subsidy available. We offer a brief view on financial 
costs..  
It is clear from the analysis that this increase in supply should be skewed towards 
regions where the pressures are greatest, which is currently London and the South, 
although the exact extent and implications of this may require further debate, in the 
light of any emerging regional development strategy. The role of local authorities in 
addressing these challenges is crucial, but the analysis highlights the point that not all 
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needs can be met in the local authority where they arise and local authorities need to 
cooperate and share in the responsibility for securing adequate housing supply. In the 
case of London, they cannot realistically all be met within the GLA boundaries.  
The study considers housing requirements for the whole population, but with a 
particular concern for lower income groups and especially people at risk of 
homelessness. Drawing on other recent research it recognises and factors in the 
significant role of complementary measures to housing supply, particularly prevention 
measures, welfare changes, criminal justice and health service measures to address 
complex needs, in cutting the risks of core homelessness and rough sleeping.  
The main focus of the analysis has been on England but it is being replicated in Wales 
and Scotland. The findings there so far suggest that in Wales there is a clear case for 
enhanced investment in and targets for affordable housing. In Scotland, the devolved 
government has adopted ambitious targets for affordable and social rented supply. It 
is expected that further local level analysis will confirm provisional findings that the 
picture in Scotland is more uneven, with the need for significantly enhanced supply 
including social renting confined to a certain geographical areas, while other areas 
have a more balanced position or even some over-supply; and that intermediate sector 
housing may merit more enhancement than social rented in some cases. 
The findings of the study clearly support the notion that government should give a lead 
and set targets for housing supply and, within that, for affordable tenures including 
social renting. However, the analysis does support our initial contention that excessive 
reliance on household projections as a basis for local targets is seriously flawed, and 
other evidence and models need to be brought to bear to arrive at a more appropriate 
set of targets. Furthermore this consideration should be more than tokenistic, as it is 
shown here that the scale of redirection of effort in terms of housing supply is really 
substantial, both in terms of geography and in terms of tenure. 
Policy Issues 
The main role of this study has been to present evidence and analysis for the policy 
process to take on board, not to engage in detailed policy re-design. However, it is 
appropriate and of value to at least highlight areas of policy where the study findings 
have implications which should be given serious consideration.  
Acknowledgement of the scale of the challenge is a good starting point. The study 
suggests levels of housing supply, including sectors directly or indirectly sponsored by 
the government, which are larger by a different order of magnitude than what has been 
contemplated so far, and perhaps closer to levels achieved in what are now 
considered ‘historical’ periods (between 1950 and 1975). This should not be a 
surprise. Demographic growth in Britain in the last 20 years has far exceeded that 
seen in the preceding 2-3 decades, but housing supply response has been sluggish, 
despite reports such as Barker (2004) and NHPAU (2009) urging greater action, and 
further greatly frustrated by the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008.  
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Planning for major growth, rather than ad hoc short term initiatives, is what is needed. 
That means some gearing up of capacity and skills in national government and 
agencies and in local authorities, particularly those where higher levels of growth are 
required. Although we have focused here on a 15 year horizon, local planning for 
housing and infrastructure should look further ahead than this, and should be ready to 
contemplate new settlements and urban extensions on a significant scale, as well as 
good quality (re)developments on previously used land.  
The role of social rented housing emerges as a strong theme of this research, because 
it is very clear from the analysis of affordability based on income distributions, even 
taking account of access to wealth and savings, that an awful lot of (younger) 
households entering or moving through the housing system cannot really afford the 
private market on any reasonable norms. To continue to rely on further expansion of 
this tenure as a long term solution appears highly challengeable, in terms of the risks 
to the households involved, costs to the government through LHA/UC, and indeed a 
political backlash from ‘generation rent’. Our analysis suggests that some could afford 
forms of ‘intermediate rent’ but many would really require some form of social rent, 
based on an objective analysis of affordability against reasonable norms.  
Security of tenure is an issue which can be related to the preceding issue. Until 
recently social rented housing was generally presumed to entail security of tenure and 
this helped to ensure that it was seen as a long-term tenure, providing valuable 
reassurance to vulnerable households (including elderly or disabled) and also to 
families or households contemplating family formation, and a basis for stable 
communities. Policy and legislative moves by government in the period 2010-15 
appeared to signal a move away from this presumption towards the treatment of social 
housing as a residual tenure of last resort which people should not regard as a long 
term option. These reforms were controversial, strongly challenged and amended 
during parliamentary processes, and appear to have been effectively withdrawn. Thus, 
in a sense, this restoration of the status quo ante provides part of the underpinning for 
a strategy involving significant investment in social rented housing.  
There are also further debates to be had about the possible role of enhanced security, 
perhaps in the context of ‘second generation rent controls’, in the private rented sector. 
We have not examined this option specifically in this study, although the SRHMM 
model has some capability of exploring this.  
Rent levels, particularly for social rented housing, are also a related issue. Social 
sector rents have been subject of frankly contradictory policies since 2010, and 
arguably a clear and stable framework would be a desirable and necessary condition 
of moving forward under a clearer view of the role of the sector. Lower rents make for 
easier affordability for a marginal group just outside the reach of HB/UC, and reduce 
the costs of HB/UC to the national government in respect of the high proportion of 
tenants who receive these benefits. Lower rents also increase the grant or other 
subsidy required to deliver new social rented housing, and with a given budget reduce 
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the amount of social rented housing which can be built. Higher rents have the opposite 
effects, but also can worsen the incentives for some households to enter work or 
increase their working hours. There will be a separate debate and detailed analysis of 
those issues, going beyond the scope of this study, but certainly affecting the scale of 
programme which can be delivered in practice given any public spending settlement. 
The financial feasibility of a much larger social rented programme also depends 
significantly on the interaction between the spatial location of the new housing needed 
and the effective use of Section 106 planning targets and obligations. Post-2010 
modifications of these arrangements have hampered what had previously been a very 
effective mechanism in England, and need to be reviewed again to ensure greater 
effectiveness (Crook et al 2016, Gurran & Bramley 2017). Our local level modelling 
framework is capable of assessing the scope for such contributions to defray costs to 
the Treasury of an enhanced social rented programme. Although this goes somewhat 
beyond the scope of the brief for this project, we have used our database to generate 
an approximate estimate of the annual subsidy cost for this programme, as developed 
in Appendix A. This suggests an annual ‘subsidy’35 cost to the government of £14.1bn. 
It allows in a reasoned and evidenced fashion for contributions from s.106 planning 
obligations worth rather more than this, at around £17bn, which is roughly four times 
the amount recorded in 2016 according to the most recent official study (Lord et al 
2018).  
The role of intermediate rental housing, alongside shared ownership, emerges as a 
significant theme from the study. We show that there is a significant contribution which 
can be made in most areas from such provision, alongside social renting. In a sense, 
this is a straightforward good news story with little downside. Such housing should be 
capable of delivery under the terms of typical s.106 affordable housing agreements 
with little or no additional public subsidy, and a wide range of providers are queuing 
up to offer such products. We would suggest that for a significant part of this sector, 
again, reasonable security of tenure should also be part of the offer.  
On the welfare system, our main thinking here is influenced by other research, 
including the Crisis Homelessness Monitor work (Fitzpatrick et al 2018) and 
Homelessness Projections work, as well as contributions to the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation ‘Solve UK Poverty’ programme (e.g. JRF 2016, Bramley et al 2016). Thus, 
certain welfare changes are essential complementary measures to secure the desired 
reductions in core homelessness and rough sleeping, particularly lifting of the LHA cap 
and review/reversal of some of the cuts in Universal Credit.  
Income distribution, particularly for younger households is a major factor, underlying 
our findings on affordability. Many factors feed into this, some reviewed in the studies 
                                                          
35Because general ‘bricks and mortar’ subsidies in UK are mainly delivered through capital grants, it seems 
appropriate to use the term subsidy, but it is equally valid to regard this spending as ‘capital investment’ as the 
government/social housing sector gain a long term asset from this spending, and the government retains a 
stake in the balance sheet of social housing providers.  
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cited above on tackling poverty and some in wider contributions such as that of 
Atkinson (2015). 
Something which arguably also emerges from this study is the need for a clearer 
regional/urban economic development strategy (what some would call a spatial plan) 
for England. A lot of the housing need and affordability problems, and the challenge 
of meeting it, relate to the geographically very skewed (London-centric) pattern of 
development in England, as drawn attention to in recent work by Beatty & Fothergill 
(2016, 2018) but also in effect acknowledged by the Government’s Industrial Strategy 
and its City Region deals. We show how a change in this could ease the ability to meet 
the challenges of housing need, affordability and homelessness, through one of the 
variant scenarios modelled in Chapter 7.  
Home-ownership remains an aspiration for many younger households, as well as 
something which both current and previous governments sought to promote. Since the 
early 2000s, we have mainly been going backwards in this respect. Our modelling 
suggests that, with even the large enhancements to supply, and given the resulting 
improvements in affordability, we would only be ‘holding the line’ in the sense of 
preventing things getting worse in terms of the share of all households, or younger 
households, in home ownership. It is very hard, according to our models, to find a 
strategy which would enable home ownership to bounce back up in a significant way. 
There are further measures which could be explored on this, but these may be 
controversial in other ways, and certainly raise issues about the relative priorities 
between this issue and tackling homelessness and the problems of the poorest in our 
society.  
Further Work Needed 
This study has achieved most of its main aims within a relatively short period, but it is 
still in some respects a work in progress. The forecasting model scenarios approach 
has been demonstrated to work well, although there are a few issues and refinements 
to be addressed, particularly in the local level implementation.  
Perhaps the most important point to make is that the forecasting outcomes approach 
is an indirect way to approach the question of how much additional housing, of different 
types and tenures, is needed, overall and by region/locality. At what point, as we 
increase the supply numbers, do we say ‘enough is enough’  -  i.e. the point at which 
gains in terms of need/affordability outcomes become negligible or negative, or other 
problems or side effects become more prominent.?   
Secondly, we have not devoted much attention to the costs of meeting these housing 
need, particularly the costs which government would need to meet. Detailed costing 
analysis is beyond the brief for this project, but we have used data compiled in this 
study to make one rough set of estimates (contained in Appendix A), and referred to 
above. This shows that a very significant part of these costs can be met through 
planning obligations for affordable housing (and infrastructure) as part of the package. 
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Thirdly, there will be ongoing debates on the appropriate spatial allocation of these 
numbers, which will interact to some extent with the subsidy cost/budget issue. We 
have presented an affordability and needs-based model for allocating total and social 
housing supply, and we have looked at some variants around the central case. 
However, more variants could be explored, given particular arguments which may be 
brought into play.   
Fourthly, we have determined a recommended division of new supply between four 
types of provision, corresponding to our affordability bands (new private market sale, 
shared ownership, intermediate rent and social rent). In the scenarios reported in this 
chapter we have so far focussed particularly on two of these, while also providing 
reasonable estimates of the requirement for shared ownership and intermediate 
rent36, and integrate this into the overall modelling of outcomes. We have not explored 
the implications of varying the assumed level of social rents. Neither have we 
addressed the potential role of forms of new build market rental, although we are 
sceptical whether this has much if anything to contribute to our brief, which focuses 
particularly on lower income households and homeless people.  
Each of the issues identified in the previous paragraphs may be seen as a form of 
optimisation problem. What is the optimal total level of supply to meet need? What is 
the optimal level when costs are taken into account? What is the optimal spatial 
distribution of supply, and how is that constrained by land use and environmental 
factors? What is the optimal tenure mix?  While the model is equipped with the 
necessary elements to take account of most of these factors, we have only in the time 
available run it for a limited range of variant assumptions. It would be necessary to run 
it repeatedly to demonstrate that the recommended solution is optimal in all respects. 
There will not, in any case, be a single optimal solution, because this will depend on 
policy judgements about (a) levels of resources to commit and (b) which of the different 
needs are priorities.  
 
 
  
                                                          
36 The model already calculates proportions of younger households able to afford these options. There is also 
provision for the model to incorporate actual provision numbers and trace their impact on backlog needs, 
which will generally be less than that associated with social renting. 
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Appendix A 
‘Subsidy’ Cost of Meeting Housing Requirements 
 
The purpose of this Appendix is to provide an illustrative indication of how the 
affordable and social housing requirements, as well as the immediate infrastructure 
requirements associated with the housing development programme suggested, could 
be met. Although these estimates build on the database developed at local authority 
level  to model housing requirements across England, they of necessity make a range 
of assumptions, some of which may be characterised as ‘broad brush’. However, some 
of the key assumptions have been informed and to some degree calibrated on the 
basis of one recent, highly relevant, officially commissioned research study (Lord et al 
2018). This study is particularly valuable for quantifying the extent to which the s106 
planning agreement/obligation system and the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) 
are being used in England to reap value from development gains, notably in the form 
of subsidies for affordable housing worth £4bn in 2016 and infrastructure associated 
with development worth £2bn in that year. It demonstrates that despite the financial 
and property market crisis of 2008-12, government responses to that and to industry 
lobbying, and the critiques of some commentators, this system has again become a 
very significant source of locally-based, flexible, hypothecated development gains 
taxation. 
The way that social and affordable housing have been developed in recent years in 
England (and across GB) has entailed a mix of funding, generally expressed in terms 
of capital sums from different sources which together make up the cost/value of a new 
housing unit37. So, a new social or intermediate affordable housing unit can be funded 
by a mixture of  
A. The capitalised net present value of future stream of rental income net of 
maintenance and management costs and major repairs provision (i.e. 
borrowing against future rental income from the new housing created) 
B. Direct capital grants from government (SHG, etc) 38 
C. A contribution from the accumulated reserves from past rental and development 
surpluses earned by the RSL/LA housing organisation, which might also include 
some prudent borrowing against future rental incomes from existing tenants 
                                                          
37 Traditionally, council housing received revenue subsidies to defray part of the loan charges on capital outlay. 
Over the period when council development effectively ceased, inflation and receipts from sales reduced the 
debt servicing burden and government levied some repayments of subsidy to offset HB costs. As council 
housing revives, it remains to be seen how exactly it will be subsidised in England, although in Scotland a 
mixture of lump sum capital grants and rental income from new and existing tenants have been used.  
38 With Housing Associations (RSLs) back in the ‘private sector’, from a legal/accounting viewpoint, this 
element is the only part of the cost which is counted as ‘public expenditure’. Although it functions as a subsidy, 
it is also a form of capital investment insofar as it helps to pay for a long lived asset, and the government 
retains a stake in that asset insofar as it forms part of the capital structure of the RSL, which may be liable to 
be repaid to the government in the event of disposal of the asset (without replacement). 
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D. The value of discounting of the land value involved in the development, both 
the value of the land on which the affordable housing would sit plus (potentially) 
some of the ‘development gain’ value on the remainder of the land (so-called 
cross-subsidy), in the case of (increasingly normal) mixed tenure 
developments, and/or financial contribution from development gains made on 
other sites, whether under the terms of s.106 planning agreements (s.75 in 
Scotland), or through arrangements for the disposal of public land. 
For the purposes of the estimates reported here, we have modelled values under 
these four headings which could be generated with the implementation of our core 
strategy of building 340,000 total housing units p.a. in England of which 90,000 would 
be social and 60,000 other intermediate affordable.  
The steps of the calculation may be summarised as follows: 
1. The cost of building a typical housing unit in 2016 was derived from a study 
undertaken for the Royal Town Planning Institute by the author working with 
Three Dragons Consultancy, who have extensive experience of developing 
‘viability toolkits’ for many local authorities. These figures are based partly on 
the BCIS information service, take account of ‘contractors profit, and vary by 
region. The values average £166k with a range from £146k (NE) to £205k (GL).  
2. An assumed level of contribution to infrastructure necessary or desirable to 
accompany typical new housing developments, averaging £20,000 per unit but 
varying pro rata construction costs across regions, is added to this. This could 
be a combination of typical CIL charges and/or typical infrastructure/social & 
environmental facilities secured via s.106.  
3. A representative sales value is derived for the typical new housing unit, using 
a combination of the ‘mix-adjusted average value’ at subregional level and the 
median actual sales value,  at LA district level, weighted more toward the latter. 
Although we considered making an adjustment for the typical new vs 
secondhand price premium, in this particular calculation we made no such 
increase. 
4. Subtracting build + infrastructure cost from this value gives a raw residual value 
or gross development profit per housing unit for the area, assuming all units 
were sold at market value. After setting the (many) negatives to zero, these 
values (per total dwelling build, 2016) range from £3,300 or 2% (North East) to 
plus £315,500 (55%) in London, with an overall average value for England of 
£91,500 or 24% of total market value.  
5. Adjusting from raw residual value to a reasonable estimate of the amount which 
might be available to subsidise new affordable housing. Here we assume that 
all residual value is available on greenfield sites but that on brownfield land 
existing or alternative use values for commercial/industrial uses, based on 
CoStar land transactions data, provide a floor, which assuming an average 
density of 30 Dwg/ha implies a reduction of between £10k (NW) and £60k (GL) 
per dwelling unit. We then assume that 50% of the remaining residual value is 
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potentially available to subsidise affordable housing. The other 50% allows for 
developers’ additional profit/risk margin and return to landowners. 
(Remembering that we have already provided for directly related infrastructure 
at step 2.). 
6. We estimate the capitalised net rent figures for social rental units assuming 
current social rents rising with CPI inflation, funding over 35 years and interest 
rates not much above current levels. These average around £55,000 (regional 
range (£36k-£84k). We estimate similar values for intermediate rent averaging 
£145k (£97-221k) and for shared ownership, where it is a combination of initial 
capital receipt and rental on the remainder, averaging £191k (£100k-£370k).  
7. We estimate the potential contribution from RSL/social landlord reserves and 
surpluses by taking the recent reported surplus in RSL Global accounts and 
dividing it by the proposed number of new social units (assuming this would be 
the priority allocation of this subsidy stream), giving an average cross-subsidy 
of £45k (£29k-69k) from this source to each new social unit across the English 
regions.   
8. We calculate a ‘subsidy gap’ based on the difference between the higher of 
cost or value minus the contributions from capitalised rent/receipts and cross 
subsidy. This averages £71k per total housing unit (with a very wide range, from 
about £2k to about £1m).  
9. If the net contribution from residual land value (Step 5) is greater than the 
subsidy gap (Step 8), we set the s.106 contribution at the level of the subsidy 
gap. If the net contribution from residual land value is less than the subsidy gap, 
we set the s.106 contribution at its maximum value derived as in Step 5. If this 
feasible net contribution is zero, we set that actual s.106 contribution at zero. 
This is the case for 105 English Local authorities, just under one-third of the 
total. 
10. We subtract the net s.106 contribution from the subsidy gap, to derive the 
requirement for government subsidy. In 42 local authorities, s.106 potential 
exceeded the subsidy gap, so there is thus apparently no need for government 
subsidy in these authorities. For positive subsidy authorities, there is wide 
variation in the amount of subsidy per total housing unit, which averages 
£37,800, or £73,400 per affordable housing unit (regional range £42k in East to 
£180k in London). Subsidy for social housing units  is somewhat higher 
(average £84k), although we have capped this at (cost-capitalized rent). 
The results of this set of calculations are that we estimate a total cost of Government 
subsidies of £14.1bn, of which £7.5bn is in respect of social rented housing39. The 
total value of s.106 contributions to AH are estimated at £17.3bn, somewhat greater 
in magnitude.  
                                                          
39 The apportionment to social housing quoted here assumes that AH providers prioritise social rented housing 
in the allocation of funds from reserves and surpluses.  
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Both of these figures seem high, relative to recent levels recorded or proposed. 
However, it should be remembered that this is in the context of a total housing 
development programme which is double in magnitude that actually being delivered in 
2016, with a strong regional focus on the south where values are far higher, and of 
course a level of new social house building which has not been seen since the early 
1970s.  
We believe our modelled values for s.106 contributions are not out of line with those 
recorded in the recent study by Lord et al (2016). For example our average contribution 
per affordable housing units across England is £78k, compared with £80k from that 
study. Our value for the East of England is £107k, compared with approx. £110k in 
that study. Our value for London, at £191k, is higher than the £142k in that study, 
however.  
London is characterised by extreme values, reflecting the extreme nature of its 
housing market, particularly in 2016. There is increasing evidence of a significant 
market correction taking place at present, although this may be more of a Brexit effect. 
Some of the calculations in London might merit further detailed examination and care. 
However, it does seem clear that residual values, relative to alternative use values, 
are very high in London (except possibly in very central locations) and could allow 
even higher contributions, if that were seen as a policy priority.  
Changes or differences in key assumptions could make quite a significant difference 
to these subsidy cost numbers. For example, imposing a maximum quota for social 
housing could reduce the public sector cost significantly, as could a more rigorous and 
assertive approach to the use of s.106 in London. Higher inflation or allowable rent 
rises would also reduce this cost significantly, although higher interest rates would 
have the opposite effect.  
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Appendix B 
Data Sources 
 
Table B.1: Data Inputs and Sources for Sub-regional (HMA) Model 
Item Definition Source 
Completions Number social and private 
per 100 households x Year 
x LAD 
DCLG  Housing Statistics Live Tables, 
T.253 
Migration 
(domestic) 
Persons per 100 residents 
‘in’ & ‘out’ x 4 age groups  x 
year x LAD, adj to HMA 
basis using 2007 matrix 
ONS Local migration estimates based 
on NHSCR data 
Household 
Headship 
Ratio of HRP/Population x 3 
age groups 
BHPS analysis 1997-2003; 2001 & 2011 
Census base rates 2001 & 2011x LAD;  
LFS trends x age x region-met/non-met. 
House Price Median and Lower quartile 
price all sales 
Land Registry data compiled by DCLG at 
LAD level 
Social housing 
stock 
LA + RSL rental dwellings x 
Year x LAD 
CLG HSSA returns; MHCLG Local 
Authority Housing Statistics data 
returns. 
Total & Private 
Stock 
Private sector dwellings x 
Year x LAD 
CLG HSSA returns ; MHCLG Table LT100 
Earnings Median full time earnings x 
LAD (residence) 
ASHE (Annual Survey of Hours & 
Earnings) 
Population Number x Age x LAD ONS Mid Year Estimates 
Net Lettings No. of lets to new tenants 
by LA’s & RSLs x LAD 
CLG HSSA returns 
Vacancies No. & % of dwellings by 
social/private x LAD 
CLG HSSA returns; LA level all Vacants 
MHCLG Table LT615.  
Household 
Income 
Gross Income of Household 
from all sources £k pa x 
LAD  
Synthetic model estimate based on 
UKHLS 2009-15; earlier years based on 
change in Regional Accounts Real 
Household Disposable Income series 
for NUTS3 regions;  
Births & Deaths Numbers x LAD ONS ‘Components of Change’ tables  
International 
Migration 
Number ‘in’ and ‘out’ x 
year x LAD 
ONS ‘Components of Change’ tables 
Mortgage 
Interest Rate 
Ave percentage x year HM Treasury ‘Pocket Databank’ 
Unemployment 
(asunem) 
Core age (30-44) claimant 
unemployment % of 
NOMIS data compiled for MigMod 
study and extended for Bramley-
Leishman panel model 
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working age, adj for 
definitional changes 
Unemployment 
(ILO) 
Unemployed and seeking 
work, % of economically 
active 
Annual Population Survey (APS) 3-year 
rolling average, and 2001/2011 
Censuses. 
Planning 
permissions flow 
New planning permissions 
granted for housing, units x 
LAD, as % of households 
Estimated from CLG PS2 returns and 
Emap-Glenigan database of major sites.  
Planning 
permissions 
stock 
Outstanding uncompleted 
permissions units x LAD, as 
% of households 
Estimated from former DOE PS3 
returns, Emap-Glenigan database, PS2 
returns and CLG completions data;  
High & low 
Social Class 
% in higher occupational 
groups 
Census 2001 + Annual Population 
Survey Occupational Groups (pooled 3 
yr ave data) 
Single person, 
lone parent & 
other  
household types 
% households single non-
elderly, lone parent, etc  
Census 2001 & 2011; LFS trends x 
broad age & region 1992-2008; DCLG 
Household projection share trends 
2008-2033 and 2014-2039 
White British,  
Black, Asian, 
Mixed/other  
% population with White-
British, Black, Asian, 
Mixed/other ethnicities 
Census 2001 & 2011; LFS trends x 
broad age & region1992-2008  
Net Density Dwellings per hectare of 
land in residential use, 
ward level 
Census 2001, GLUD (Generalised Land 
Use Database) from CLG via 
Neighbourhood Statistics 
Sparsity Hectares per person, LAD 
level 
Census 2001 & 2011 
Students % population f t students Census 2001 & 2011; LFS trends x 
broad age & region1992-2008 
IMD Low Income IMD 2004 Low Income 
Score, ward level 
IMD (Indices of Multiple Deprivation),  
Benefits data, from Neighbourhood 
Statistics 
Distance major 
centre 
Ave distance in km of 
dwellings from major retail 
service centre (>150k m2 
floorspace) 
CLG database of major retail/service 
centres 
Greenspace % of land area ‘greenspace’ GLUD 
Air Index of Air 
quality/pollution 
Derived for DTLR MigMod study  
Climate Index of warmer, drier, 
sunnier climate 
Derived for DTLR MigMod study  
Scenic Index of proximity to scenic 
areas e.g. Nat Parks, AONB 
Derived for DTLR MigMod study 
Cars density Cars per m of road length 2001 Census, GIS analysis  
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Sick/disabled Limiting long term 
illness/disability, % 
2001 Census; LFS trends x broad age & 
region1992-2008 
 
  
Table B.2: Additional data Inputs and Sources for Homeless Projection Model and Enhancement of 
SRHMM to provide local level needs estimates and targets 
Item Definition Source 
Statutory 
Homeless 
annual flow 
numbers 
Applications, Acceptances 
and Decisions; reasons for 
loss of last secure 
accommodation, etc. 
Local Authority Annual ‘P1E’ statistical 
returns  
Temporary 
Accommodation 
Homeless households in TA 
in total and in particular 
‘unsuitable’ types (B&B, 
nightly non-selfcontained, 
out of area) 
LA returns of numbers at 31 March 
each year. 
Rough Sleepers Spot count/estimate data 
for autumn each year; 
Alternative estimates for 
rough sleeping and ‘quasi 
rough sleeping’. 
MHCLG .Rough Sleeping in England 
2010-18. Alternative estimates  based 
on Multiple Exclusion Homeless Survey 
2010, Supporting People client record 
data 2010; PSE-UK survey 2012 and SHS 
2012-15 retrospective homeless 
questions and logistic regression 
models fitted to these; also Destitution 
in the UK 2017 survey.  
Hostel Residents Occupied hostel places. Homeless Link ‘SNAP’ /SSHP survey 
annual; 2011 Census data on 
communal establishments 
Sofa surfers Concealed singles or 
households wanting to 
move, not non-dependent 
children or students, 
overcrowded 
EHS and UKHLS survey estimates; PSE 
and SHS retrospective survey 
questions; predicted rates based on 
logistic regression models fitted to 
these surveys  
 
 
